A History of Korea (45 page)

Another source of suffering for peasant farmers was military service. Initially the principle that military service was imposed upon the individual and corvee labor was assigned to a household had been strictly kept. As military rosters increased with the reign of Sejo, however, it was impossible to fill the quotas for corvee labor and thus soldiers were frequently mobilized for this duty. The increase in military rosters was a result of the adoption of the
pop
ŏ
p,
or paired provisioner system, which required peasant farmers to serve alternately as conscript soldiers or as sustainers who would provide economic support for
conscripts called to active duty. The nature of military service was increasingly transformed into the corvee labor obligation. To escape this double burden, the men in the military rosters either hired slaves of yangban or landless wanderers to perform corvee labor in their place; the
choy
ŏ
kka,
or support in kind, which these substitutes received from their
poin,
or provisioners, was usually 17–18 bolts of cotton cloth (for men registered as land soldiers) or 20 bolts (for men registered as naval soldiers) for 20 months. Soon payment for corvee service was required to be made directly to the office in charge of corvee labor mobilization in a particular locality. As this was a very high payment, a great number of conscript soldiers and provisioners fled to escape this burden.
⁶
As a result, reportedly nine out of ten houses were abandoned in many rural villages. The escapees moved to other regions to become merchants or slaves, or only to hide.

As compulsory military service proved an increasingly onerous duty to the peasantry, the government doubted the effectiveness of the conscription system manned by the peasants. In 1537 it levied two bolts of cotton cloth, called
kunp’o,
or military cloth, yearly on every prospective conscript and recruited professional soldiers with the payments. Thus the military organization shifted from a system of compulsory conscription to one of career soldiers in the late sixteenth century. This was immediately before the Korean-Japanese war (1592– 1598), when the strength of Chos
ŏ
n’s active duty army numbered no more than 1,000.

Since the sixteenth century the grain loan system drove the peasantry further to the wall. In the fifteenth century the government had operated the
ŭ
ich’ang program, giving loans of grain to needy peasants in the lean spring season. Only the principal sum of grain loans was repaid from the harvest in the fall. Since the late fifteenth century the responsibility for this aid program was transferred to the sangp’y
ŏ
ngch’ang, established to control violent fluctuations in grain prices that occurred because the
ŭ
ich’ang program lacked adequate supplies. Under this new relief system, the peasants paid interest when paying back their grain loans. Although the government set the interest rate at 10 percent, the peasants usually borrowed grain at a far higher interest, thus incurring yet another heavy burden.

By the early sixteenth century Chos
ŏ
n officialdom was divided into two distinct factions, the hun’gu and sarim forces, that were enmeshed in fierce power struggles. Whereas members of the hun’gu faction lived in districts clustered
around the capital, those in the sarim faction mainly led a rural life initially devoted to the education of their youth. Struggles between the two factions, culminating in a series of sahwa, or literati purges, along with subsequent
tangjaeng,
or factional strife, among the literati themselves, were bitter and bloody, splintering the government and sapping the Korean nation of its former vitality.

In the reign of King S
ŏ
ngjong, the locally based Neo-Confucian literati entered the central bureaucracy for the first time. In an effort to check the further expansion of power by the meritorious elite, S
ŏ
ngjong took Kim Chong-jik and his disciples into government service, appointing them to positions in the samsa of the Sah
ŏ
nbu, Saganw
ŏ
n, and Hongmun’gwan, where they took charge of criticisms of the government and the preparation of important state documents. S
ŏ
ngjong proved to be unusually tolerant of official criticism, perhaps because he had acceded to the throne as a child and had been subjected to heavy indoctrination regarding a ruler’s Confucian duty to heed his advisers.

Kim Chong-jik was a member of the Neo-Confucian literati from Ky
ŏ
ngsang province and a son of Kim Suk-cha, the leading disciple of Kil Chae, a man who had remained faithful to Kory
ŏ
by refusing to accept office in the Chos
ŏ
n dynasty. Following the teachings of Kil Chae, Kim Chong-jik and his disciples were more thoroughly indoctrinated in Confucian principles than were the meritorious elite, and they were characterized by idealism, were less experienced in administration, and tended to be idealistic moralists. Under the aegis of King S
ŏ
ngjong, the influence of these Neo-Confucian literati-officials rapidly grew into a major force challenging the preponderant power of the meritorious elite. Thus conflict inevitably developed between the two forces and led to bloody political convulsions of sahwa.

