Tom Barry (41 page)

By February 1923 Barry realised that ‘the war of brothers' was only bleeding the Irish people; the British were no longer in the war; an observation period was necessary; the iron hand of the Free State government needed some melting; that perhaps by some form of negotiations Republicanism might again be cemented, thus affording the opportunity of bringing about a united Ireland.

Meanwhile Fr Tom Duggan who had been a British army chaplain with Republican sympathies was anxious to heal divisions caused by the Civil War. He met Liam Lynch but found him totally unco-operative and un-compromising. He then got in touch with Tom Barry and found him much more understanding and flexible. Despite the fact that Lynch wrote to Fr Duggan demanding that he discontinue with peace feelers, Duggan felt that Barry was one man who could differentiate between an ideal situation and a real one. Barry went to endless trouble endeavouring to effectuate an executive meeting.

A meeting of the First Southern Division, to which Lynch was invited but didn't attend, was held in Cronin's of Gougane Barra, West Cork. Barry suggested, and it was again agreed, to send Lynch a further request to attend a meeting of the executive because he was the only member who was strongly opposed to negotiations. Todd Andrews believed that Lynch's reasoning was that De Valera could easily be manipulated into ‘a compromise peace' situation, and this was one of the reasons Lynch ‘opposed the holding of a meeting of the executive.'
[1]

Some weeks later when Barry heard of the ‘Free State atrocities' in Ballyseedy, Co. Kerry, he was shocked. Nine prisoners were taken from jail, tied to a mine and blown to pieces, one, Stephen Fuller miraculously escaped by being hurled onto a tree. Five prisoners in Killarney were similarly treated. Four were killed. At Caherciveen a few days later five more met a similar fate. The incidents were sparked when Republicans who had placed a mine, off the main road near Knocknagoshal, killed four of the Free State forces and badly injured another. The turn events were taking saddened him very much. Was this what he had fought so hard for – Irishmen murdering Irishmen? Things seemed to have lost proportion; it just could not go on.
[2]

At this time, Flor O'Donoghue with Fr Duggan and other neutral men were endeavouring to have a truce called. On 13 February, before Barry's request letter reached Lynch, Lynch had already left Dublin for his journey south. By mid-February he arrived in the Ballingeary district where he met Todd Andrews. On 25 February, Flor O'Donoghue and a few (neutral) men went to meet Tom Barry and ‘put the Truce idea to him and he approved'; it was worthy of consideration, though he had conditions, such as that ‘all men join an association.'
[3]

Then on 26 February 18 officers attended the first Southern Division council meeting in Ballingeary which lasted three days. Seán O'Hegarty arrived in disguise; he asked Mick Murphy what he thought. Through ‘the dark and dismal' passages there was ‘the inevitable beam of humour. Mick looked him over, ‘saw the scraggy beard, the battered, weather-worn hat, the old coat and the hob-nailed boots. He stepped back from Seán and said, “you look like the fellow in the thirteenth Station of the Cross handing up the nails”.'
[4]

At the council meeting, Barry was among those who again put forward a demand on Lynch to call an executive meeting saying that Lynch ‘alone was responsible for not calling it'. Lynch's argument was that they had no power to make peace or war because the imprisoned members would have to be released to produce a comprehensive decision.
[5]

Lynch listened to the men who had the pulse of the situation, and got a more realistic view of the position than he could have visualised from headquarters in Dublin. ‘The majority, while believing that military victory was no longer a possibility expressed a willingness to continue the struggle.'
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Barry emphasised strongly that in the entire country their strength did not exceed 8,000. As Lynch heard the outspoken opinion of Barry and his comrades he became more convinced that they were in a crisis situation. But he was determined that the fight should go on.
[7]

Eventually Barry, using persuasive language with aggressive power, commanded that a meeting of the executive should be held – just as he would command that an ambush be carried out. He failed to understand why Lynch was so single-minded in his attitude and why Lynch failed to respond to requests from De Valera to see him.

Barry said that if he believed that by continuing the struggle, success would be achieved, he wouldn't hesitate for one moment. However, the strength of their forces was reduced, their armament supplies were diminishing and the general conditions as regards prisoners and the lack of people-support, all pointed to the fact that the continuation of hostilities was futile.

