To stop Forster and at the same time control the “cleansing” of the country, Himmler appointed an SS officer to head local self-defense units. One of them was the SS Oberführer Ludolf von Alvensleben. In the West Prussian county of Bromberg he arbitrarily decided about the life or death of the Poles. He felt justified because in this region in particular German nationals had been harassed and murdered in various heinous ways. As Himmler and Wolff went to inspect the region, Alvensleben was able to provide an attraction: he executed about twenty prisoners handed over by his drumhead court-martial supposedly as murderers who had been sentenced to death. Wolff was convinced as a spectator that the punishment was deserved in every case. He coldly watched the executions without scruples and without pity. On the other hand, the behavior of SS Oberführer von Alvensleben outraged him when he took a pistol and gave the “coup de grace” to many victims who had not been properly shot. Wolff said he rejected “an action contrary to the old principles of Prussian tradition.” Even a Hessian knew that.
The crimes of the Einsatzgruppen that Heydrich let loose in Poland caused the SS, including Himmler and Wolff, considerably greater aggravation than an unfortunate “formal mistake.” Those crimes were contrary to the old Prussian principles and the Wehrmacht issued a protest. Wolff
supposedly had no idea these events were taking place. The Wehrmacht leadership sampled the SS encroachments during the first few days. In a town they had just seized, an SS police unit attached to an attacking tank formation from East Prussia gathered the Jews into a church and murdered them. When this was reported to army commander General Georg von Küchler, he placed the SS formations at the disposal of the OKW because he no longer wanted them within his ranks. An SS court-martial dealt with the crime but the sentence was so mild that General von Küchler refused to acknowledge it.
An Einsatzgruppen that had been sent to Upper Silesia by Himmler “for special purposes” under the SS Obergruppenführer Udo von Woyrsch should have indeed feared being prosecuted. Their assignment was to spread panic and terror in the recently seized region to force the Jews to flee to the east. After that the Fourteenth Army reported to the High Command for the East, Lieutenant General Gerd von Rundstedt, that many arbitrary shootings by the SS had outraged the troops because the Einsatzgruppen was killing defenseless people instead of fighting at the front. Rundstedt demanded that Himmler remove Einsatzgruppen Woyrsch from his area of operations. This actually did take place, but instead of units changing positions, they established fixed RSHA posts throughout the entire region that were less noticeable, but continued to kill just as brutally.
These incidents increased as German armies penetrated deeper into the country. Of course, they were also discussed at Hitler’s headquarters among the military. Wolff had to report back to the Reichsführer the disgust and outrage within Wehrmacht circles, and as expected the complaints went as high as Hitler. Lieutenant General von Brauchitsch of the Army High Command was responsible for the accusation. Admittedly he and his colleagues should not have been surprised by the mass murders, because on September 12 Hitler had already given the lieutenant general to understand that he intended to conduct a war of extermination in Poland. If the Wehrmacht wanted to have nothing to do with this, then they had to accept that the SS and the Gestapo would be working alongside them.
Neither Himmler nor Wolff needed to be afraid of falling out of grace with the Führer because of the murders, but at the most because the murders were not secretive enough. On the other hand, the OKH was in no rush to level an accusation, and was seeking more to dampen the outrage among the troops. On September 21, Himmler reminded the commanders “that the police Einsatzgruppen were on assignment by the
Führer and according to instructions from the Führer were to carry out certain ethnic political duties” that “lay outside the purview of the High Command.” The following day he discussed the situation with Heydrich, whom he advised—in vain—to use moderation. Heydrich tried to make it clear to him that any moderation was impossible if the SS and the police were to fulfill their duties. What Heydrich concluded from the conversation, he shared with his Einsatzgruppen in memo a week later. He reminded them to carry out “the necessary measures in closest cooperation” with the responsible military commanders, and ordered at the same time to concentrate the Jews in a few areas selected for this purpose as the “first requirement for the final solution.” Wolff would have the opportunity to become involved in this situation.
