At this point in time, Dulles was not in any way disposed to speak with Wolff. He feared that this conversation could be used to drive a wedge between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Should nothing come from the meeting, but should it become known, U.S. Intelligence would be blamed for having fiddled with the Black Order of the SS, therefore giving them credibility. But Husmann felt that he was playing a role in shaping world history. He was so convinced of his mission that he managed to change Dulles’ mind. Wolff had instructed him to give the American (according to Dulles) some “astounding documents in the German language, on which Wolff’s business card with all of his tides was stapled.” They were character references that later in Germany were called “Persilscheine” [detergent soap] that are mentioned often in this biography. Here they served as letters of credit. Among his “good deeds,” Wolff referred to preventing the bombing of Rome when the Germans retreated, and when he saved many works of art from being destroyed, moving them to safety along with the coin collection belonging to the King of Italy. He referred to the fact that he ended the general strike without bloodshed; that he was responsible for an amnesty, which allowed the striking Italian workers and those who refused to report to the armed forces to return
to civilian life. As a reference for information about himself he named “the former deputy of the Führer Rudolf Hess, now in Canada” first, and then the “current Pope: audience in May 1944,” and after that a number of Catholic clerics and Italian aristocrats.
The OSS kept a safehouse in Zurich. Husmann drove Wolff there, but was not to be present during the discussion between Dulles, Gaevernitz, and the SS general. Gaevernitz was successful in starting off with a friendly note: a common acquaintance, the Countess Podewils had told him that ages ago, upon her request, Wolff had protected Catholic philosopher Romano Guardini from an investigation by the Gestapo. For Wolff, who had always been a collector of aristocratic acquaintances, the mention of this name meant that he was on somewhat more stable ground once again. He loosened up visibly—his host concluded—from the excited tension he was under. When he was offered a glass of whiskey, he no longer felt discriminated against because no one had offered to shake hands in greeting. Also he felt satisfied that they were negotiating in German since he did not speak English.
Once more he had to repeat that Germany was completely and inevitably defeated as far as he was concerned and that he was not speculating on any dissension among Allies. His main concern only regarded the SS and the police units under his command. Should the soldiers of the Army Group C, meaning the forces located in Italy, keep on fighting, he would have to convince Field Marshal Kesselring. However, he trusted that his influence as political advisor would be enough. His open break with Hitler, Himmler, and all National Socialist doctrine impressed Dulles that he was dealing with an honest soldier and not some kind of double-dealing politician. He became increasingly friendly and Gaevernitz felt the cease-fire could be reached within a few days. Euphorically Wolff assured them: “Gentlemen, if you can be patient, I will hand you Italy on a silver platter.”
Dulles did not attend a second discussion the following day; he sent Gaevernitz alone. Wolff brought in Dollmann, who was very talkative and presented his plan. Together with Rahn and Kesselring, he could end the war very quickly. They would not only sign the cease-fire, but by retreating into southern Germany at the same time, the Germans could also prevent Hitler from attempting to take up his position in the much-discussed Alpine redoubt. By issuing appeals they would also win over other armies to join the surrender. Wolff agreed to release all the Jews still being held captive so they could cross into Switzerland. As soon as he reached
the South Tyrol, he would get in touch with Kesselring at his headquarters. The general could possibly meet with Allied generals within a week.
It quickly became obvious that the chronically optimistic Wolff had promised too much. He crossed the border on March 9 and on the following day Rauff was waiting for him at the train station with a request from Kaltenbrunner that he come immediately to Innsbruck. Wolff felt this was not advisable; he excused himself by saying that because of his absence, he had too much work to catch up on. Even if Kaltenbrunner could not order him to do anything, the Chief of the Security Police was certainly authorized to have an SS comrade of similar rank arrested as soon as he was in German territory and, therefore, also within the reach of the Gestapo. Wolff also expected that Himmler would demand an explanation for the trip to Switzerland. His excuse was that he wanted to get a present for Hitler’s 56th birthday on April 20. SS Obersturmmbannführer Max Wünsche, the Führer’s favorite adjutant, was serving at the front for the single purpose of qualifying for a medal, when he ended up as a POW of the western Allies. Wolff supposedly was only seeking to have Wünsche freed as an exchange for Parri. To support this version, Parilli had to quickly travel to Zurich once more and at least suggest the idea of an exchange.
