Authors: Andrei Lankov
Of course, the “three no” proposal is not without serious downsides. From the US point of view, such a deal would mean that North Korea is rewarded for its nuclear blackmail. Indeed, North Korea is so far the world’s only state that first signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then withdrew from the NPT and successfully developed a workable nuclear device. If it is not only allowed to keep its nuclear arsenal but also manages to squeeze some monetary aid from the United States, this will clearly create a dangerous precedent. Control—especially in regard to proliferation—is also a difficult issue because few would doubt that the North Korean side would use every opportunity to cheat. Last but not least, it is important to keep in mind that signed treaties have virtually no binding power in the North Korean leaders’ frame of mind, so we can be sure that the North Korean side will keep its obligations only as long as they receive a steady supply of aid and other payments.
However, although these problems and concerns are real, it nonetheless might make sense to accept the “three no” approach. The alternatives are even less attractive. The North Korean government is not going to remain idle while Washington ignores it. North Korean engineers will work hard to produce more uranium and plutonium, to perfect available technologies
while the North Korean diplomats quietly but persistently explore possible markets for nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, missile engineers will continue their work as well, and sooner or later they will develop a sufficiently reliable long-range delivery system that is quite capable of hitting the continental United States. In January 2011 the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that North Korea is “within five years of being able to strike the continental United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile.”
3
As head of the US military establishment, Robert Gates might have an instinct for exaggerating threats—and some people have assumed that he exaggerated the Soviet missile threat as the CIA head in the 1980s.
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Chances are, then, that it will probably take longer than five years—but it will happen sooner or later if the Kim family regime stays in control long enough. And there is little doubt that, while their engineers and spies are working hard, North Korean politicians will stage occasional confrontations, just to remind the world that they are capable of inflicting damage if their demands are ignored.
In order to prevent such developments, it might make sense to seriously consider the “three no” approach—in spite of its only too obvious shortcomings. But, even if such an approach is accepted, one should enter the deal without any illusions. This is merely the way to buy time—and quite an imperfect way at that.
Another possible and useful palliative is the maintenance of the six-party talks that are currently in yet another hibernation period. Ostensibly these talks were once initiated in order to bring about the complete denuclearization of North Korea. This stated goal is unachievable (or, to be more precise, talks will not contribute much in achieving this goal). However, this does not necessarily mean that the six-party talks are of little or no value.
There are at least two important functions the six-party talks serve well. First, the very existence of negotiations contributes toward stability in and around North Korea; the six-party talks marginally reduce the likelihood of military confrontation in the region.
That said, it is the second function that is of special importance. The six-party talks create a convenient venue for diplomats of all interested
countries to discuss North Korea-related problems. The six-party talks are not going to reach their stated goal of denuclearization, but they are a natural place to agree on positions and actions in case of a major crisis. When a new crisis comes (and it will come sooner or later), interested parties will have precious little time to discuss manifold challenges, so speedy and reliable interactions between all major stakeholders will be vital. Neither the unwieldy UN bureaucracy nor standard diplomatic channels are efficient and fast enough in addressing such an emergency; and the stakes in a grave crisis may be very high.
It is therefore a good idea to keep the six-party talks in place—partially as a way to mitigate tensions and handle the ongoing problems but largely as a place where future North Korea—related issues can be dealt with quickly and decisively. Taking into account the possible political and diplomatic consequences of regime collapse in the North, this is a cheap and efficient measure. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the main goal: waiting for (and, to an extent, promoting) regime transformation inside North Korea. The measures outlined above should be seen realistically. Short-term policies are painkillers—not antibiotics.
What to say in concluding this book? Perhaps we should start with two pieces of bad news: first, North Korea is a problem; and second, this problem has no fast or easy solution.
Who is responsible for the North Korean tragedy? Starry-eyed West European intellectuals who in the 1840 and 1850s, surrounded by gross injustices and inequalities, suggested an alternative to the nascent capitalist system? Or young East Asian idealists who in the 1920s enthusiastically embraced the Marxist (or, rather, Leninist) recipes as a way for national salvation? Or battle-hardened Soviet commanders who in the 1940s wanted to “liberate” the Korean people while creating a friendly government in a neighboring country? Or the North Koreans who in the 1950s came to believe that the Soviet (or, rather, Stalinist) model would provide them with a blueprint for building a new Korean nation, powerful, prosperous, and proud? The sad part of the North Korean story is that most of its key players—or key culprits, should we say?—were decent human beings, often driven by noble and admirable motivation. They made decisions that seemed logical at the time. The accumulated result is, however, a complete mess, with no easy and universally acceptable solution in sight.
North Korea remains a problem for the outside world because in order to survive, its decision makers have no choice but to live dangerously. Real or alleged proliferation attempts, nuclear and missile tests, and occasional shoot-outs do not reflect the insane bellicosity or irrationality of the North Korean leadership. On the contrary, these actions are manifestations of a quite rational survival strategy that might have no viable alternative if judged from the point of view of Pyongyang’s tiny elite.
We should bear in mind the fact that we outsiders are not the primary victims of North Korea’s situation. The greatest suffering is borne by the North Korean people who are the major victims of the North Korean tragedy. While other nations of East Asia enjoy an era of unprecedented improvement in living standards, educational achievement, and life expectancy, North Koreans are stuck with a system that is both repressive politically and grotesquely inefficient economically. Many of them have found ways to cope, but on balance the current situation has brought ruin to countless lives and has led to a great waste of human creative force and energy—and continues to do so.