At the same time, Himmler was given another assignment whereby the mass murders that had just begun were to attain a higher meaning in the spirit of National Socialism. A decree by Hitler of October 7, 1939, that was never published in its entirety, named the Reichsführer SS as “Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Tradition.” Among his duties there was “the elimination of the damaging influence by foreign elements of the population representing danger to the Reich and the German community.” SS Oberführer Ulrich Greifelt, who up to that point was part of the personal staff under Wolff, was appointed as leader of the new SS Main Office, established for this purpose. Naturally the connection to Wolff’s main office was not suddenly eliminated; on the contrary, he was the first to be informed as to which regions were to be cleared of Jews and Poles for settlers of German stock and which methods would be used.
Wolff again found time to handle bureaucratic matters in his office. On September 26, he returned to Berlin as part of Hitler’s baggage. Officially the Führer headquarters were at the Reich chancellery, but in practice, it dissolved because of the drop in activity and lack of things to do for the large entourage. The war in the west had not even started, the occasional battles between the Maginot Line and West Wall notwithstanding. Hitler also hoped that the great confrontation would not even take place because England and France would have to accept the situation created by the division of Poland between Berlin and Moscow. On October 5, with Himmler and Wolff in tow, he flew once more to the conquered country for a victory parade on Ujazdowski Allee in Warsaw.
On that occasion, however, Danzig gauleiter Forster complained about the military because they interfered too much with his brutal pacification
policies in the newly seized country. This was too much for Hitler and the army was taken out of the new Gaus of the Reich. The military lost their authority first in the regions around Danzig and Posen, now absorbed into the Reich, and then in the strips of land that were added to the Gau of East Prussia and Silesia. On October 26, 1939, the other occupied regions were named the General Government and given to former Munich lawyer Dr. Hans Frank to administer. From now on, the Wehrmacht had very little say in the Polish regions; the army was no longer necessary in those areas and the police, the SD and the SS, directed by higher SS and Police commanders appointed by Himmler and reporting to him, would see to it that things were done quietly. Hitler could not be indifferent to the Wehrmacht’s reactions to the SS or even what they were saying about them. Hitler still needed the generals and the troops they led—even more so when in the late fall it became very clear that fighting in the west could not be avoided. At the end of November the new commander in the east, Lieutenant General Johannes Blaskowitz, drafted a report in which he protested the crimes of the SS and the police because the danger of disputes—between the army and the SS—was growing, and until then had only been avoided because of the “high demands on the discipline of the troops.” Blaskowitz wrote of the troops displeasure “to be identified with the atrocious actions of the security police.” They refuse “on their part any cooperation with the Einsatzgruppen that operate almost exclusively as execution commandos.”
The report reached von Brauchitsch, who had reservations about presenting it to Hitler. So the army adjutant to the Führer, Major Gerhard Engel, had to pass it along, finally handing it to his commander on November 18. Hitler did not get upset at all about the content, but rather at the author. It was a mistake on the part of the OKH to entrust an army to a man like Blaskowitz. His reproaches indicated his “childish attitude” toward army leadership. However, despite the rebuff, further reports of atrocities were assembled; and the commanders still hoped to move the undecided supreme commander to issue a formal protest to Hitler.
This did not matter much to Himmler. For such an action, files had to be created marked with a
SECRET
stamp, but that could be read at any time. Wolff, the experienced appeaser, was given the task of calming down the military. After all, one of his assignments at the Führer headquarters had been to further develop the already friendly contacts with high-ranking military officers. His suggestions pleased both sides: Lieutenant General von Brauchitsch as well as the Reichsführer SS were prepared to meet
and discuss the matter thoroughly. For this not to look like a clash, the two gentlemen met for tea on January 24, 1940, and agreed to another suggestion from Wolff. The army handed over the entire collection of atrocity reports, and Wolff assigned the SS officer from the Main Office SS Court to examine the accusations. For those already convicted, Himmler promised he would begin criminal proceedings and the sentences would be fair and stringent.
