Authors: Norbert Bacyk
4:e Panzer-Divisions armament,
August 1st 1944 Model:
TYPE | |
---|---|
PzKpfw V “Panther” | 58 (40) |
PzKpfw IV | 83 (45) |
PzBfWg III | 5 (3) |
Panzerjäger IV | 12 |
“Marder” III | 10 |
“Grille” | 9 |
“Wespe” | 6 |
“Hummel” | 6? |
Sd Kfz 250/251/253 | 311 (237) |
Armoured cars | ? |
Pak 40 AT-guns | 7 |
|e|G infantry guns | 10 |
leFH 18/sFH 18/K 18 guns and howitzers | 38? |
sGrWr 34 (8 cm) mortars | 26 |
sGrWr 42 (12 cm) mortars | 12 |
FLAK 36 (37 mm) AA-guns | 8 |
FLAK 18/36 (8.8 cm) AA-guns | 8 |
Machine guns | 718 |
Soldiers | 12,700 |
On August 1, both Waffen-SS divisions drove round StanisÅawów, while simultaneously covering the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” forces' southern flank from the MiÅsk Mazowiecki direction. The 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf “received orders to attack WoÅomin, and 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” was ordered to move out quickly in the direction of Okuniew with the objective of linking up with the XXXIX Panzer-Corps. The success of this offensive operation meant that the 3rd Tank Corps was sheared off from the rest of the 2nd Tank Army. Immediately after the attack began, however, some tens of Soviet tanks from the 59th Tank Guards Brigade cropped up on SS-Gruppenführer Gilles division's left flank. They were about to carry out the 8th Tank Guards Corps' manoeuvre against StanisÅawów on orders they had received the previous day. Confronted with this situation the SS-forces were forced to intensively defend themselves instead of attacking. Both sides suffered heavy equipment losses and both sides broke off further attacks. At this juncture, General Popov took advantage of the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking's” aborted attack against Okuniew and re-deployed his troops precisely in that direction. In the evening, the 8th Tank Guards Corps struck back against Okuniew and drove the Kampfgruppe from the 19th Panzer-Division out from there and to some extent restored contact with the 3rd Tank Corps. Here it should be pointed out that during this time both the 3rd and the 5th SS-Panzer-Divisions “Wiking” only succeeded in setting isolated units into battle. SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 “Westland” had not yet completed the transport of its entire complement across the Bug, and the most vital troops in the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” were still fighting east of Siedlce. In short, the contribution of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” to the fighting at Praga was at this time decidedly modest.
Infantry from either the 4th Panzer-Division or the 19th Panzer-Division inspecting the remains of a Soviet tank unit they had just detroyed. The wreck of a T-34-85 is engulfed in smoke. Behind it stands an SU-85. The location is east of Praga; date â August 1, 1944. This is one of the few pictures of the battle that halted the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw at the time of the Home Army's Uprising on August 1, 1944. It was in this battle that the 3rd Tank Corps out of the Soviet's 2nd Tank Army sustained such heavy losses that they were actually forced to retire and relinquish newly won terrain at the outskirts of Warsaw/Praga. Thereby, the “magical” Soviet retreat chronicled by historians the world over. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)
Another picture of destroyed Soviet equipment from the beginning of the battle for Praga. It appears to be the same location as shown above, a few days later. In front of the JS-II tank appears to be a T-34, model undetermined. (Leandoer & Ekholm Archive)
The intensity of tank battles increased. Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model ordered General von Vormann to set about annihilating the frontline troops in the enemy's panzer corps as fast as possible, and, moreover, see to it that the Soviet bridge-defence emplacements at Magnuszew were likewise destroyed. The commander of the 9th Army reported that, due to the prevailing shortage of equipment, it was impossible to carry out both missions simultaneously. Model informed him that the VIII Army-Corps' command had been transferred to the 9th Army. This force would organise the defence of the WisÅa south of Warsaw (as a result of the Uprising in Warsaw, the Army-Corps' staff, with General Höhne at its head, finally reached the new battlefield after a delay of four days). In addition, at Wyszków a Kampfgruppe “Felzmann” was formed drawn from units of the German 2nd Army. Incorporated into it was a Kampfgruppe from the 4thPanzer-Division that had been promised to von Vormann a couple of days earlier, along with the remainder of the troops from Brest and two heavy artillery units. General Betzel's 4th Panzer-Division provided Panzer-Regiment 35, Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12, Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 103, Panzer-Pioneer-Battalion 79, two companies from the Panzer-Flak-Artillerie-Abteilung 290, along with a communications unit. Model despatched these troops to Radzymin with the mission of supporting the 19th Panzer-Division. In order to further better the German command, the field marshal gave orders directing that the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf ” and he 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” should also be incorporated into Gruppe “von Saucken.” This meant that both divisions would, in effect, be transferred to the 9th Army.
