By All Means Necessary (41 page)

25
. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference on December 18, 2008, ”
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t526955.htm
.

26
. Ibid.

27
. “PLA Navy Escort Mission.”

28
. China Military Online, “14th and 15th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforces Complete Mission Handover, ”
People's Daily Online
, August 26, 2013,
http://english.people.com.cn/90786/8377070.html
.

29
. Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “Four Years of Anti-Piracy Mission: Chinese Navy's Showcase Achievement, ” National Maritime Foundation, January 22, 2013,
http://www.maritimeindia.org/four-years-anti-piracy-mission-chinese-navy%E2%80%99s-showcase-achievement.html
.

30
. Daozu Bao, “Pirate Attacks Prompt Tighter Security, ”
China Daily
, November 26, 2010,
http://english.sina.com/china/2010/1125/349691.html
.

31
. In June 2008, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that called on countries to use “‘all necessary means' to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.” See Department of Public Information, “Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery off Somalia's Coast, Authorizes for Six Month ‘All
Necessary Means' to Repress Such Acts: Resolution 1816 (2008) Adopted Unanimously with Somalia's Consent; Measures Do Not Affect Rights, Obligations Under Law of Sea Convention, ” UN Security Council, June 2, 2008; and UN Security Council, “Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Vessels in Territorial Waters and the High Seas off the Coast of Somalia, ” S/RES/1816 (2008), June 2, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48464c622.html
. In October 2008, the UNSC passed another resolution that urged “States that have the capacity to do so to cooperate with the [Transitional Federal Government] in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea in conformity with the provisions of resolution 1816 (2008)” and followed it up with another resolution in early December 2008 that called upon “states and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia…by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft.” See UN Security Council, “Security Council Resolution 1838 (2009) on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Vessels in Territorial Waters and the High Seas off the Coast of Somalia, ” S/RES/1838 (2008), October 7, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48ef651f2.html
; and UN Security Council, “Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008) on Repressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, ” S/RES/1846 (2008), December 2, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493e3f852.html
. The UNSC repeated this call to action later on December 16, 2008. See UN Security Council, “Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) on Fight Against Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, ” S/RES/1851 (2008), December 16, 2008,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4952044e2.html
. By the time China deployed, many other countries, among them Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Russia, and India as well as EU member states (Finland and France) and NATO forces, were already active in counter-piracy operations in the region. See Commodore Per Bigum Christensen, “Task Force 150 Anti-piracy Operations, ” presentation, Combined Maritime Forces, January 25, 2009,
http://www.doc-txt.com/Pirates.ppt
; Admiral Danish Fleet, “Task Force 150 / 151, ” Navy, accessed on March 1, 2013,
http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/eng/International/TF150/Pages/default.aspx
; and Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs, “New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established, ” U.S. Navy NNS090108-01, January 8, 2009,
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=41687
.

32
. “Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, ” Combined Maritime Forces, accessed September 5, 2013,
http://web.archive.org/web/20121022004947/
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/
.

33
. “CMF Hosts 21st SHADE Meeting, ” Combined Maritime Forces, September 27, 2011,
http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2011/09/27/cmf-hosts-21st-shade-meeting/
.

34
. Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean, ”
Naval War College Review
64, no. 1 (Winter 2011).

35
. C. Raja Mohan,
Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 127.

36
. Declan Walsh, “Chinese Company Will Run Strategic Pakistani Port, ”
New York Times
, January 31, 2013.

37
. As reported in Farhan Bokhari and Kathrin Hille, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base, ”
Financial Times
, May 22, 2011. See also Gideon Rachman, “A Chinese Base in Pakistan?” The World,
Financial Times,
May 23, 2011,
http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2011/05/a-chinese-base-in-pakistan/
.

38
. The authors thank Erica Downs for this observation.

39
. “Hoffman, 2010, p. 54.” As cited in Ryan Henry et al.,
Promoting International Energy Security: Volume 3, Sea-Lanes to Asia
, RAND Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2012), 23.

40
. “The term ‘place' as opposed to a ‘base' was used by Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, then commander, U.S. Pacific Command, during March 31, 2004, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, available at
www.pacom.mil/
.” As cited in Kostecka, “Places and Bases.”

41
. Dingli Shen, “Don't Shun the Idea of Setting up Overseas Military Bases, ”
China.org.cn
, January 8, 2010,
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm
.

42
. Kostecka, “Places and Bases, ” 72.

43
. Ibid.

44
. The first stage was completed in 2009 and runs west to east from Taishet (in East Siberia) to Skovorodino, roughly forty miles from the Chinese border, but still in Russian territory. This part of the pipeline has a capacity of 600, 000 barrels a day. In 2009, China agreed to finance Russian construction of a thirty-eight-mile overland spur to China. Under the deal, backed by $25 billion in Chinese loans, Russia agreed to sell China 300, 000 barrels of oil a day through the pipeline for twenty years. CNPC and the Russian company Rosneft then signed a twenty-year contract for the delivery of 300, 000 barrels per day to China, starting in 2011. See Platts, “Russian Crude Oil Exports to the Pacific Basin—an ESPO Update, ” Special Report, February 2011.

45
. Sudha Ramachandran, “China Secures Myanmar Energy Route, ”
Asia Times Online
, April 3, 2009,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KD03Df03.html
.