S
ŏ
ngjong managed to balance power between the two factions, and so no direct collision occurred under his reign. This changed dramatically, however, after Y
ŏ
nsan’gun, who subsequently was denied the usual posthumous title, ascended the throne in 1494. Y
ŏ
nsan’gun sought to strengthen royal authority by bringing both the meritorious elite and the Neo-Confucian literati under his control. A man whose outlook differed from his father’s, he gradually sided with the meritorious elite faction, as he hated the literati force that attempted to restrain royal authority through unlimited criticisms. Divining Y
ŏ
nsan’gun’s thoughts, members of the meritorious elite such as Yi K
ŭ
k-ton and Yu Cha-gwang incited the king to purge the court of the Neo-Confucian literati. In doing so, they brought to the fore Kim Il-son’s draft of the annals of King S
ŏ
ngjong’s reign, discussed earlier.While serving as a state historian,
Kim Il-son, a disciple of Kim Chong-jik, had incorporated into his draft for the
S
ŏ
ngjong sillok,
or Annals of King S
ŏ
ngjong, his teacher’s
Cho
ŭ
ije mun,
or Lament for Emperor Yidi. In his writing Kim Chong-jik had mourned the killing of the young Chinese emperor Yidi by his general Xiang Yu. He criticized, metaphorically, King Sejo’s usurpation of the throne and the subsequent murder of his young nephew, King Tanjong. When Kim Il-son’s draft was discovered by Yi K
ŭ
k-ton, who was in charge of compiling the
sillok,
the meritorious elite incited the king to execute Kim Il-son and those closely linked to him. Scores of the Neo-Confucian literati were executed or banished, including Kim Il-son, Ch
ŏ
ng Y
ŏ
-ch’ang, Pyo Y
ŏ
n-mal, and Ch’oe Pu. Kim Chong-jik’s corpse was dug up and beheaded. The power of the Neo-Confucian literati was greatly weakened. This event has been called the
Muo sahwa,
or Purge of 1498, after the designation for the cyclical year of 1498, or the
Sahwa,
History Purge.

After purging the Neo-Confucian literati from the government, Y
ŏ
nsan’gun sought to eliminate all opponents of his kingly authority, including the meritorious elite. He finally found an opportunity in 1504; a group of courtiers connected to the king by marriage, including Im Sa-hong, exposed the fact that key members of the meritorious elite were involved in an incident that occurred in the reign of S
ŏ
ngjong, in which Y
ŏ
nsan’gun’s mother, the Lady Yun, was deposed as the king’s consort and poisoned to death. The enraged Y
ŏ
nsan’gun executed or banished not only many members of the meritorious elite, such as Yun P’il-sang, but also some Neo-Confucian literati who had survived the 1498 purge, such as Kim Koeng-p’il, and then appropriated the property of the ousted meritorious elite. This massive second purge has been known as the
Kapcha sahwa,
or Purge of 1504. Essentially the motive was not Y
ŏ
nsan’gun’s revenge for his mother’s tragic death but rather his intentions to consolidate royal authority.

After eliminating nearly all his critics in the two purges, Y
ŏ
nsan’gun was said to indulge in spending sprees and lewd activities, leading to massive squandering of the state’s fiscal resources. Setting out to undo what his predecessors had done, he banned the Korean alphabet, han’g
ŭ
l, for males, simply because a wall poster criticizing his misconduct was written in that alphabet. For two years he carried on a reign of terror, executing or banishing hundreds of hapless officials. Finally, in 1506, he was forcefully dethroned by the meritorious elite, including Pak W
ŏ
n-jong, S
ŏ
ng H
ŭ
i-an, and Yu Sun-j
ŏ
ng, and was replaced by his half-brother, King Chungjong (1506–1544). He was dishonored after his death and called “Y
ŏ
nsan’gun,” or Prince of Y
ŏ
nsan. The prime players in the coup
included opportunists who had even abetted his purges. Y
ŏ
nsan’gun’s folly was that instead of ousting the Neo-Confucian literati along with the meritorious elite, he should have made the former his allies by having them fill the posts left vacant by the latter and distributing the forfeited property to the populace. The meritorious elite, after all, had expelled him from the throne by force, whereas the Neo-Confucian literati had simply justified the coup by pen. Perhaps, had he acted more wisely, he might not have been dethroned.

