Thought Manipulation: The Use and Abuse of Psychological Trickery (5 page)

10. Goodin,
Manipulatory Politics
, 17.

11. Ibid., 19.

12. See, for example, Watzlawick, P., J. H. Weakland, and R. Fisch (1974), Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company).

13. Compare to Maoz, Z. (1990), “Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings,” World Politics 43: 77. “Political manipulation is an attempt by one or more individuals to structure a group choice situation in a manner that maximizes the chances of a favorable outcome or minimizes the chances of an unfavorable one.” It is worth mentioning that Maoz’s definition is more specific and related to decision-making processes in political discussion groups.

14. For example, Maoz (“Framing the National Interest,” 1990, 93) claims that certain political crises require a quick reaction. Policy makers assume there is not much time to develop a critical discussion. In order to speed up the decision-making process and to reach a desirable outcome, they present the data to the leading group in a manipulative manner.

15. Ironically, the correlation between the development of knowledge and the ability to examine reality from different perspectives appears in many fields. For example, the well-known psychologist Jean Piaget associated the development of intelligence with the growing capability to examine the world from different angles of vision. Or, in the history of science it is quite common to view developments in modern physics as byproducts of examining old problems from additional perspectives (for example, Newtonian physics versus Einsteinian physics). For a further discussion, see Holmes, R. (1976), Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable (London: Routledge).

16. Compare to Goodin (1980),
Manipulatory Politics
, 9: “...manipulation is something which actually happens invisibly.” Compare also to Goldhamer, H., and E. A. Shils. (1939), “Types of Power and Status,” American Journal of Sociology 45 (2): 17: “...in the case of manipulation there is no recognition by the subordinated individual that an act of power has been effected.”

17. Compare to Goodin,
Manipulatory Politics
, 11: “By the time we start talking about manipulation at all, the act has been already exposed. But when we do speak of manipulation, either in the past tense (‘I was manipulated’) or in the second third person (‘You/they are being manipulated’), the implication is always that the manipulation was unbeknownst to its object at the time of the act. When we tell someone, ‘You are being manipulated,’ we think we really are telling him something he does not already know.”

18. Fromm, E. (1994), Escape from Freedom (New York: H. Holt), 128. I will analyze and challenge Fromm’s ideas in the chapter that deals with modern advertising.

19. Erickson, M., and E. Rossi (1980), “The Confusion Technique in Hypnosis” in Rossi (Ed.). The Collected Papers of Milton H. Erickson on Hypnosis: Vol. 1. The Nature of Hypnosis and Suggestion (New York: Irvington), 259–260.

20. Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch, Change, 101.

21. Maoz, “Framing the National Interest,” 88.

22. Trachtenberg, J. A. (1987), “Beyond the Hidden Persuaders,” Forbes (March 23) Vol. 139 (6): 134.

23. Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch, Change, xi.

24. Compare to Phillips,
Ethics and Manipulation in Advertising
, 18: Associative advertising “foils the rational evaluation of a product by creating the illusion that it will satisfy conscious and unconscious desires that it may not, in fact, satisfy.” The possibility to satisfy a strong desire (or to fulfill a powerful wish) is an important element in a motivating interaction. It can help us to better distinguish between manipulation and deception. I will get back to this issue in the relevant chapter.

25. In this context, Rudinow (“Manipulation,” 345) distinguishes between simple and complex motivations. I found it more useful and illuminating to distinguish between two types of misleading.

26. Dworkin, G. (1997),
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
(New York: Cambridge University Press), 14.

27. Kelman, H. C. (2001), “Ethical Limits on the Use of Influence in Hierarchical Relationships” in
Social Influences on Ethical Behavior in Organizations
. Edited by J. M. Darley, D. Messick, and T. R. Tyler, (Mahwah, NJ and London: Lawrence Erlbaum).

