Tom Barry (42 page)

Shortly after the implementation of the cease-fire derogatory rumours circulated regarding Barry's part in ‘peace feelers'. Tom wrote to Mary MacSwiney on 9 May saying he was annoyed regarding the rumours that he was personally negotiating with ‘the Free State people. I have not troubled to refute those falsehoods to any except a few who matter and I number you amongst those.' He wanted to meet her to discuss the position.

Personally my position is that I have given as my view that we cannot beat the Free State people. If we can force them to accept a negotiated peace on the basis of 1,2,3 of the published proclamation (see Appendix IV) we have saved the Independence of the country, established what we have been fighting for – Independence as a right – and preserved its continuity. We remain in the position of custodians of those agreed principles even though a Republican government be not in power and we shall be bound always to ensure that those principles are being acted on by any means in our power. Our moral right to do so is contained in those principles and they are agreed to by our present enemy. I should say that if we have to resort within a few days or years our position will from every point of view be much better.

He would only agree to ‘a negotiated peace' on the sovereign rights of the nation being derived from the people of Ireland. ‘I at any rate will not agree to any other basis.'

When beaten to the ropes – and we are not beaten that bad yet – and then when I could fight no longer, say, you have beaten me in arms but you will never make me accept that “Treaty” on your conditions. I will never agree to a living lie. I would still say to them that they killed, tortured and destroyed our people, to uphold foreign domination and that the only thing that prevents my destroying that rotten immoral government is that I have not strength enough left to do so.

If those negotiations are turned down by the Free State I favour going ahead with the war. That briefly is my position and I will ask you to believe that whilst the struggle for the Republic is going on that I will not be one of those who will drop out, although perhaps I have felt tired and depressed at such times as LD's [Liam Deasy's] action and prisoners, documents, etc.
[20]

Barry was correct in his observation of ‘the disturbing rumours' because Florrie O'Donoghue in his diary believed that ‘the Barry business ended any chance of success by our arm', by being in touch with ‘both sides'. (In later life Barry and O'Donoghue became close friends. The diary was written at the time when emotions ran high.)
[21]

The ‘peace feeler' rumours angered Barry because he said he only acted ‘as courier' to circulate to army executive members ‘the Archbishop Harty Proposals' given to him by Fr Duggan.
[22]

It does appear that Barry was incorrectly blamed for informing the Free State government that the army executive was contemplating ‘A General Laying Down of Arms' and wanted a peace settlement. Since 16 April they were aware of the position, because a notebook found on the captured Austin Stack contained ‘a draft of a memorandum, prepared for signature by all available members, which called' on De Valera ‘for a general laying down of arms'. Stack's hand written memorandum mentioned ‘the gravity of the situation of the army of the Republic'; the futility ‘of further military efforts' necessitated ‘an immediate cessation of hostilities'. It concludes with the Volunteers' requirement to hand in their arms ‘pending the election of a government, the free choice of the people.'
[23]

Barry said, ‘any Civil War is bad. Like within a family – daggers drawn! I believe the Civil War would have been over in three days [initially] if the IRA had acted properly.' The Republicans ‘could have won it in Dublin' he hadn't the slightest doubt ‘anytime up to June – especially around March, when we were at conventions and discussions, appointing executive and issuing statements. We had about 30,000 men, and we had arms. If 10,000 were put into Dublin, we could take over … banks, the railway station, Beggars Bush and the rest … I have no doubt in the world but the British would come in, and we'd be forced back into hostilities,' resulting in a lasting final outcome. Those were his views, he said, ‘as a military man'.
[24]

Now in May, with Senators Jameson and Douglas acting as intermediaries between the Free State government and the army council the negotiations went through stormy passages. The oath was the kernel of the problem. Finally the decision by the army council (Barry, Aiken, Pilkington) to ‘dump arms' and ‘cease-fire' which had been given, came into effect on 24 May 1923.
[25]
An intelligence report with the names of prominent leaders, states ‘T Barry is presently supposed to be in Liverpool'.
[26]
This information was incorrect.

