A History of Korea (47 page)

The formulation of the material ki doctrine was completed by Yi I (Yulgok), following the thinking of such scholars as S
ŏ
Ky
ŏ
ng-d
ŏ
k and Ki Tae-s
ŭ
ng. Contrary to Yi Hwang’s concepts, Yi I thought that human nature, i, could be manifested only through its ki, or physical aspects. Along with his followers he sought to grasp the laws governing the material world, and thus emphasized external experience and observation of nature, as well as breadth of learning. A famed philosopher almost equal to Yi Hwang, Yi I thus advanced many proposals for reforming government, economics, and national defense. The ki school of thought was carried on by scholars including S
ŏ
ng Hon, Song Ik-p’il, Kim Changsaeng, and Ch
ŏ
ng Y
ŏ
p, and became known as the Kiho (Ky
ŏ
nggi and Ch’ungch’
ŏ
ng provinces) school.

As factional struggles grew increasingly intense in the late sixteenth century, disaster struck Chos
ŏ
n in the form of a massive Japanese invasion. Already in 1510, as a result of Chos
ŏ
n’s tightening grip on Japanese trade, Japanese residents in the three open ports had rebelled. At the time Chos
ŏ
n felt threatened by the Japanese demand to expand trade and by the growing number of Japanese residents in the three ports. After this rebellion was suppressed, Chos
ŏ
n cut in half the number of Japanese ships permitted in the ports and limited the volume of rice and beans to be given or traded with the Japanese. The result was occasional large-scale attacks by Japanese pirates on the Chos
ŏ
n coast. In 1555 the Japanese plundered Chos
ŏ
n’s southwest coastal regions but were repelled by Chos
ŏ
n forces. Suffering sporadic Japanese attacks on its coasts, in 1517 Chos
ŏ
n established the Piby
ŏ
nsa, or Border Defense Council, jointly staffed by civil and military officials, which was responsible for all matters relating to national defense. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, Chos
ŏ
n society as a whole was accustomed to centuries of peace and sank into complacency.

At this very point, a new political development in Japan brought the return of centralized control. In 1590 Toyotomi Hideyoshi emerged as the power behind the throne, establishing mastery over the entire Japanese nation. He then decided to invade China, indirectly, through Chos
ŏ
n. Apart from his desire to make Japan the dominant power in East Asia, he also wished to distract his warlords, restless from inactivity, from domestic affairs. Thus he demanded that Chos
ŏ
n give him free passage to China.

To determine Toyotomi’s intentions, in 1590 Chos
ŏ
n sent two emissaries, one each from the Easterners and Westerners, to meet with him in Japan. When they returned in 1591, their opinions were divided. Hwang Yun-gil of the Westerners reported that war was imminent, whereas Kim S
ŏ
ng-il of the Easterners claimed that Toyotomi was merely bluffing, thus leaving the Chos
ŏ
n court uncertain about a possible Japanese attack. The returning emissaries carried back a letter from Toyotomi demanding that his forces be allowed to pass through Chos
ŏ
n in order to attack Ming China. Chos
ŏ
n refused this demand, which would have meant the Japanese occupation of Chos
ŏ
n.

After two centuries of peace, Chos
ŏ
n forces were disorganized, ill-trained, and ill-equipped, and were scattered across the country. Koreans were totally unprepared for warfare. The only preparations at the time were by Admiral Yi Sun-sin, the commander of the left naval command of Ch
ŏ
lla province, guarding the southwestern coastline. Yi Sun-sin was an inventor and one of history’s most effective naval commanders. Appointed to the post in 1591, he strengthened his naval forces and set about building warships and training their crews. Specifically, on the model of vessels already in use in the mid-fifteenth century, he built his well-known
k
ŏ
buks
ŏ
n,
or turtle ships, the world’s first ironclad warships, which would play a leading role in the forthcoming war.