28. For a further discussion on “manipulation in the financial market,” see Fischel, D. R., and D. Ross J. (1991), “Should the Law Prohibit Manipulation in Financial Markets,” Harvard Law Review 105: 510–511.

29. For a further discussion, see Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. (1981), “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211: 453–458; Riker, W. H. (1986),
The Art of Political Manipulation
(New Haven: Yale University Press); Maoz, “Framing the National Interest,” 77–110; Rubinstein, A. (1998),
Modeling Bounded Rationality
(Cambridge, MA: The M I T Press), 19.

CHAPTER 2

The Topography of Manipulation

BETWEEN DIFFERENT MOTIVATING ACTIONS

Manipulation is not exactly coercion, not precisely persuasion, and not merely deception. Nevertheless, in order for any motivating action to be effective it must, at least to some extent, be persuasive, compelling, or both. A basic understanding of manipulation is that it involves a combination of persuasion and coercion made possible by trickery. In other words, manipulation dissected looks like a weird mixture of persuasion, coercion, and deception. Therefore, trying to distinguish between the different motivating actions might help us understand the very essence of manipulation and give us a better vision of its territory. In light of this, it seems that the project at hand should include the formulation of criteria that indicate where coercion, persuasion, and deception end and manipulation begins. But is it possible to formulate such criteria for a clear distinction between the different motivating actions?

Crudely and basically, it seems that every social interaction is a dynamic process combining different elements and characteristics, including coercion, persuasion, and deception. Therefore, even apparently well-defined motivating actions, such as coercion, persuasion, and deception, practically speaking, more closely resemble theoretical concepts that hardly exist in reality. For example, even the more desperate situations of coercion, such as pointing a gun at somebody, leave the target certain options (to obey or die). Therefore, a kind of mutual communication, exceeding physical coercion alone, is likely to evolve. The same concept may be applied to persuasion and deception. On one hand, it seems impossible to be completely honest when trying to persuade someone to act. On the other hand, even the biggest scam must contain certain elements consistent with honesty and truth (at least for credible consideration).

It seems that “pure” motivating actions are more like theoretical concepts, or “ideal types” in Max Weber’s terminology, that hardly exist in reality. Almost any practical version of coercion, persuasion, and deception contains manipulative elements. Therefore, the inevitable question that arises again is this: How is it possible to formulate criteria to indicate where coercion, persuasion, and deception end and manipulation begins?

At first glance, it seems that setting the scope of manipulative situations is a difficult and confusing task. Therefore, the progression should be gradual. The first very basic step will focus on the potential demarcations between coercion, manipulation, and persuasion. The second step, which might be the hardest one, will begin to include the deceptive dimension in our discussion. Hopefully, this will complete the picture and provide a clearer vision of the scope of the manipulation phenomenon.

COERCION, PERSUASION, AND MANIPULATION

Manipulation seems to be a weird composite of various motivating actions. This elusive phenomenon is clearly designed to create some of the effects that appear in coercive and persuasive interactions. This observation indicates that it will be unrealistic—and even impossible—to draw exact boundaries between the territories of these three motivating actions.

Klaidman and Beauchamp, who seem to be fully aware of the indefinable feature of manipulation, state that “...it is difficult to specify where persuasion ends and manipulation begins. Ordinary usage, philosophy, and the social sciences provide no exact boundaries.” They suggest drawing a sequence that includes the three motivating actions. Their continuum is based upon the “level of controlling” that the motivator holds at the time of the interaction. According to their description, manipulation, which is a broad concept, moves between two extremes: coercion—a situation of complete controlling—on the one end, and persuasion—the lack of controlling—on the other end: “Coercion—which involves a threat of harm so severe that a person is unable to resist acting to avoid it—is always completely controlling. Persuasion is never controlling. Manipulation, by contrast, can run from highly controlling to altogether no controlling.”

