Clinical Handbook of Mindfulness (21 page)

believe, because the concept of mindfulness is not well understood within

contemporary behavioral science, likely due in part to its relative novelty

as a topic of scientific study. Conversely, the annals of philosophical and

psychological discourse are replete with discussions of consciousness that

can help to inform the construction of a well-specified theory about the

meaning and functional consequences of mindfulness. A second aim of this

chapter is to highlight the findings of recent research on those functional

consequences of mindfulness, particularly as they pertain to emotional states

and well-being. The study of emotion in the context of consciousness is

important for several reasons, including the fact that emotions are a pri-

mary, ongoing feature of day-to-day consciousness and, as we will argue,

the valence, duration, and other aspects of emotion are dependent on the

modes through which events and experiences are processed. Also, emotions

can significantly influence cognitive experience and behavior, and not coin-

cidentally in view of its impact on human functioning, emotion is the domain

in which much of the extant research on the mindfulness construct has been

conducted.

The Nature of Mindfulness

Central to the scientific enterprise of describing the nature and effects of

mindfulness is a clear definition of the phenomenon. In contemporary behav-

ioral science discourse, the term is often used in an unclear, even confus-

ing way
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007;
Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007).

There is general agreement in both historical and contemporary philosophi-

cal and psychological discourse that mindfulness is rooted in the fundamen-

tal capacities of consciousness, namely, attention and (meta-) awareness. Yet

consciousness is a challenging area of study, thus making a firm understand-

ing of mindfulness more difficult. In this chapter we attempt to clarify the

nature of mindfulness by drawing on scholarship that has devoted consider-

able study to its experiential nature. In particular, we discuss work that has

attempted to deconstruct human consciousness into its primary modes of

processing. Viewing mindfulness through such a lens may facilitate an under-

standing of mindfulness as a basic human capacity (e.g.,
Goldstein, 2002;

Kabat-Zinn, 2003)
and not simply as a therapeutic practice. In so doing, the task of understanding mindfulness per se, apart from the attitudes and techniques used to cultivate it in clinical and other practices, may be simplified

considerably (cf.
Olendzki, 2005).
This will also aid the advancement of the science of mindfulness, insofar as it aims to de-confound mindfulness from

its antecedents, consequences, and particular uses in clinical practice and

research.

In this discussion we draw on two rich traditions of historical and contem-

porary scholarship, namely phenomenology, particularly with the Husserlian

school, and Buddhism, especially within the Theravadin tradition, which

has and continues to have intense interest in mindfulness. We begin with

Husserlian phenomenology. This vital philosophical tradition offers a rich

analysis of subjective states of mind that can inform our understanding of

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

61

the Buddhist psychology on mindfulness. Indeed, the various points of inter-

section between these schools of thought may help to show what features of

conscious experience that are relevant to mindfulness extend beyond the

specific cultural and practice traditions of Buddhism. Such dialogue may

facilitate the scientific investigation of mindfulness and related conscious

states. Given space constraints, we will not attempt a detailed analysis of

such descriptive parallels, but will simply indicate basic points of connec-

tion that, recent theory and research suggest, may be generative for further

investigation.

A Phenomenological Perspective

While the concept of mindfulness appears to have been first described in

Asia, its phenomenological nature is strikingly familiar to Western philosoph-

ical and psychological schools of thought. Phenomenology, particularly in

the Husserlian school (e.g.,
Husserl, 1999),
has a considerable literature of relevance to the experiential nature of mindfulness. Buddhist psychology

and phenomenology naturally converge in their interest in discovering the

operation of the mind through first-person experience, specifically by closely

observing our subjective and sensory experiences
(Dreyfus & Thompson,

2007).
Phenomenology, and more recently cognitive science, propose that

there are two primary modes of conscious processing. Husserl called these

the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude. The
natural atti-

tude
– the default mode of processing – is an orientation toward ourselves,

others, and the world in which events and experiences are treated as objects

upon which cognitive operations are made. In this mode, what comes into

awareness through the senses or the mind is both subjectively experienced

as a sense impression, image, feeling, and so on and filtered through cogni-

tive operations, typically of a habitual nature – evaluation of it, rumination

about it, for example – all designed to disclose the content of what we expe-

rience, and in particular what it represents (or could represent)
to me
or

for me
. This mode of processing has a variety of expressions. A common

one is a rapid presumption of truth about some phenomenon in which the

discursive mind makes cognitive commitments that say, in effect, “I know

what this is” or “I know what’s going on” without careful observation, or

sometimes without more than a glance (cf.
Langer, 2002).
In this conceptual mode or attitude, similar to what has been called second-order processing

(Lambie & Marcel, 2002)
and propositional processing
(Teasdale, 1999),
our reality takes mental representational form; that is, our experience becomes

what we
conceptualize
it to be.