Increasingly tired of the abuse of power by the meritorious elite who had brought him to the throne, King Chungjong took the young Neo-Confucian scholar Cho Kwang-jo into government service in 1515, appointing him to a succession of influential government positions, including that of inspector-general. Securing the confidence of Chungjong, Cho Kwang-jo carried out a series of reforms to create the hypothetical, ideal Confucian state. In an effort to correct the behavior of the king in the aftermath of Y
ŏ
nsan’gun’s tyranny, he tightened up ky
ŏ
ngy
ŏ
n. To inculcate Confucian ideals in the general populace, he implemented the
hyangyak,
or village code, a rule for local self-government. To stabilize peasants’ livelihood, he attempted to redress the abuses of expanded agricultural estates and indirect payment of the tribute tax. Cho proposed in 1518, and secured in 1519, enactment of the
hy
ŏ
llyangkwa,
or examination for the learned and virtuous; this required that individuals holding responsible central and local government posts recommend men of talent and integrity to take a simplified examination, held in the presence of the king, for recruitment into officialdom. In 1519, 28 successful candidates were selected from 120 who had been recommended to take the exam. Most of them, like Cho Kwang-jo, were dedicated Neo-Confucian literati, who furiously attacked existing institutions and high-level officials. In the process they incurred the enmity of the meritorious elite and even alarmed Chungjong by their obvious threat to the exercise of strong regal power.

In 1519 Cho Kwang-jo launched a campaign to rescind the awards, including the titles of merit subjects, farmland, and slaves, that had been bestowed on many as a reward for setting King Chungjong on the throne. He succeeded in persuading the king to delete 76 names from the 100 on the merit roster. The enraged merit subjects, particularly Sim Ch
ŏ
ng and Nam Kon, incited Chungjong’s fear that his own position might be in jeopardy, as they unjustly accused Cho Kwang-jo of committing high treason by planning to enthrone himself. Having tired of Cho’s excessive pressure on him, Chungjong executed Cho and his leading supporters in an event that is known as the
Kimyo sahwa,
or Purge
of 1519, which again dealt a severe blow to the power of the Neo-Confucian literati.

The fourth purge, known as the
Ŭ
lsa sahwa,
or Purge of 1545, resulted from the successive enthronement of two sons of King Chungjong by different consorts. Even before Chungjong’s death, government officials had formed factions around brothers of the two queens. The accession of King Injong (1544–1545), Chungjong’s eldest son, led his maternal uncle, Yun Im, and his faction, the
Taeyun,
or Senior Yun, to seize power. The Taeyun faction consisted mainly of locally based young Neo-Confucian scholars identified with Cho Kwang-jo. Injong’s untimely death, however, brought his younger brother, King My
ŏ
ngjong (1545–1567), to the throne. This time My
ŏ
ngjong’s maternal uncle, Yun W
ŏ
n-hy
ŏ
ng, and his faction, the
Soyun,
or Junior Yun, came into power. The Soyun faction was made up largely by Seoul-based established men. The Yun W
ŏ
n-hy
ŏ
ng faction charged the Yun Im faction with attempting to kill My
ŏ
ngjong, with the intent of purging the latter force from the government. Once again, many promising Neo-Confucian scholar-officials were killed or banished.

The main theme of all four literati purges was the struggle for power between the meritorious elite and the Neo-Confucian literati. In the course of the bloody purges, the Neo-Confucian literati suffered blow after blow, but despite their repeated setbacks, they slowly and steadily took back the political initiative from the meritorious elite. Their continual supply of manpower made this possible. After these purges, factional rivalries became a major motif of Chos
ŏ
n politics, taking precedence over the general welfare of the populace.