At the same time, the North Korean problem does not have any easy solution. So far the policies of Seoul and Washington have oscillated between a hard- and soft-line approach. But neither is going to produce much impact on the international and domestic behavior of the North Korean elite. These people cannot be bribed into changing themselves and their country, nor can they be blackmailed into reform.
Nonetheless, there is also good news. The North Korean regime is not sustainable in the long run. Subtle and spontaneous change is gradually eroding the ideological, political, and even economic foundations of the regime. The government understands how dangerous these spontaneous changes are, but cannot do much about the situation; the erosion cannot be halted, let alone reversed. It is not impossible that Kim Jong Un and his future confidants (yet to be seen at the time of writing) will take risks and initiate reforms, hoping to create a North Korean version of a “developmental dictatorship.” One can wish them some luck, since gradual evolution is usually better than dramatic and violent upheaval, but—perhaps unfortunately—such a reformist regime has little chance of remaining stable in the presence of an affluent South that is so near.
So what can the outside world do? Frankly, not all that much. It can in some ways attempt to speed up the slow-motion erosion of the Kim family dictatorship, creating forces that will demand change, while also ensuring that the coming crisis will be less chaotic and painful. It makes some sense to speed things up somehow—after all, if the inevitable happens a few years earlier it will mean that fewer people will die in prison camps and more people will have the chance to live, work, and raise children in a
more decent society. For the outside world, it means one or two fewer major crises. Nonetheless, one should not become too enthusiastic about these attempts to speed up the inevitable: such efforts, however admirable and useful, will have a relatively moderate impact on the situation.
It is even more important to prepare for the post-unification mess because it will bring difficult and often unforeseen challenges (and the North Korean crisis is bound to be messy). Admittedly the potential threats associated with North Korea’s collapse are widely understood, but usually it makes people fantasize about a gradual transformation of the regime along Chinese lines as the way to deliver a “soft landing.” Unfortunately, a soft landing, while not completely impossible and indeed desirable, is not very probable. Instead, we are likely to face either of two scenarios: either a hard landing or the extended survival of the regime in its existing form followed, in due time, by an even harder landing. Thus, the only way to achieve the desirable soft landing is to make the hard landing as soft as possible—or, speaking less metaphorically, to find ways to mitigate the social and economic disasters that will be brought about by the likely collapse of the regime.
There is one problem we should keep in mind, however—the policies that might help to change North Korea eventually are not going to sell well in the countries that have the largest stakes in promoting such a change—above all, in the United States and South Korea. This is not because these policies are expensive or difficult to implement or might lead to unnecessary complications. On the contrary, these policies are cheap—so cheap, actually, that in some cases contributions by individuals might make a difference. But there is a serious problem with all of these policies—they require long-term commitments to goals that are likely to be achieved well after the next election cycle. These are not the types of policies that sell well in a democracy, at least as long as official bureaucracies and political decision makers are involved.
Even though such programs as support for broadcasting or providing scholarships for refugees will hardly cost more than a few million dollars a year, one cannot expect them to win the ringing endorsement of professional politicians once they realize that the impact is likely to be felt by the next generation and that it will be quite difficult to attribute the success to their policies.
Alas, the hawkish approach sells well when the regime under consideration is a repulsive hereditary dictatorship. It is very good for both politicians’ self-esteem and election results to insist that “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it,” even when such lofty statements are nonsensical and have no impact on the world outside polling stations.
The sales pitch of the doves is equally powerful. Indeed, it is appealing to say that North Korean decision makers are also “humans who love their families,” so sufficient kindness in dealing with them will help to bring about a wonderful world of mutual harmony. There is no doubt that North Korean leaders are humans who love their families—actually this wonderful and noble feeling might be one of the major reasons behind what they doing. After all, as we have seen, they believe that not only their future but that of their loved ones is contingent on the continued existence of their regime and this regime can be maintained only through skillful diplomatic brinkmanship and the generous application of terror within state borders.
This is the sorry reality of modern democratic politics, once described by Winston Churchill as “the worst form of government.” Churchill later added, however, that “except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time,” we should not despair. If government bureaucracies are not particularly interested, part of the work can and should be done by private foundations and individuals. Everything that improves interactions between North Koreans and the outside world should be welcomed and supported.
North Korean history is another sad example of how lofty ideals and good intentions can turn sour. The founding fathers of North Korea might be brutal and shrewd, but they were neither cold-minded killers nor power-hungry politicos. Rather, they were sincere—if ruthless—idealists who wanted to bring about a perfect world. They made the wrong choice, however, and in due course their children and grandchildren found themselves captives of a brutal and inefficient system. This wasn’t anybody’s intention, since most of the key participants in the North Korean tragedy were rational and often well-meaning human beings. Nevertheless, the result was and remains a disaster, and this disaster is likely to continue for a few more years or even decades—and its consequences are likely to haunt Koreans for generations.
CHAPTER
1
1
. For those who want to learn about North Korean history in some depth, the best introduction is a short book by Adrian Buzo (its main emphasis is on the 1965–1995 events, however).
Adrian Buzo,
The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).
2
. Chay Jongsuk,
Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948–1953
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 32–33.