Vichy France (68 page)

No Vichy controversy better illustrates the pitfalls of seizing a few documents out of context than the war question of January 1942. Otto Abetz’ July 1943 memoir, published as
Pétain et les allemands: Mémorandum d’Abetz sur les relations franco-allemandes
(Paris, 1945), claimed that Vichy had wanted to declare war on the Allies following Pearl Harbor, in exchange for political concessions, but that Hitler had missed that opportunity. The prosecution before the High Court of Justice, following up this lead, got French military justice officials in Germany to look for corroboration. They unearthed Abetz’ telegram no. 126 to Ribbentrop of 13 January 1942 (now microfilmed as T-120/405/214258–60 and T-120/898/291966–68) reporting that a rump session of the Vichy cabinet (Pétain, Darlan, Moysset, Romier, Bouthillier, Pucheu, with Benoist-Méchin also present) voted on January 11 in favor of declaring war on the Allies. In November 1945 a sealed dossier of thirty-eight documents that Benoist-Méchin had given Darlan, probably in April 1942, turned up at the Quai d’ Orsay. It contained, among other papers about Franco-German relations in 1941 and 1942, two letters by Benoist-Méchin to Darlan, dated 9 and 12 January 1942, concerning French readiness to declare war on the Allies in exchange for a “profound modification” of the current Franco-German relationship. These documents figured prominently in the later trials, such as those of Jacques Benoist-Méchin and Yves Bouthillier.
Pétain was also interrograted in his prison on the Ile d’Yeu in January 1947, revealing that the old man was by now genuinely senile (see the report in
Le Monde
, 19 January 1947).

The full sequence of Franco-German government relations (best followed in Ernst von Weizsäcker’s “Frankreich” file, vol. 6, T-120/405) for this period puts the whole affair into perspective. It is true that Hitler began to reopen the French question in December 1941–January 1942, with Rommel being pressed toward the frontiers of Tunisia, as he always did when he needed something from France. It is also true that Darlan and Pétain, as always, were no less eager than in the fall of 1941 for a sweeping Franco-German settlement. The entry of the United States into the war on 7 December 1941 introduced the new issue of whether France would break relations or not, but the January 1942 negotiation should be seen as the last gasp of the Protocols of Paris maneuvers rather than merely as a response to the American entry into the war. The final essential point is that the January 1942 negotiation was the work of subordinates, Abetz and Benoist-Méchin, who were disavowed by superiors on both sides.

Otto Abetz found his fortunes at a low ebb following the final failure of the postprotocol negotiations at the end of 1941 and the misunderstanding of the Pétain-Goering meeting on December 1 at Saint-Florentin. Back in Germany for consultations, he had a rare meeting with Hitler on January 5, 1942. This heady experience seems to have prompted him to mount a major diplomatic scheme of his own. Hitler, who wanted the use of Bizerte for aid to Rommel, seems to have mused about the possibilities of meeting Darlan and of negotiating a peace settlement with France in the event of a French entry into war against the Allies. For the moment, however, even a French rupture of diplomatic relations was put off for further consideration. (See Abetz’ report to Ribbentrop of this meeting, T-120/405/214238–39, and
Mémorandum d’Abetz
, 128–39.) Hitler may have been tempted by the idea of shifting occupation forces from France to the Russian front.

Back in Paris on January 9, Abetz sought out Jacques Benoist-Méchin, the prewar propagandist for a French understanding with Hitler who was now Secretaire-général à la vice-présidence du conseil and Darlan’s roving negotiator with the Germans. Hitler’s rather hypothetical musings now blossomed into a firm four-point offer. If France was ready to “march with us to the end of the conflict,” there could be a “profound modification” of the current Franco-German status, preliminary accord over a peace treaty, study of material and economic means France would need to meet her new responsibilities
and of the best way to present the matter to French public opinion. If the French were agreed in principle (and Hitler did not want an immediate French declaration of war), Hitler, Abetz said, was “ready to grant a Treaty of Peace which will astonish the French.” Benoist-Méchin reported this proposal, perhaps further inflated, in his letter of 9 January to Darlan [see text in
Procès Benoist-Méchin
(Paris, 1948), 340–46]. He asked for a reply by the following Monday.

There is no reason to doubt that these issues were indeed discussed at Vichy. A sweeping settlement was just what Darlan had been working for since February 1941. General Juin had just been in Berlin working out what would happen if Rommel had to withdraw into Tunisia, thus bringing the North African desert war onto French soil. Pétain had just seen Goering, with a fat dossier of concessions the French wanted in exchange for their cooperation in such matters. The reply that Benoist-Méchin brought back on 12 January (see text in
Procès Benoist-Méchin
, 347–49) was affirmative in general principles but surrounded by all sorts of qualifications. Benoist-Méchin pointed out to Abetz that in no case could France be drawn into operations that would require total or partial mobilization. Vichy was apprehensive about too quick action. A solution must move by stages, with clear material and psychological preparation in advance. Benoist-Méchin talked mostly about African operations, to which he said Vichy was already committed by Pétain’s agreement about Rommel. In other words, the same Vichy plea for caution and for concessions that would strike public opinion in the eye, coupled with an interest in an overall settlement. There was no mention of immediate French war on the Allies.