46
. “Burma-China Gas Pipeline Ready in May, ”
Irrawaddy
, January 22, 2013,
http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/24800
.

47
. Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China's Oil Security Pipe Dream: The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports, ”
Naval War College Review
63, no. 2 (Spring 2010); and May Thingyan Hein, “Myanmar-China Pipeline Leaves Trail of Worries, Complaints, ”
Business Recorder
, January 21, 2013,
http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?option=com_news&view=single&id=1146110
.

48
. Boyuan Chen, “Myanmar Pipeline Project Gives China Pause for Thought, ”
China.org.cn
, June 21, 2013,
www.china.org.cn/business/2013-06/21/content_29188744.htm
.

49
. Ibid.

50
. European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre, “China's Sea Power, Reaching out to the Blue Waters, ”
China Analysis
, March 2011,
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China%20Analysis%200311.pdf
.

51
. Bo Kong,
China's International Petroleum Policy
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010), 130.

52
. Ibid.

53
. Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd., “Karakoram Oil Pipeline: Gawadur to Khunjraab Pass to China, ” presentation,
http://www.ssgc.com.pk/ssgc/media_center/presentations/pdf/karakorum.pdf
.

54
. Olivier Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir, “Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict, ”
Lancet
375, no. 9711 (January 23, 2010).

55
. International Crisis Group, “Darfur: The Failure to Protect, ”
Africa Report
no. 89, March 8, 2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/089-darfur-the-failure-to-protect.aspx
; and Alex de Waal, “Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect, ”
International Affairs
83, no. 6 (November 2007).

56
. International Crisis Group, “Darfur's New Security Reality, ” Africa Report no. 134, November 26, 2007; and de Waal, “Darfur and the Failure.” Most sources suggest Khartoum lacked the capacity to disarm the militias anyway.

57
. China National Petroleum Corporation, “CNPC in Sudan, ” 2011,
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/cnpcworldwide/sudan/PageAssets/Images/CNPC-in-Sudan.pdf?COLLCC=35518968&
.

58
. Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton,
Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts
, Information Paper (Paris: International Energy Agency, June 2011), 14.

59
. Ibid., 17.

60
. Daniel Large, “China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War, ”
China Quarterly
, no. 199 (September 2009).

61
. “9 Chinese Oil Workers Are Kidnapped in Sudan, ”
Reuters,
October 19, 2008.

62
. U.S. EIA, “Total Oil Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day), ”
International Energy Statistics
, March 1, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1&cid=regions&syid=2004&eyid=2011&unit=TBPD
.

63
. Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations Between China and Sudan, ”
Sudan Issue Brief: Small Arms Survey
(7), July 2007,
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-07-Arms.pdf
.

64
. “Li Anshan, ‘China and Africa: policy and challenges, ' China Security, Vol. 3 No. 3 (2007), p. 77.” As cited in Large, “China's Sudan Engagement, ” 619.

65
. Gaafar Karrar Ahmed, “The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict, ” SAIIA China in Africa Project, Occasional Paper No. 67, September 2010, 6–7.

66
. Ibid.; and Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms, Oil, and Darfur.”

67
. Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms, Oil, and Darfur, ” 7.

68
. Ibid.; and Human Security Baseline Assessment, “United Nations Resolutions on Sudan, ” Sudan Documents,
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/documents/united-nations-resolutions-on-sudansouth-sudan.html
.

69
. Ahmed, “The Chinese Stance, ” 8–10; and Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms, Oil, and Darfur, ” 8.

70
. For views on China's abstentions, see Ahmed, “The Chinese Stance”; International Crisis Group, “China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, ” Asia Report no. 166, April 17, 2009,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/166_chinas_growing_role_in_un_peacekeeping.ashx
; and John Prendergast and David Sullivan, “Irresolution: The U.N. Security Council on Darfur, ” ENOUGH Strategy Paper 33, July 2008,
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/unsc_%20july_%2024-2_0.pdf
.

71
. For example, see Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy, ”
Foreign Affairs
87, no. 1 (January/February 2008); and Nicholas D. Kristof, “China's Genocide Olympics, ”
New York Times,
January 24, 2008.

72
. Amnesty International,
Sudan: No End to Violence in Darfur
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 2012); United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan. S/2009/562 of 29 October 2009, ” 2009,
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/documents/HSBA-Sec-Gen-2009-562.pdf
; and Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms, Oil, and Darfur.”

73
. Hilary Andersson, “China ‘Is Fuelling War in Darfur, '”
BBC News
July 13, 2008; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, ”
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
.

74
. David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran's Nuclear Program, ” in
The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy
, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2010).

75
. U.S. EIA, “Iran, ” Country Analysis Briefs, last updated March 28, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR
.

76
. Xiaocong Wang, “China's CNPC Performs Balancing Act in Iran, ”
Caixin Online
, September 26, 2012,
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-09-26/industries/34084845_1_cnpc-south-pars-project-south-azadegan
.

77
. “Work Starts at 2 of Iran's Oil Fields to Produce 700, 000 bpd, ”
Tehran Times
, July 8, 2012,
http://tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/99442-chinese-company-invests-20b-in-iranian-oil-fields
; and Erica Downs, “Getting China to Turn on Iran, ”
National Interest
, July 19, 2012,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-china-turn-iran-7215?page=1
.