Each of the 18 officers present expressed his opinion, and as Lynch listened to their outspoken views, he realised that a crisis had come and that a meeting of the executive could no longer be deferred. Finally, with full agreement from the group, a decision to call an executive meeting was taken. Throughout this period a number of churchmen and other dignitaries had made approaches to Barry to use his influence and persuasive powers to bring an end to hostilities; they were also in touch with Cosgrave and Mulcahy. Florrie O'Donoghue of the neutral executive (intermediaries negotiating peace) also found De Valera difficult. ‘No truce for him. Wish he were doing some of the fighting,' he wrote.
[8]

While arrangements were being made for the executive meeting a proposal for the cessation of hostilities was addressed by the archbishop of Cashel, Dr Harty. A number of priests and laymen came to Barry with ‘a request that it should be circulated to IRA leaders … in the interests of the future of Ireland'.
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Tom in a letter to the bishop and also to the press agreed to the ‘request' as he felt it was his ‘bounden duty' not to influence but to pass on the request. However, the army executive ‘unanimously rejected' the proposals.
[10]

Lynch finally sent De Valera an invitation to attend an executive meeting in the Monavullagh Mountains in Co. Waterford. Sporting a beard he travelled with Frank Aiken and Austin Stack in a large car, posing as an American.

Meanwhile, Tom Barry, Tom Crofts and some other officers joined Todd Andrews and Liam Lynch as they headed for the executive meeting. Andrews and Lynch were in bed one night when they were awakened abruptly as the door of their bedroom was kicked open. ‘A figure appeared with a lighted candle in one hand and in the other a sheet of paper. I was terrified by this sudden and violent intrusion,' Todd Andrew wrote. ‘My first reaction was that the end had come at last, that we were at the mercy of the Staters. Liam recognised, more quickly than I, that the visitor was Tom Barry. He waved the piece of paper about shouting angrily “Lynch! Did you write this?” The paper in Barry's hand was Liam's order to withdraw from peace feelers. Liam merely replied, “Yes”.

‘A tirade of abuse followed from Barry, mainly directed at asserting the superiority of his fighting record. Barry's peroration was dramatic: “I fought more in a week than you did in your life.” Liam said nothing. Having emptied himself of indignation, Barry withdrew slamming the door ... Barry's dramatic entrance holding the candle-stick with the lighted candle struck me as having something of the character of an Abbey Theatre farce.'
[11]

Tom Barry, Crofts, Lynch, Andrews and other officers reached Carriganimma near Macroom for the first part of their journey to the executive meeting. A lorry had been provided to take them towards Araglin outside Fermoy. Todd Andrews says that everybody was in a good humour and there was ‘sly nudging' when Tom Barry automatically took command.

‘We drove into the night and it was easy to see why Barry was probably the best field commander in the IRA. Before approaching any crossroads he dismounted, covering the passage of the lorry with the bodyguard. The operation he was commanding wasn't complicated, but his air of confident authority impressed me. One felt safe with Barry in charge.'
[12]

Around midnight they arrived outside Kilworth where they previously decided to abandon the lorry and continue on foot towards Araglin. Feeling thirsty, they decided to call to a pub. Before they knocked up the proprietor, Barry placed a guard around the premises.

They had one drink each and moved off in three pony-traps provided by the local company to pre-arranged billets organised by these North Corkmen. ‘The boys' had some days previously commandeered a lorry-load of bacon from Sir John Keane's factory at Cappoquin. They distributed it among the people of the area, so Barry, Lynch, Andrews and all the others had a wholesome meal in the morning before trudging 20 miles over the Knockmealdowns to Ballinamult, Co. Waterford. ‘It was a welcome addition to their monotonous diet which consisted almost entirely of bread, butter, eggs and tea'.
[13]

The available members of the executive assembled on 23 March 1923 at James Cullinane's, Bliantas, Co. Waterford.
[14]
Anxious to stop the war, De Valera stated that Irish sovereignty and the abolition of the oath were pre-requisite. Tom Barry proposed that the executive recognise that continued resistance would not further the cause of independence. This meeting, with deep discussion, took three days. Three significant aspects of the situation were considered. First, the heavy losses by death or capture of officers and men; second, the policy of executions which had been suspended by the Free State authorities in February, but resumed again in March; and third, the lack of weapons which might enable attacks on posts to be made successfully.