“According to what I can remember there were about forty-six cases of infringements reported,” Wolff said many years later, although on other occasions he claimed his memory still functioned so well that he was able to quote his conversations with Hitler and Himmler verbatim. “Upon checking, the justified accusations boiled down to seven or eight cases.” Those who were found guilty received harsh punishment. At a second tea between Himmler and Brauchitsch (according to Wolff), “the argument was settled… and played down to the most uncomplicated level possible.” The happy reconciliation was to be short-lived for both sides. While this second tea was taking place, General Wilhelm Ulex in southern Poland was drafting a new accusation where he reported the “savagery of the SS Einsatzgruppen”: “by their acts, they have tarnished the honor of the entire German nation.” When Blaskowitz read that report, he drafted another memorandum containing new material for Brauchitsch. He also made sure that the contents were circulated to other officers on the western front. “The attitude of the troops,” wrote Blaskowitz, “towards the SS and the police alternates between repulsion and hate. Every soldier feels sick because of these crimes.” Cases of army officers refusing to shake hands when greeting SS officers were increasing. Reichenau was being urgently pressured by the officer corps to step in because another tea session with Himmler was no longer enough to preserve his authority over the army.
On the other hand it was incumbent upon Wolff to restore the peace between the army and Himmler’s SS killers. He suggested to Major Radke of the General Staff, representing Reichenau, that the Reichsführer SS personally face up to the army leaders and their criticism. In a talk he would explain the assignment he was given by the Führer. The next day Wolff was already giving assurances to the major by phone that, once the reasons were given, “the Reichsführer SS understood the perception of the High Command” and acknowledged “his wish to hold the talk concerning issues in the east.”
The clever negotiator then suggested that Himmler’s lecture be scheduled “in the evening, possibly right after dinner” because “the evening
creates a more favorable atmosphere for the listeners” and would be more favorable to a possible friendly discussion of an already difficult problem.” Himmler preferred a meeting in the west—said Wolff on the telephone—than one in Berlin.
On March 13, 1940, the top army generals gathered—those invited all held no less than the rank of army commander—in Koblenz, at the headquarters of Army Group A. Himmler said that the harshness in Poland was necessary because the subjects had already prepared a general rebellion during the last battles. The guilty parties had been executed according to martial law, and, therefore, the army was spared a terrible partisan war. As far as infringements were concerned, he was having them examined thoroughly. Guilty parties had been punished. This was, however, handled by SS judges because the Black Corps preferred its own jurisdiction.
In summarizing, Himmler admitted: “In front of this committee of the highest ranking officers I can unequivocally state that I do nothing without the Führer’s knowledge.” He was ready to assume responsibility in front of the world because the Führer himself “must not be connected to this.” Later there was some discussion because the generals asked questions, but they did not push the Reichsführer SS too far; as a speaker in front of many groups for more than a decade, he was experienced in avoiding uncomfortable questions. Wolff thought, in any case, that Himmler handled himself well. Besides that, all those gathered secretly believed in Hitler’s principle that the crimes of the victors are forgotten and only those who are defeated must pay.
The weeks that followed were to prove this theory. Two months after Himmler’s speech the Wehrmacht overran Holland, Belgium, and France, after Denmark and Norway had already been occupied. With so much fame, so many promotions and medals, the atrocities in the east were quickly forgotten, and not only by the generals. Without a doubt it was part of their profession not to be shocked by blood, as long as it was shed for lofty purposes.
Within the SS there circulated two different views regarding the disputes with the army. They came from the two men who at that time were considered Himmler’s most important advisors. Wolff delicately maintained, as he was prone to do, that the atrocities took place only because the Reichsführer SS had trusted the Einsatzgruppen and allowed lax supervision. Heydrich, on the other hand, said that the army leadership under Brauchitsch and the leaders of the Security Police neglected to thoroughly
inform the commanders of the individual armies of the Einsatzgruppen’s assignment. That was the harsh and simple truth.