Even more serious was the fact that Kesselring had been called to Führer headquarters on March 8 and was ordered to take over the command of the western front. Kesselring’s chief of staff, General Hans Röttinger, was temporarily representing him in Italy, and Wolff suspected that he would have the same mindset. It was, however, expected that a new commander-in-chief would soon arrive. There was also the suspicion that Mussolini was preparing to escape to Spain by plane. For Wolff, this meant dedicating more time and a higher level of surveillance to the Duce.
When Parilli took this news to Dulles, his trust in Wolff shrank quite a bit. The man from OSS found fault with all these unfavorable things that had caught Wolff unprepared. He said: “Now that word had leaked and he was or would be in trouble, he was hastily trying to devise a belated pretext for what he had done. He either considered himself even more powerful than he was or thought his stock with Himmler (or possibly Hitler) was so high that he could do no wrong. Or, worst of all, he simply didn’t think ahead.”
*
On the other hand, Dulles wanted a lot more from Wolff. He therefore had a search made to locate Max Wünsche in Allied POW camps. He
was found, but had already been brought to Canada, and that made it difficult to get hold of him. Wolff then asked for a replacement, some prominent Party comrade, who had been decorated. His concerns, however, proved to be unnecessary. No one held it against him. In Berlin, they had other worries. Only Mussolini got upset when he heard that Parri was free.
In the following days, Parilli was traveling between Switzerland and Lake Garda almost without a break. He reported to Dulles that immediately after his arrival Wolff ordered all high-ranking SS officers within his territory to issue orders forbidding all violent operations. Even the partisans were to be spared, as long as they didn’t attack. Dulles found out that Wolff was now waiting for Kesselring’s successor: “If there is no other way,” the SS general reportedly said, “then I’m prepared to deal with this alone.” He had come to the conclusion that since he had dared move so far, there was no turning back. In this case, he wanted to have a plan for all those locations under his command, where he could facilitate the landings of naval and airborne troops. These by themselves would not immediately end the war, but the end would definitely come about much faster.
None of these discussions were committed to paper. According to the old espionage tradition the envoy Parilli had to memorize each of the texts. And so Wolff made a request that the Allied air force be ordered not to target any moving vehicles in the region of Lake Garda and Milan. Only through sheer luck Wolff was unharmed when his car was shot at from the air on a country road; his driver was wounded and the car destroyed. He let Dulles know that, without him, a surrender in Italy was impossible.
Dulles also had difficulties. After he had reported the result of his Zurich talks of March 8–9 to headquarters at Caserta, near Naples, everyone suddenly became very active. Dulles found out that the British Major General Terence S. Airy and the U.S. Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer were on the way to Lyon in liberated France, and that he would be required to sneak them into Switzerland as negotiating partners with the Germans. This succeeded with Waibel’s help. Dulles found out from the generals that Moscow had been told of the forthcoming negotiations. He thought he was free of all commitments once the Soviet Union sensed there was some kind of betrayal in his actions. He was very quickly to feel how much he was mistaken and immediately got a taste of the consequences. Stalin demanded that the Red Army take part in the surrender negotiations—something the Western Powers agreed to. He was requesting that three of his generals be present. It would be difficult and unreasonable for Waibel to get a disguised Soviet general across the border. And
now three of them from a country with which Switzerland didn’t even have diplomatic relations? With the British and American generals, this was easy: they presented themselves as non-commissioned officers from an American unit wanting to spend a vacation in Switzerland.
