Authors: Andrei Lankov
3
. On the factions in the North Korea leadership and the complicated domestic politics of the 1940s see: Andrei Lankov,
From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).
4
. The best biography of Kim Il Sung was written by Dae-Sook Suh in the 1980s, before the Soviet archives were opened and provided a wealth of additional material. However, most of what he wrote in the 1980s managed to stand such a hard test surprisingly well. See Dae-Sook Suh,
Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
5
. For a detailed discussion of these instructions (complete with referrals to archival material and lengthy quotes) see: Andrei Lankov,
From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 42–47.
6
. For a detailed description of the meeting (based on the evidence of the surviving diary of Shtykov) see: Ch
ŏ
n Hy
ŏ
nsu.
“Switt
ŭ
ikkop’
ŭ
ilki”ka malhan
ŭ
n pukhan ch
ŏ
ngkw
ŏ
n-
ŭ
i s
ŏ
ngrip kwach
ŏ
ng [Shytykov’s diary and the formation of North Korea]
// y
ŏ
ksapip’y
ŏ
ng 1995ny
ŏ
n vol. 32 (1995).
7
. In English, plentiful evidence of such support can be found in a well-researched study of Charles Armstrong, who drew on the wealth of the original North Korean document captured by the US forces during the Korean War. See Charles Armstrong,
The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
8
. For the most up-to-date review on the emerging evidence on the Korean War origin, see materials (bulletins and working papers) of the Cold War International History Project. Of special importance is the working paper by Kathryn Weathersby. Kathryn Weathersby,
“Should We Fear This?” Stalin and the Danger of War with America
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004).
9
. For a detailed description of the 1956 crisis and its consequences, see Andrei Lankov,
Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).
Of special importance is a well-researched work by Balázs Szalontai, who used Eastern European documents to carefully trace the formation of Kim Il Sung’s peculiar version of “national Stalinism.” See Balázs Szalontai,
Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
10
. Research on the educational background of the Manchurian guerrillas was done by Wada Haruki. Wada Haruki,
Kim Il S
ŏ
ng-wa Manchu hangil ch
ŏ
nchaeng [Kim Il Sung and anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria]
(Seoul: Ch’angjak-kwa pip’y
ŏ
ngsa, 1992), 303.
11
. Bernd Schaefer,
North Korean “Adventurism” and China’s Long Shadow, 1966–1972
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004), 9.
This working paper by Bernd Schaefer provides a wealth of new information on the tense relations between China and North Korea in the era of China’s “Cultural revolution.”
12
. Ibid., 5.
13
. Ibid., 2.
14
. Ibid., 7–9.
15
. Not much is written about the debt debacle of the 1970s. For some basic information, see Sophie Roell, “For North Korean Exposure Try Buying Its Debt,”
Dow Jones Newswires
, Pyongyang, May 7, 2001.
16
. For a comprehensive review of the nonclassified material in regard to North Korea’s involvement with smuggling, see Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,”
International Security
vol. 32, iss.1 (2007): 80–111.
17
. There are a large number of publications on the abductions of Japanese citizens. For example, see Patricia Steinhoff, “Kidnapped Japanese in North Korea: The New Left Connection,”
Journal of Japanese Studies
, vol. 30, (Winter 2004): 123–142.
18
. For a detailed study of the politics behind the transfer of the ethnic Koreans to the DPRK, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki,
Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
19
. In 1969 Chad and Central African Republic became the first two states to maintain full diplomatic relations with both Koreas. See Barry Gills,
Korea Versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 132.
20
. Mitchell Lerner,
Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011).
21
. For a comprehensive overview of the PDS since its inception and until its collapse in the 1990s, see No Yong Hwan and Y
ŏ
n Ha Ch’
ŏ
ng,
Pukhan-
ŭ
i chumin saenghwal pochang ch
ŏ
ngch’aek p’y
ŏ
ngka [Evaluation of the welfare policies in North Korea]
(Seoul: Hankuk pok
ŏ
nsahoey
ŏ
nkuw
ŏ
n, 1997), 47–62.
22
. For more information, see Viola Lynne (ed.),
Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
2002), 173; Alex Dowlah, and John Elliot,
The Life and Times of Soviet Socialism
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 168.
23
. Chad Raymond, “No Responsibility and No Rice: The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Collectivization in Vietnam,”
Agricultural History
1 (2008), iss. 1: 49.
24
. Michael Nelson,
War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 163.
25
. Yonhap news report, January 18, 2011.
26
. For the most detailed description of the North Korean prison system in English, see David Hawk,
Hidden Gulag, Second Edition
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012).
27
. Ibid., 30.
28
. See prison memoirs by Kang Ch’
ŏ
l-hwan: Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot,
The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in a North Korean Gulag
(New York: Basic Books, 2001).
29
. Kang Ch’
ŏ
l-hwan. “Pukhan kyogwas
ŏ
sok-
ŭ
i Namhan” [South Korea in North Korean textbooks],
Chos
ŏ
n ilbo
, December 7, 2001, 54.
30
. Yi Hyo-b
ŏ
m and Ch’oe Hy
ŏ
n-ho, “Pukhan kyokwas
ŏ
-r
ŭ
l t’onghan ch’
ŏ
ngsony
ŏ
n kach’igwan y
ŏ
ngu: Kod
ŭ
ng chunghakkyo kongsanjuj
ŭ
i todok 3,4 hakny
ŏ
n chungsim-
ŭ
ro. Pukhan y
ŏ
ngu hakhoebo. [A study of the youth value system through North Korean textbooks: centered around the textbooks for “Communist Morality” for years 3 and 4 in high school],”
Pukhan y
ŏ
ngu hakhoebo
, 2000, iss. 2, 250.