The ceasefire solved none of the problems brought about by the Treaty. It only induced a stronger hand by the pro-Treaty party and created more bitterness. Not alone were prisoners not released, but Republican combatants continued to be rounded up to add to the 15,000 by this time already interned. Fearing that they might return to their hidden arsenals, the leaders of the Free State knew what was already occupying prisoners' minds, and how easy their companions outside could be induced to renew the struggle, so they resorted to a firm stance.

A Public Safety Act passed by the Dáil in June allowed anti-Treatyites to be arrested without trial. As this was a body blow to Republicans, there were those who tried to save ‘the fighting men'. Tom Barry sent an appeal ‘as a matter of extreme urgency' to the IRB Supreme Council ‘to intervene' and use ‘its influence to stop the now unnecessary and therefore vindictive pursuit' of IRA members countrywide ‘by the Free State troops'. The members ‘had dumped their arms for the most part', he wrote. ‘Irrespective' of allegiance to ‘one side or the other' he wanted men saved ‘for future work for the Republic'. A few weeks later he sent a document signed by Tom Crofts, Thomas O'Sullivan and himself to Frank Aiken C/S (20 June) stating that they, as executive members, would have to ‘appeal directly to men if something was not done immediately to secure immunity from arrest.' This ‘document' Aiken maintained, was ‘a threat' and an ‘accusation' of ‘government [Republican] and army neglect of duty'. Consequently, he issued an order (No. 20, 24 June) ‘pointing out that any man who attempted to usurp the powers of the proper authorities of the army would be severely dealt with.'
[27]

This order was read and discussed at a ‘government and army council' meeting on 30 June. Barry said ‘he had no intention of accusing government and army council of neglect of duty, and read a letter, which he was sending to army officers who had seen a copy of his letter to C/S'. In the letter he explained that though he often disagreed with ‘the government and army council' policy he believed that they ‘had always done their best for the country and the army.' Discussion also centred on a memo Barry had sent to the president of the Republican government (De Valera) on the destruction of arms. All, ‘with the exception' of Barry were ‘strongly against destruction of arms'. Barry believed that this gesture could help ease the plight of prisoners awaiting execution as the execution of prisoners went against all his beliefs of the code of war.
[28]
Barry had made ‘The Leinster House Proposals' – an army council confidential document.

During the June exchange, when Barry ‘realised that militarily' they were sending a signal of defeat, he asserted that a way could found to turn it into ‘victory'. Being against the Treaty from its initiation, he proposed ‘that a picked force of Volunteers should rush and capture Leinster House and all its occupants' thus putting ‘an end to the Free State government'. De Valera and Aiken questioned him ‘as to the feasibility' of the operation. In Barry's ‘considered opinion' it was ‘quite feasible'. He ‘offered to take personal charge of the attacking party'. If agreed, it would bring ‘a successful conclusion' to the war ‘from a Republican point of view.'
[29]
To ‘occupy Dublin for an honourable exit for our defeated force … would not have altered the result, but would have redeemed our defeat and thus hastened the Republican resurgence,' Barry wrote. As Barry generally thought actions through, it is unlikely that this was an impulsive decision. Aiken C/S opposed these ‘Leinster House Proposals'.
[30]
Barry wrote later:

At this time [April – July 1923] military resistance to a vastly greater Free State army had spent itself. We were faced with the fact that there were 20,000 Republicans in jails, whilst only a few hundred men were left in arms throughout the country. Added to this seventy-eight of our soldiers had already been executed and further batches were awaiting their legal murder, having already been notified. This slaughter would have continued whilst the Free State government had the slightest pretence of armed resistance to justify it. To implement the Cease Fire and Dump Arms orders Mr De Valera proposed the setting up of a government and army council. This was agreed to … The duty of the council was to stop the war in the most advantageous way possible for the Republican Movement; to save the lives of our men awaiting execution; to preserve Republican morale and to control and co-ordinate all efforts by Republican and military bodies towards a Republican resurgence.
[31]

Barry's document of ‘immunity from arrest' came to a head at an army executive meeting, held on 11 and 12 July 1923 when Aiken ‘pointed out that those officers [including Barry] had threatened to take action' without army approval. Unusual for Barry, he was late for the meeting. Apparently, he wanted the discussion to proceed before his arrival. However, the meeting ‘decided to defer further discussion in order to ascertain if Comdt Gen. Barry would attend.' During a lengthy discussion Aiken put it to Barry that unless he obeyed Order No. 20 he would have to ask him to resign. Barry said he would resign from the army executive council and tendered his resignation in writing. Obviously he had anticipated this, as he had his letter prepared:

1. Accept my resignation from the army executive council, army council and as an officer of the I.R.A.

2. Lest my resignation may be interpreted (sic) as a result of my wanting to compromise, I wish to make it clear in this as in former communications, that any policy I suggested was suggested only if the majority of the executive decided that such policy did not (a) compromise any National Principle. (b) Deny the right of any future party to prevent by force of arms if necessary the functioning of any government not based on the complete independence of Ireland.

3. I also wish to state that the rumours propagated in some cases by Republicans as to my negotiating for peace with the Free State, are absolutely false. Lies, suspicion and distrust are broadcasted, and I have no option but to remove myself from a position wherein I can be suspected of compromising the position. I have never entered into negotiations for peace by compromise with the Free State.

4. I cannot withdraw my responsibility in sending you the signed communication with the three Div. O/C's. I believed then and now, that we are bound to arrange for the safety of our men by every means in our powers, once a/b of Par. 2 are not infringed on. I admit a technical breach of discipline, but I do not withdraw my act.

5. When arms are taken up again in a fight for the complete independence of Ireland, I will again be available for service. Should it be decided at any future date that the executive should have to bear any responsibility for any acts of our army committed in the war, I should like to be included.
[32]

Chief-of-staff, Aiken asked him to reconsider his decision and ‘withdraw his resignation'. But Barry was not for turning. So the meeting ‘unanimously agreed to accept it'.
[33]
Before the meeting closed Comdt P. O'Brien was elected to fill the vacancy due to Tom Barry's resignation.
[34]

A decision to hold a general election on 27 August made the Republican position difficult, as they hadn't accepted the terms of the Free State.
[35]

De Valera and his party contested the election under the banner of Sinn Féin. But, while in Ennis on 15 August addressing his constituents, shots rang out, one got him in the leg, another, aimed at him, hit and wounded Cumann na mBan member Peg Barrett, who had jumped on the platform to shield him when gunfire erupted. He was arrested and spent eleven months in prison.
[36]

Winning 63 of the 153 seats, Cosgrave (Free State) was returned to power. But it was a shock to his party to discover that he had only a majority because De Valera's party of 44 were either in prison or refused to take the oath.

The government was faced with a problem when prisoners in Tintown, Dundalk internment camp had gone on hunger-strike. Many of Barry's former Volunteer comrades had already fasted 40 days – including Jim Kearney and Timmy Sullivan. (Both were participants in the Beál na mBláth ambush during the Civil War when Michael Collins was fatally shot – they were among the last prisoners to be released in 1924.) The situation was serious. Republican chief-of-staff, Aiken reported to his executive: ‘After the elections the enemy offensive to treat our prisoners as individuals and as criminals began. The Mountjoy prisoners suffered the worst as they were subjected to very brutal treatment.' Aiken ordered that all Volunteers should do their best ‘to arouse indignation among the people' and ‘demand their release'. Kilmainham prisoners like the others who were interned continued their hunger-strike for over 30 days.
[37]

The prisoners had asked the army executive for permission to hunger-strike. But during discussion at 11 and 12 July meeting, it was unanimously decided that hunger-striking was a matter for individuals.
[38]

In October, Barry who had previously resigned from IRA/GHQ army council and executive, but still remained an IRA member, wrote to Frank Aiken CS. ‘I feel it is my duty to offer my help in any way I can … Men's lives are again in danger and whatever past opinions may be as to tactics and policy, I believe it is the duty of every volunteer to co-operate and help in every way he possibly can. The fight in the jails looks as if it will be the most important yet fought and surely if the men inside are to fight until the end, we outside should also be in it.' He offered his assistance in ‘some way other than being simply “on the run”.'
[39]