In May 1592, a Japanese force of 158,000 launched a surprise attack on Chos
ŏ
n, first landing at Pusan. Taking advantage of a unified command and superior weaponry, particularly matchlock guns that were unfamiliar to the Chos
ŏ
n military, the invaders soon overwhelmed the numerically inferior and ill-equipped defenders. Ch
ŏ
ng Pal, commander of the Pusan garrison, and Song Sang-hy
ŏ
n, magistrate of neighboring Tongnae, tenaciously defended the two beachheads, but to no avail. The Japanese then launched a three-pronged attack northward to Seoul. The Japanese met with little effective resistance, as the Chos
ŏ
n leadership was disorganized and had failed to prepare for the invasion. The stunned Chos
ŏ
n court pinned its hopes on General Sin Nip, but he suffered utter defeat at Ch’ungju in late May. Two days after the defeat, King S
ŏ
njo escaped to
Pyongyang and then to the northern border town of
Ŭ
iju. The Japanese occupied the capital in June, but by then parts of Seoul had already been looted and burned (particularly the registry that maintained the slave rosters), and the entire capital had been abandoned by its inhabitants.

After occupying Seoul, Japanese forces divided and took two opposite directions: Konishi Yukinaga’s forces took Pyongyang, and Kato Kiyomasa’s troops advanced on the east coast toward the Tumen River. At the border area in the northeastern part of the Korean peninsula, Kato captured two Chos
ŏ
n princes who had been dispatched to raise troops in Hamgy
ŏ
ng and Kangw
ŏ
n provinces. The situation went from bad to worse, as Koreans were massacred by Japanese forces everywhere. The invaders collected enough ears and noses (cutting parts off enemy bodies for making casualty counts was accepted practice) to build a large mound, which the Japanese termed
Mimizuka,
or the Mound of Ears, in their country.

The overall Japanese strategy was to invade and occupy Chos
ŏ
n’s southeast and central regions with ground forces while its navy attacked and occupied the rice-rich areas of Ch
ŏ
lla and Ch’ungch’
ŏ
ng provinces, ensuring a food supply for their land forces. This general plan failed, however, as the Japanese suffered defeats at sea.

Chos
ŏ
n dominance at sea was credited to the brilliance of Admiral Yi Sunsin, who gained decisive victories in a series of naval battles, intercepting and scattering a large Japanese reinforcement convoy. His first triumph was at Okp’o, followed by victories at Sach’
ŏ
n, Tangp’o, Tanghangp’o, Angolp’o, Hansan-do, and Pusan, from June to October 1592. The battle in the seas off Hansan-do in July is particularly well known as one of the three great victories of the war against the Japanese. There Yi’s navy sank 63 large Japanese ships. Beginning in October Yi’s navy seized complete control of the sea, cutting off Japanese forces in Chos
ŏ
n from their homeland. No more reinforcements or supplies could be shipped from Japan.

On land, as well, the Japanese positions increasingly weakened. The general populace at first was infuriated at the government’s incompetence and irresponsibility, and some even collaborated with the enemy. But now the same people began to volunteer for the militia called the
ŭ
iby
ŏ
ng,
or righteous army, mostly because they were enraged by Japanese atrocities against Korean civilians. The yangban literati, peasants, and even slaves in a single district coalesced around a
ŭ
iby
ŏ
ng leader and constantly harassed the Japanese. The
ŭ
iby
ŏ
ng leaders were generally Neo-Confucian literati of high repute in their locales and included
such outstanding figures as Kwak Chae-u, Kim My
ŏ
n, Ch
ŏ
ng In-hong, and Kw
ŏ
n
Ŭ
ng-su of Ky
ŏ
ngsang province; Cho H
ŏ
n of Ch’ungch’
ŏ
ng province; Ko Ky
ŏ
ng-my
ŏ
ng of Ch
ŏ
lla province; Kim Ch’
ŏ
n-il, Sim Tae, and Hong Kye-nam of Ky
ŏ
nggi province; Yi Ch
ŏ
ng-am of Hwanghae province; Cho Hoik and Yang T
ŏ
k-nok of P’y
ŏ
ngan province; and Ch
ŏ
ng Mun-bu of Hamgy
ŏ
ng province. Bands of Buddhist monks, led by honored figures such as Hyuj
ŏ
ng and Yuj
ŏ
ng, often struck severe blows to Japanese military operations.