The French were interested in what they were told was Hitler’s new mood; Abetz now had to get Ribbentrop interested. In his telegram of 13 January (T-120/405/214258–60), Abetz reported having given Benoist-Méchin “his own” opinion of overall Franco-German relations—i.e., he recognized his own initiative in what had been presented to the French as an offer from Hitler. Then he said that France was “ripe for a discussion of fundamental questions.” Unlike the case in 1941, he said, the French were ready for negotiations without political preconditions. Abetz said he had never mentioned a preliminary peace to the French. But the French had “unanimously” decided to declare war on Britain and the United States in return for “satisfactory status” after the war.

Abetz had consistently misrepresented the terms of his conversation, first to the French, then to his own superiors. Neither government
went any further with it. Hitler’s thoughts about some possible French solution to both his North African and Russian front problems, if they were anything more than figments of Abetz’ imagination, were fleeting. Rommel had begun to advance again in early January. Darlan, on his side, made it clear to Schleier on 29 January that he could see no German interest in a French declaration of war upon the Allies. France, he said, would declare war on the Allies only if the Allies invaded the empire. See Schleier (Paris) 423 to Abetz (Berlin) 30 January 1942 (T-120/405/214294–95). Hitler still rejected cooperation with France that would purchase a soft peace. See the Goebbels Diaries, 7 March 1942.

Benoist-Méchin was left high and dry. He kept asking Abetz what had happened to the “constructive” French answer, which he understood had been relayed to the German military high command (Benoist-Méchin note to Abetz, 25 March 1942,
Procès
, 351). Abetz’ influence continued to diminish with Ribbentrop, who finally told him on 25 November 1942 to “cease all activity in the domain of political developments and Franco-German relations, and take no personal initiatives.” (Ribbentrop 1475 of 25 November 1942, T-120/928/297469–71; also text of telephone message in
Ministère public c/Bouthillier
, fascicule 4, 116).

Appendix B

Glossary of French and German Abbreviations

Bibliographical Note

I shall not make a tedious list of all the materials used in the preparation of this book. Readers interested in the specialized bibliography of particular questions should consult the footnotes at appropriate passages. Even the general reader, however, needs to know that authentic sources of information about Vichy France are both abundant and uneven. They are abundant because the subject is nearly contemporary; they are uneven because the French government still, at this writing, closes official Vichy papers to research.

That is a revealing fact in itself. When a regime is defeated and discredited, its innermost secrets are likely to be pawed over sacrilegiously by the victors. It is a mark of the essential administrative continuity of France through war, occupation, and Liberation that Vichy’s public records passed in uninterrupted confidentiality from one regime to its enemy and successor. In many cases the custodians were the same person. The full record of how policy was made, upon what grounds and after what dissensions, is no more accessible for Vichy than for the later Third Republic.

That seemed to me insufficient reason to renounce scholarly interest in a period as much in need of demythologizing as Vichy France. At best, a historian must pit his ingenuity against imperfect sources, and there is already more authentic Vichy material available than one man can cover in a lifetime. The results of Vichy domestic policies are clearly
visible, for the regime made no secret of most of them. As for foreign policy, French officials can be followed virtually hour by hour as they dealt with officials of Germany and the United States.

Even the inner workings of the Vichy official world are not altogether closed. One government agency, the Commissariat aux Questions Juives, had no successor to take custody of its archives. Integral runs of a substantial part of its working papers can be followed at the Bibliothèque de Documentation Juive Contemporaine in Paris. Since the Commissariat received all sorts of ministerial memoranda, this archive’s interest extends well beyond the question of Vichy Jewish policy.

The papers of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden have also been published: Délégation française auprès de la Commission Allemande d’armistice,
Recueil de documents publié par le gouvernement français
, 5 vols. (Paris, 1947–59). The Armistice Commission was entrusted with applying the armistice to France at the beginning, when everyone expected a brief interim period of purely technical negotiation. Its deliberations are the essential source for Vichy high policy in the early months, though less so after spring 1941. The editors omitted some major pieces from the first volumes, but fortunately the later volumes, edited in more serene days, went back and picked up some very interesting 1940 material. The gaps can be filled from the German archives and from a typed set of minutes kept by the French delegation’s economic branch: Délégation Française auprès de la Commission Allemande pour l’Economie, “Comptes-rendus des reunions du 1er juillet 1940 au 5 août,” 10 vols. A set of these minutes is found in the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine, in Paris.

The curtain has been further lifted by the postwar trials of Vichy leaders. These have been the main source for such standard works as Robert Aron,
Histoire de Vichy
(Paris, 1954), translated as
The Vichy Regime.
In principle, all Vichy cabinet members came before a special High Court of Justice set up in 1944, 108 cases in all. Lesser figures were tried in regional Courts of Justice and Chambres civiques, 124,751 cases in all.
¹
Transcripts of the public sessions of some of the major trials have been published: Pétain, Laval, Benoist-Méchin, Brinon, Darnand, Pucheu, and Vallat (excerpts) before the High Court of Justice; Marras before the regional Court of Justice at Lyon. Notes on
some of the other public sessions are deposited in the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine. The original trial records are held at the National Archives in Paris.

No doubt these trial records are the richest single source for the regime’s inner workings, but they must be used with great care. They contain isolated nuggets rather than whole veins of contemporary letters and papers, placed in artificial contexts by the trial proceedings. For the prosecution wanted only to prove that the accused’s acts fit the penal code definition of the crime of which he was accused, such as “transactions with the enemy.” He was likely to bring forward in public session only those fragments of documents that strengthened his case. The defense, by contrast, presented character testimony more than documents and minimized his client’s role in decision-making. Neither party addressed himself to historians’ questions: a sustained analysis of the defendant’s thoughts and actions.