The idea of building a sequence between motivating actions seems to be more appropriate than categorical division; therefore, I will adopt it. From any more realistic point of view, however, using the term ‘level of controlling’ might result in some confusion. In this book, I refer to coercion as a motivating action that physically limits the target’s options, while persuasion intervenes in current decision-making to move the target toward a more desired existing option without physically limiting any of those currently existing options. In other words, coercion is primarily related to the physical dimension while persuasion pertains to cognition and affect (the mental sphere). Therefore, any description made from the point of view of the motivator has to distinguish between the notions of ‘control’ and ’influence.’ Accordingly, Klaidman and Beauchamp’s presentation, which uses levels of controlling as a criterion to distinguish between the different motivating actions, risks ending in confusion.

In order to bypass that hurdle and emphasize more clearly the characteristics of manipulation, I will suggest a similar description from the point of view of the target. From the perspective of the target, it seems that if persuasion is a situation in which freedom of choice exists, manipulation might result from illusionary freedom of choice and coercion from the absence or limitation of freedom of choice. The last description seems to illuminate some of the mystery surrounding manipulative behavior. It might even be helpful in bypassing the technical problems of control versus influence. But does this description sufficiently distinguish between the different motivating actions?

The characteristic of illusionary free choice sounds like an elegant and sophisticated compromise taken from an unclear academic discussion. From any more realistic point of view, however, illusionary free choice is a vague term that might begin to concretize the illusiveness of the manipulation phenomenon but certainly demands careful examination. Are there “real” situations of illusionary free choice inherent to manipulative interactions? Is the target deeply convinced of his freedom of choice and actually compelled to act?

COERCION, PERSUASION, DECEPTION, AND MANIPULATION

There is a major difficulty in trying to characterize manipulative situations through analyzing the balance of power between the key actors at the time of the interaction. In general, we do not have access to another person’s mind. We are not able to quantify variables like the level of free choice, the extent of independent thinking, and the “real” impact of external influences (especially in elusive situations like manipulative interactions). Hence, another shift in perspective is called for in order to gain a clearer understanding of the scope of manipulative behavior.

Once again, like Klaidman and Beauchamp, I will focus on the motivator but, unlike Klaidman and Beauchamp, I will examine the motivator prior to the interaction. I will present the considerations of a rational, efficient motivator who chooses his strategy under ideal circumstances. This shift helps me avoid major obstacles that could not easily be bypassed, such as measuring the balance of power between the key actors at the time of the interaction.

To attain the desired result, a rational motivator, in ideal circumstances, must evaluate the level of control and the extent of influence he has over the target. He, the motivator, chooses his strategy according to this evaluation and estimation. This analysis (choosing the most efficient motivating action) refers to the physical dimension (control) and to the mental sphere (influence) simultaneously, without causing too much confusion. However, this description is not complete yet, since it leaves out one important characteristic inherent to manipulative behavior: trickery.

Morally speaking, manipulation is an elusive phenomenon that operates in gray areas. Manipulation is not an honest motivating action (at least in the sense of transparency), and yet it is also not completely deceptive. Nevertheless, it is common to describe manipulation as a mode of deception—a description that emphasizes certain similarities between deception and manipulation but makes it almost impossible to distinguish between the two different motivating actions. Therefore, I suggest employing different terminology. Instead of using the term ‘deceiving,’ which is quite a strict term, I propose applying the notion misleading,’ which seems to be more flexible.

This slight change allows for the ranking of motivating actions according to the level of misleading that a rational motivator employs in his actions. Coercion and persuasion are motivating actions that hardly contain misleading elements, while deception involves almost complete intentional misleading. Manipulation, which is a broad concept, can contain different levels of misleading and, therefore, is located between the extremes.

A rational, efficient motivator, disconnected from external considerations, will motivate by coercion when he feels that he has full control, by persuasion when he recognizes that he has maximum influence, and by deception when he estimates that he has neither control nor influence. As soon as the motivator estimates that his level of control and extent of influence decrease he will start to manipulate; he will increase the degree to which he misleads.