In January 1593, with its own security threatened, Ming China dispatched a 40,000-strong relief army commanded by Li Rusonh to Chos
ŏ
n. In early February the combined Ming and Chos
ŏ
n troops recaptured Pyongyang and pushed the Japanese southward. After suffering a heavy loss in a battle at Py
ŏ
kchegwan just north of Seoul, however, the Chinese withdrew to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, a Chos
ŏ
n force of a few thousand under Kw
ŏ
n Yul, which had been garrisoned in the mountain redoubt at Haengju on the north bank of the Han River, attempted to launch a combined operation with Chinese forces to retake Seoul. But when the Ming army pulled back to Pyongyang, the Korean defenders, including women, were left isolated. Bolstered by the victory at Py
ŏ
kchegwan, 43,000 Japanese troops repeatedly launched large-scale assaults against the mountain fortress at Haengju. After nine massive assaults and enormous casualties, the Japanese retreated in March 1593. The battle at Haengju was an important victory for the Korean army, as it greatly raised its morale. The battle has been celebrated as one of the three great Chos
ŏ
n victories in the struggle against the Japanese invaders.

Under multiple pressures, particularly the interruption of supplies from Japan, the Japanese experienced many setbacks in Chos
ŏ
n. The top Japanese generals, including Konishi Yukinaga, sued for peace and began negotiations for a truce with Ming forces that desired to return home. While negotiations for peace were under way, Japanese forces retreated from Seoul to an enclave around Pusan. They were determined to occupy the Chos
ŏ
n stronghold of Chinju, situated in the Japanese-held areas, which was blocking the coordination of Japanese forces as well as defending the rice-rich Ch
ŏ
lla province. Already in November 1592 a 3,000-man Chos
ŏ
n force commanded by Kim Simin had soundly defeated a major Japanese force, which lost more than 30,000 men. This decisive Japanese defeat is considered one of the three great Chos
ŏ
n victories of the war. In July 1593 some 79,000 Japanese troops attacked the town once again, and despite a heroic defense led by Kim Ch’
ŏ
n-il, Chinju fell and the Japanese slaughtered many of its inhabitants.

From April 1593 on, truce negotiations continued between Ming and Japan but with no agreement. Meanwhile, Japan withdrew almost all its forces from Chos
ŏ
n, and Ming also pulled most of its troops out. The Japanese now believed that they won the war, but the Chinese insisted that Japan become a vassal state to Ming. The truce talks dragged on for three years and eventually ended with each side far apart in their demands. The Chinese tried to enfeoff Toyotomi as the king of Japan, but Toyotomi, for his part, demanded that Chos
ŏ
n first cede four southern provinces to Japan, that Ming send a daughter of the emperor to Japan as a consort of the Japanese “emperor,” and that Chos
ŏ
n send a prince and several high officials to Japan as hostages. Because of the huge gap in the bargaining positions, there was no hope for a settlement. In the end peace negotiations dissolved, and the war entered its second phase when Toyotomi sent another force to invade Chos
ŏ
n.

In February 1597 141,000 Japanese troops again sailed to Chos
ŏ
n. This time, however, the Japanese met much stronger opposition, as the Chos
ŏ
n forces were better equipped and prepared to fight. Landing near Pusan, the Japanese drove north, devastating much of Chos
ŏ
n and causing Ming China to step in again and send forces. Throughout the second invasion, however, the Japanese were confined mainly to Ky
ŏ
ngsang province. At sea, however, the Chos
ŏ
n navy suffered a crushing defeat in July 1597. This came about when Yi Sun-sin learned that the Japanese were attempting to lure him into a trap and so he refused a royal order to attack. Thereupon Yi Sun-sin was dismissed as commander-in-chief of the Chos
ŏ
n naval forces and was replaced by W
ŏ
n Kyun. But W
ŏ
n proved incompetent, leading the Chos
ŏ
n fleet to destruction off Pusan in the battle at Ch’ilch’
ŏ
nnyang. He was killed in action, and 157 of 169 Chos
ŏ
n ships were lost.

Dismayed by the debacle at Ch’ilch’
ŏ
nnyang, the Chos
ŏ
n government reinstated Admiral Yi Sun-sin, who reorganized the navy, now reduced to only 12 ships and 200 men. With these few ships, Yi Sun-sin engaged a Japanese fleet of 300 ships in the My
ŏ
ngnyang strait, near present-day Mokp’o, South Ch
ŏ
lla province, and, using his wide experience and knowledge of tides and currents, he achieved a smashing victory in October 1597 and regained control of the sea.