31
.
DPR Korea 2008 Population Census. National Report
(Pyongyang: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).
32
.
World Health Statistics 2011
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011), 116–122.
33
. Brian Myers, “The Watershed That Wasn’t: Re-evaluating Kim Il Sung’s ‘Juche speech’ of 1955,”
Acta Koreana
, 2006, iss. 9: 89–115.
34
. Kim Jong Il,
On the Juche Idea of Our Party
(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), 7.
35
. The life story of Kim Jong Il has been a topic of many works, but due to the nature of his regime it is often difficult to distinguish between facts and unsubstantiated rumors. So far, the most comprehensive Kim Jong Il biography in English is Michael Breen,
Kim Jong-il: North Korea’s Dear Leader
(Singapore and Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2004).
36
. George McCune,
Korea
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 56–57.
37
. Historical statistics compiled by Angus Maddison and his research team. Available for download at:
www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_02-2010.xls
.
38
. On the scale of the North Korean military, see Nicholas Eberstadt,
Korea Approaches Reunification
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 51–72.
CHAPTER
2
1
. For trade statistics, see Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig,
North Korea Through the Looking Glass
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 44–45.
2
. Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,”
Population and Development Review
, vol. 27 (2001), iss. 2: 219–238.
3
. Pak Keong-Suk, “Economic Hardship and Famines since the 1990s and Their Impact on Population Dynamics in North Korea,” Presentation at the 51 Asia Seminar at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, December 2010.
4
. Daniel Goodkind, Loraine West, and Peter Johnson, “A Reassessment of Mortality in North Korea, 1993–2008,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America March 31–April 2, 2011, Washington, D.C.
5
. Kim Byung-Yeon and Song Dongho, “The Participation of North Korean Households in the Informal Economy: Size, Determinants, and Effect,”
Seoul Journal of Economics
, vol. 21 (2008), iss. 2, 373.
6
. Kim Py
ŏ
n Y
ŏ
n and Yang Mun Su,
Pukhan ky
ŏ
ngche-es
ŏ
ŭ
i sichangkwa ch
ŏ
ngpu [The government and market in North Korean economy]
(Seoul, S
ŏ
ul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anmunhwaw
ŏ
n, 2012), 124.
7
. Ibid., 124.
8
. The decrease in official-sponsored drug production was reported by the AFP (Agence France-Presse), which cited the US State Department. See “US says N. Korea’s State Drug Trafficking on Wane,”
Asiaone News
, March 4, 2011, accessed at
news.asiaone.com
. This agrees quite well with the observations of the present author.
9
. Yi Y
ŏ
ng-guk told his own story in a recently published book: Yi Y
ŏ
ng-guk,
Na-n
ŭ
n Kim Ch
ŏ
ng-il ky
ŏ
nghowon i
ŏ
ssta [I was the bodyguard of Kim Jong I])
(Seoul: Sidae ch
ŏ
ngsin, 2004).
10
.
P Tumankang-
ŭ
l k
ŏ
nn
ŏ
on saramt
ŭ
l [People who have crossed the Tumen River]
(Seoul: Ch
ŏ
ngdo ch’ulp’an, 1999), 27.
11
. For a review of the existent research on the number of North Korean refugees in China, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland,
Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights Into North Korea
(Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 2.
12
. For a description of such VIP defection (arranged for an aged woman by her daughter), see Barbara Demick,
Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea
(New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010), 239–247. In her informative and highly recommended book, Demick also provides detailed descriptions of far more common, cheap defections.
13
. Some rough estimates of the scale of remittances have been made in 2009–11 by a number of people, including the present author. These estimates lay in the $5–20 million range.
14
. International Crisis Group,
Strangers At Home: North Koreans in the South Report N°208
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), 14–15. This report is the latest (and arguably the best) of a small number of English-language materials dealing with the refugee problem in South Korea. There is a large number of Korean-language material, however.
15
. The spread of videos was widely reported by refugees and the media. For a detailed account of the North Korean “video revolution,” see Yi Chu-chol, “Pukhan chuminui oepu chongpo suyong taeto pyonhwa” [The Research of Changes in North Koreans’ Attitudes toward the Outside World Information],
Hankuk tongpuka nonchong
, vol. 46 (2008): 245–248.
16
. InterMedia, “International Broadcasting in North Korea: North Korean Refugee/Traveler Survey Report,” April–August 2009.
17
. Remarks about the role of the computer as a status symbol: Kim Po-k
ŏ
n. “The 5 storages and 6 contraptions which serve as symbols of prosperity in North Korea,”
T’ongil Hankuk [Unified Korea]
vol. 27 (2009), iss. 1: 80. I would add that in my own talks with defectors this new symbolic significance of the computer was mentioned frequently.
CHAPTER
3
1
. Surjit Bhalla,
Imagine There’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in the Era of Globalization
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2002), 16.
2
. According to the calculations of Angus Maddison, the most respected economic historian of our days, in 1960 the per capita GDP was: $1,226 for South Korea, $1,277 for Somalia, $1,353 for Taiwan, $1,445 for Senegal (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars).