Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can Do Better (68 page)

4
. Julia Werdigier, “Britain Offers Its Proposal to Privatize Mail Service,”
New York Times
, July 11, 2013.

5
. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,”
Stanford Law Review
21 (1968): 548–643.

6
. Amihai Glazer argues in private correspondence that under certain conditions an individual might have an incentive to contribute to a
private
purchase of a public good.

7
. This distinction is highlighted in Charles Wolf Jr., “A Theory of Non-Market Failures,”
Public Interest
55 (1979): 114–33.

8
. Paul E. Peterson,
The Price of Federalism
(1995). On races to the bottom, see Jan K. Brueckner, “Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence,”
Southern Economic Journal
66 (2000): 505–25.

9
. Saul Levmore, “Internality Regulation through Public Choice,”
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
15 (forthcoming, 2014).

10
. Gerald D. Skoning, “How Congress Puts Itself above the Law,”
Wall Street Journal
, April 16, 2013.

11
. For evidence, see Kay L. Schlozman, Sidney Verba, & Henry E. Brady,
The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy
(2012). For theory, see Mancur Olson Jr.,
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(1965).

12
. Jerry L. Mashaw, “Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,”
Boston University Law Review
61 (1981): 885–931.

13
. Anne Joseph O’Connell, “Bureaucracy at the Boundary,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
162 (forthcoming, 2013).

14
. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, “Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies),”
Cornell Law Review
98 (2013): 769–843.

15
. Adrian Vermeule, “Conventions of Agency Independence,”
Columbia Law Review
113 (2013): 1175–79.

16
.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

17
.
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.
, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

18
. The leading academic proponent of this view is David Schoenbrod; see his
Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation
(1993).

19
. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, “Placing ‘Reins’ on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act,”
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
16 (2013): 1–37; Jonathan R. Siegel, “The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking,”
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
16 (2013): 131–85.

20
. Peter H. Schuck, “Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod,”
Cardozo Law Review
20 (1999): 775–93.

21
. See, generally, Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner,
The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
(2013).

22
.
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

23
. See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick,
Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights
(1994); R. Shep Melnick,
Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act
(1983); and
Sean Farhang,
The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the United States
(2010).

24
. See, e.g.,
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

25
. The principle that courts should remand to the agency where it has incorrectly interpreted the statute grows out of the
Chenery
litigation. See,
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation
, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

26
. The distinction between competence and capacity is analyzed in Andrew B. Coan, “Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law,”
Yale Law Journal
122 (2012): 422–58.

27
. See, e.g.,
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation
, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (multiple remands); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, “To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law,”
Duke Law Journal
1990 (1990): 984–1077.

28
.
United States v. Booker
, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

29
. Mosi Secret, “Big Sentencing Disparity Seen for Judges,”
New York Times
, March 6, 2012, A23.

30
. Philip K. Howard,
The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America
(1994).

31
. Rachel E. Barkow, “Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice,”
University of Virginia Law Review
99 (2013): part II.

32
. Robert A. Katzmann,
Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy
(1980).

33
. Margo Schlanger, “Offices of Goodness: Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies,” September 9, 2013,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2322797
.

34
. Lester M. Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance
(2002), 1–2; emphasis in the original.

35
. Ibid., 9.

36
. See, generally, Christopher K. Leman, “Direct Government,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 2.

37
. Salamon,
The Tools of Government
, 4–5.

38
. See, generally, Thomas H. Stanton & Ronald C. Moe, “Government Corporations and Government-Sponsored Enterprises,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 3.

39
. See, generally, Lester M. Salamon, “Economic Regulation,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 4.

40
. See, generally, Peter J. May, “Social Regulation,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 5.

41
. See, generally, Ron J. Feldman, “Government Insurance,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 6.

42
. See, generally, Janet A. Weiss, “Public Information,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 7.

43
. See, generally, Joseph J. Cordes, “Corrective Taxes, Charges, and Tradable Permits,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 8.

44
. See, generally, Steven J. Kelman, “Contracting,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 9; and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog and Lester M. Salamon, “Purchase-of-Service Contracting,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 10.