The 2nd Tank Army's Units, August 1, 1944
2nd Tank Army | The 2nd Tank Army, in fact, ceased to exist on August 6, 1944, following the crushing of the 3rd Tank Corps and the retreat of the 16th Tank Corps back to Magnuszew. From this point on, each corps operated independently under the aegis of the regular army. The 2nd Tank Army (as of November 20, 1944, called the 2nd Tank Guards Army) never re-established the corps structure that existed in July 1944. The above chart contains all the large unit formations within the 2nd Tank Army but does not include certain smaller formations, subordinate to corps or army commands. Theoretically, each tank corps had a subordinated mortar regiment, an armoured artillery regiment (the regiments' self-propelled guns are presented in tables together with the equipment; the 8th Tank Guards Corps had the 301st and the 1817th Anti-tank Guards Regiments; the 16th Tank Corps had the 1239th and the 1441st Anti-tank Regiments), a motorcycle battalion, an engineer battalion (in the 3rd Tank Corps, the 220th Battalion; in the 16th Tank Corps, the 201st Battalion), and an anti-aircraft Tank Corps, the 201st Battalion), anti-aircraft regiment. Likewise, on the tank “army” level apart from the corps structure, there were, among other units, a motorcycle regiment, an artillery regiment, a rocket artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, a communications regiment, an air-support liaison regiment (20 Po-2), an engineer battalion, a repair battalion or a transportation regiment. But in 1944, every Soviet tank army had a somewhat different make up, depending on the mission it was then carrying out. Sometimes, a special army unit was attached which cannot be found in the formal register, and certain units were simply never actual. |
Commanding Officer: General Aleksiej Ivanovitjv Radzjijevskij | |
Army forces: | |
41st Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade | |
5th Independent motorcycle regiment | |
87th Independent Motorcycle Battalion | |
9th or 79th Independent Liaison Regiment | |
86th Guards Mortar Regiment | |
10th Flame-thrower Battalion | |
729th Independent Mortar Battalion | |
3rd Tank Corps | |
Commanding Officer: General Nikolaj Vjedjenejev | |
50th Tank Brigade | |
51st Tank Brigade | |
103rd Tank Brigade | |
57th Mechanised Brigade | |
8th Tank Guards Corps | |
Commanding Officer: General Aleksiej Popov | |
58th Tank Guards Brigade 58th Tank Guards Brigade | |
58th Tank Guards Brigade | |
60th Tank Guards Brigade | |
28th Mechanised Brigade | |
62nd Guards Regiment (heavy tanks) | |
16th Tank Corps | |
Commander: General Ivan Dubovoj | |
107th Tank Brigade | |
109th Tank Brigade | |
164th Tank Brigade | |
15th Mechanised Brigade | |
6th Guards Regiment (heavy tanks) |
On August 2, the 3rd Tank Corps' situation further deteriorated. The entire area controlled by General Vjedjenjejev's soldiers came under heavy enemy artillery fire. The Germans attacked Radzymin from the northeast with a Kampfgruppe from the 4th Panzer-Division, and from the north and west with the 19th Panzer-Division. Along the Radzymin-Wyszków roadway, an attack was launched by Kampfgrupp “Christern” (under the command of Colonel Christern, commander of Panzer-Regiment 35), with 28 model PzKpfw IV tanks from the II Panzer-Regiment 35, along with the 12th Regiment out of the I Panzergrenadier-Battalion. This offensive developed into fiercely contested battles fought over the bridges crossing the RzÄ
dza River in the vicinity of Dybowo, a village the Germans had succeeded in taking. Due to the concentric attack, the Soviet 103rd Tank Brigade's units were forced to turn back toward WoÅomin, and in doing so, simultaneously abandoned a considerable amount of war materials on the battlefield. In the evening, Colonel Christern's kampfgrupp, having split into two separate assault units, attacked Ciemne and Dobczyn. (The first unit was made up of the II Panzer-Regiment 35 together with the Panzergrenadier- Regiment 12 from the I Panzergrenadier-Battalion â the second unit consisted of the I Panzer-Regiment 35 and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 12 from the II Panzergrenadier-Battalion.) The re-taking of Radzymin meant that the vital road between Warsaw and Wyszków could be re-opened and that contact between the 9th and 2nd Armies could also be re-established.
A PzKpfw “Panther” tank Sd Kfz 267 from the 3rd Panzer-Regiment 35. The photo is probably taken during the course of fighting in the vicinity of Radzymin during the first ten days of August 1944. (MWP)
Further south, enemy positions outside WoÅomin were attacked by Division “Hermann Göring” from Zielonka, and by the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf” from the area around TÅuszcz. This time, the Soviet tank troops from the 51st Tank Brigade and the infantry from the 57th Mechanised Brigade proved to be the more skilled combatants. They inflicted heavy casualties on their attackers and forced them to quickly retire. The 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” (II SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 “Wiking” and the grenadier battalions from SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 “Germania”) also participated in the attack and tried to break through the 3rd Tank Division's positions around the village of PoÅwiÄtne. This effort was only partially successful. Clearly, the Soviet forces withdrew from MiÄdzyleÅ, Wólka DÄ
brownicka and PoÅwÄtne, but they succeeded in setting up another defence line. SS-Gruppenführer Gille could not commit his entire division to battle because he was also responsible for the defense of the battlefield outside Warsaw between MiÅsk Mazowiecki and KaÅuszyn (SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 10 Westland,” which had also been reinforced, completed its transport across the Bug that same day and only just now was able to join up with the rest of the formation). On August 2, components within the 5th SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking,” together with soldiers from the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division “Totenkopf,” were positioned along this stretch to repel attacks from the 8thTank Guards Corps supported by the Soviet 47th Army's frontline units. By reason of the above-described situation, the Germans were not in a position to launch a new attack against Okuniew.