The two negotiators from Caserta made do with Wolff for a lack of something better, as he arrived in Ascona on March 19, with several escorts. The location on Lake Maggiore was chosen for the generals’ meeting—the first between the top opponents in the war—because Gaevernitz’s brother-in-law Edmund H. Stinnes owned two houses that were perfectly suited to accommodate both groups separately and keep them hidden. Wolff came with apparently good news: replacing Kesselring, Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff was taking over the Army Group C. Wolff had been fairly close friends with him for some time. However, he had never spoken with him about ending the war since Vietinghoff had been leading an army group in the Baltic countries during the last few months. It would not be easy to win him over to a surrender either, since he firmly believed in the iron Prussian military principles. It would probably be easier to convince him if Kesseking also agreed to the plan. Wolff therefore had to find the field marshal. He would need a week for that since allied air supremacy prevented him from flying. The warring parties were to delay their planned major offensive since it would be more difficult to implement a ceasefire in the midst of a battle.
But once again, things happened differently than what had been agreed upon. Back from Ascona, Wolff was to find out during an exploratory discussion with Vietinghoff that he would not discuss surrender. His chief of staff, General Hans Röttinger, proved to be more open-minded. From him, Wolff also found out that Vietinghoff advised his closest coworkers that they had to be careful in conversations with Wolff, because he could no longer be trusted.
Wolff therefore immediately went to Kesseking’s headquarters in Bad Nauheim. The field marshal had no time for long conversations on March 23; the Americans had crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and were threatening to divide north and south Germany. All the same, Kesselring agreed in principle that it was correct to hold talks with the Allies in the west. Wolff was so satisfied with this discussion that he passed on the results to Dulles through his office. Wolff liked those vague formulations because they were easy and gave him freedom of interpretation.
In three days, Kesseking had said, there would be more time for discussion. But it never came to that. When Himmler heard that Wolff was
in German territory, he ordered him to come to Berlin immediately. On March 24, around midday, the general arrived there, somewhat shaken because low-flying aircraft along the way had once again shot at his plane. Together, Himmler and Kaltenbrunner gave him a going-over in the apartment of the SS Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, who was Wolff’s successor as liaison officer of the Reichsführer SS at the Führer headquarters and now lived in the area of the Reich chancellery. Himmler condemned Wolff for meeting with Dulles without getting his permission beforehand, and without having reported to Schellenberg’s office in the SD. From Kaltenbrunner’s questions, Wolff concluded that he was only waiting for a reason to make an arrest. But since there were no further reproaches, Wolff knew that his much more incriminating meeting with the two Allied generals was not yet common knowledge in Berlin. He referred once again to the instructions he had received from Hitler on February 6. He had been successful, he said (as if it were a victory announcement), and had been able to establish a direct contact with the Western Powers. Peace, however, had never been discussed. The purpose of the discussion at first was to bring SS comrade Standartenführer Max Wünsche from a POW camp back to Führer headquarters.
Wolff indicated that on March 24, he had already spoken with Himmler and Kaltenbrunner about the possibility of an armistice in Italy. One can suppose that he only discussed this as one of many alternatives and that it should only come into play if the alliance between west and east could be either loosened or completely severed. The fact that on that occasion the forbidden word “capitulation” was even used by Wolff within Hitler’s reach is even more improbable, since he suggested at the end that they continue the discussion with Hitler regarding his contacts and that they get his decision. Kaltenbrunner refused to take him to the Führer. He was so irritable at the time that the topic could not be discussed with him. In this respect, neither he nor Himmler had a clear conscience. Kaltenbrunner was planning a connection to Switzerland and the Reichsführer SS had cast a line to Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte.
As one can see, Wolff was playing poker in two games at the same time—which was admirable because he used his different negotiations as a joker in Berlin as well as in Bern. With Hitler and Himmler his suggestions sought to divide the Allies—the final objective being an alliance with half of the Allies forcing the other half to pay the high price for this war. This was not Wolff’s idea; it had been making the rounds at Führer headquarters for some time, and even Hitler occasionally held monologues
about it. Wolff had naturally opted for the west. As long as he took this direction to make his game believable to his Party comrades, he was in little danger of risking his neck. In Switzerland, he was playing his joker, namely, his readiness to negotiate, in a combination that was completely different, which according to requirements could be either an armistice or an unconditional surrender. He played as if he did not consider the deterioration of the Allied union as a possibility. In this case as well he believed he couldn’t lose.