45
. Daniel P. Gitterman, “Presidency, the Power of the Purchaser and Public Policy,”
The Forum
10 (2012): article 1, 1–39.

46
. See, generally, David R. Beam & Timothy J. Conlan, “Grants,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 11.

47
. See, generally, Thomas H. Stanton, “Loans and Loan Guarantees,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 12.

48
.
See, generally, Christopher Howard, “Tax Expenditures,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 13.

49
. See, generally, C. Eugene Steuerle & Eric C. Twombly, “Vouchers,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 14.

50
. See, generally, Peter H. Schuck, “Tort Liability,” in Salamon, ed.,
The Tools of Government
, chap. 15.

51
. This apt formulation comes from Richard E. Neustadt,
Presidential Power
(1960).

52
. Isaiah Berlin,
Two Concepts of Liberty
(1958).

53
. See Peter H. Schuck, “Professor Rabin and the Administrative State,”
DePaul Law Review
61 (2012): 595: “To expect the administrative state to be coherent in any meaningful sense is equivalent to expecting the proverbial pig to wear lipstick.”

54
. Pietro Nivola, “Two Cheers for Our Peculiar Politics: America’s Political Process and the Economic Crisis,”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/21-economy-politics-nivola
.

55
. Colleen McCain Nelson, “Tough Slog for Obama’s Gun Orders,”
Wall Street Journal
, April 29, 2013.

56
. Wesley J. Campbell, “Commandeering and Constitutional Change,”
Yale Law Journal
122 (2013): 1104–81.

57
. Nelson W. Polsby, “The Political System,” in Schuck & Wilson, eds.,
Understanding America
, 20.

58
. Martha Derthick, “Federalism,” in Schuck & Wilson, eds.,
Understanding America
, 145.

59
. Polsby, “The Political System,” 23.

60
. Alan I. Abramowitz,
The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization and American Democracy
(2010), 142–57; Thomas Mann, “Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerrymandering Matter?” in Pietro Nivola & David W. Brady, eds.,
Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics
(2006).

61
. See, generally, Richard Briffault, “Super PACs,”
Minnesota Law Review
96 (2012): 1644.

62
.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
, 558 U.S. 50 (2010);
SpeechNow.org
v.
Federal Election Commissionn
, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

63
. On the “independent” voter phenomenon, see Nancy L. Rosenblum,
On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship
(2010).

64
. “Lonely at the Top,”
Economist
, August 4, 2012, 55.

65
. Russell J. Dalton,
The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation Is Reshaping American Politics
, rev. ed. (2008).

66
. On the wasted vote argument, see Peter H. Schuck, “The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics,”
Columbia Law Review
87 (1987): 1356–61.

67
. Torben Iversen & David Soskice, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,”
American Political Science Review
100 (2006): 165–81.

68
. See S. Robert Lichter, “The Media,” in Schuck & Wilson, eds.,
Understanding America
, chap. 7.

69
. Ibid., 204–7.

CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF POLICY MAKING

1
. See, e.g., Martha Bayles, “Popular Culture,” in Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson, eds.,
Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional Nation
(2008), chap. 8.

2
. For two very recent critiques of Congress, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal,
Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Failure of American Democracy
(2013); and Robert G. Kaiser,
Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t
(2013).

3
. Bruce Katz & Jennifer Bradley,
The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities and Metros Are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy
(2013).

4
. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “Learning to Love Volatility,”
Wall Street Journal
, September 16, 2012.

5
. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “State Governments Viewed Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low,”
http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/
.

6
. I am grateful to Henry Aaron for pointing this out.

7
.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012
, tables 428 and 461.

8
. Diane Cardwell, “Few Seize on a U.S. Bond Program Backing Green Energy,”
New York Times
, May 8, 2012.

9
. Martha Derthick,
New Town in Town: Why a Government Program Failed
(1972); Sam Dillon, “In School Aid Race, Many States Are Left Behind,”
New York Times
, April 5, 2010.