At this time the total strength of the Republican army was about 8,000. Jails and internment camps held an estimated 13,000 prisoners. Against the 8,000 still in the field the Free State government could muster 38,000 combat troops. There was no effective answer to the executions' policy, short of retaliation, equally lawless and cruel, and Lynch had forbidden any such action. At the time Michael Cremin was negotiating the purchase of mountain artillery on the continent, but there was no indication that he would be successful.
[15]

On 25 March the members had to move into the Nire valley because of reports of raiding forces in the area. Here the session continued at John Wall's, Glenanore, until 26 March. A motion which had clauses to be put before the next executive meeting, with terms for the Republican government to enter into negotiations, resulted in five for and five against. Lynch did not vote. Then Tom Barry proposed: ‘That in the opinion of the executive further armed resistance and operation against F. S. government will not further the cause of independence of the country.'

De Valera spoke in favour of the motion, but was not allowed to vote. The motion, which Lynch voted against, was defeated by one vote. It proved impossible to reconcile the divergent views held by the executive members. Lynch still believed in possible victory. Finally, a decision was taken to adjourn the meeting and re-assemble three weeks later on 10 April.
[16]

Barry, Crofts and McSwiney returned to the Ballyvourney area. A few days later Fr Duggan approached Barry saying he hoped that some form of c ompromise could be achieved.

The reconvened executive meeting was to be held near Goatenbridge at the foot of the Knockmealdown mountains. Before dawn on Tuesday 10 April, the scouts at Croagh schoolhouse reported a party of Free State troops moving in two files along the grass margins at each side of the road.

Barry, Liam Lynch and all the men were alerted. They assembled around 5 a.m. at Bill Houlihans, the house nearest the mountains and were having cups of tea and chatting while they awaited further reports. A scout rushed in about 8 a.m. saying that another column of Free State troops was approaching over the mountains to their left. Their line of escape was being threatened. They were about to be encircled. Lynch ‘turned to Barry, “You take charge Tom”, which he did and succeeded in getting the members of the government and those of the executive council away in safety.' Leaving the house they dashed up a glen towards the mountains. Soon some Free State troops appeared over a rise, and the first shots were exchanged. Barry and all the officers carried only revolvers or automatics . None had rifles, so their fire was quite ineffective at the range. The party continued up the mountain, over a hundred yards. Again they came into the view of approximately 50 Free State troops. Heavy fire opened up.

Liam Lynch, chief-of-staff and Seán Hyde were in the rear. There was another lull, ‘then one single shot rang out. Liam fell'. He died later that night in Clonmel Hospital.
[17]

Four of the eleven officers were captured while trying to make their getaway. Barry, with his creative imagination, foiled capture by pretending he was a farmer driving home his cows for milking as Free State troops combed the fields close by. Eventually he got to a dug-out in
s
outh Tipperary where he remained for a few days.

Owing to Liam Lynch's death, the executive, with Frank Aiken succeeding as chief-of-staff, did not meet until 20 April 1923. Aiken, Barry and Liam Pilkington were appointed as an army council. At this meeting the executive decided to call on De Valera, as head of the Republican government and the army council, to make peace under certain terms, with the Free State authorities. Barry had quite a controversial exchange with Frank Aiken. Aiken accused Barry ‘of running around making peace,' while Barry accused Aiken ‘of dodging the fighting' and conveying ‘utterances' to ‘executive meetings' that he (Barry) would be ‘responsible for a Republican defeat'.
[18]

With his army council comrades Barry attended a meeting on 26 and 27 April. De Valera presided. The main discussion centred round a cease-fire. Finally, a decision was taken that they would issue a proclamation announcing their readiness to negotiate an immediate cease-fire. Coupled with this was the order issued by Frank Aiken under the ‘Special Army Order' for suspension of all operations from 30 April.
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