Contemporary cognitive and social cognitive science has lent support to

the phenomenological claim that the natural attitude can be considered a

default mode of conscious processing because what comes into awareness

is often held in focal attention only briefly, if at all, before some cognitive

and emotional reaction to it occurs. These rapid perceptual reactions have

several characteristics of relevance to subjective experience and function-

ing: First, they are often of an evaluative nature, in which a primary appraisal

of the object is made as, most basically, “good,” “bad,” or “neutral,” usually

in reference to the self and usually with an affective tone of, most basically,

62

Kirk Warren Brown and Shari Cordon

pleasantness or unpleasantness. Second, they are usually conditioned by past

experience of the sensory object or other objects of sufficient similarity

to evoke an association in memory. Third, perceptual experience is easily

assimilated or, through further cognitive operations upon the object, made

to assimilate into existing cognitive schemas.

The psychological consequence of such processing is that concepts,

labels, ideas, and judgments are often imposed, often automatically, on every-

thing that is encountered (e.g.,
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).
This is not to imply that humans simply process the world passively, however, because cognitive

schemas, beliefs, and opinions also channel our attention and subsequent

cognitive processing of what is attended to
(Leary
,
2004; 2005).
This mode of processing does have adaptive benefits, including the establishment and

maintenance of order upon events and experience of relevance to the self,

and the facilitation of goal pursuit and attainment. However, it also means

that we do not experience reality impartially, as it truly is, but rather through

cognitive filters that are frequently of a habitual, conditioned nature. These

filters can furnish superficial, incomplete, or distorted views of reality, and

they lend themselves to particular emotional colorings. For example, an opti-

mistic view or bias may conduce to hope or excitement; a pessimistic view

may result in frustration, fear, or sadness.

Husserl called the second mode of processing the
phenomenological atti-

tude
in which our attention is turned toward reality simply as it appears

or is given to us, that is, simply as a flow of phenomena or appearances.

Husserl termed the means to do so
phenomenological reduction
. This does

not mean a replacement or an elimination of our typical cognitive operations

upon reality but rather a “stepping back” from our usual way of processing

in order to receive experience as it manifests itself to us. In this way, every-

thing – sense impressions, feelings, images, and thoughts – remain but are

perceived in a different way, that is, strictly as they appear (Thompson &

Zahavi,
2007).
In this stepping out of the natural attitude, through a “suspension” or “bracketing” of our habitually conceptual mode of processing,

the mind discloses how reality is “constituted” in the present moment and

within the structure of our conscious minds.

This mode of processing, similar to first-order processing (Lambie &

Marcel,
2002)
and buffered implicational processing
(Teasdale, 1999),

involves a receptive state of mind, wherein attention is kept to a bare reg-

istering of the facts observed. That this is possible is suggested by a simple

illustration
(Kriegel, 2007):
An individual looks at the sky with a particular shade of blue that we will call blue17. But when later presented with two

shades of blue, blue17 and blue18, he is unable to recognize which shade of

blue he saw before. This suggests that he lacks the concept of blue17 and that

his experience of that color is non-conceptual. Another illustration to help

make the distinction between the natural and phenomenological attitudes

comes from
Varela and Depraz (2003,
p. 205):

When I am perceiving a pear tree in the garden and its gradual blossoming

during early spring, the tree is here in front of me. I can touch it if I stretch

out my hand, I can sense its perfume and listen to the noise of the wind in its

branches. I am attending to the whole situation in flesh and bone, directly and

concretely. If, on the contrary, I close my eyes and try to get a mental image of

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

63

the tree and its surroundings, I might be able to accurately describe the just-

lived scene if I have been quite attentive to its developing. But most probably I

will forget some features of the experience and will add some others.

At this point, it may be apparent that if one were not fully attending to

the scene in the first place, both the subjective quality of the experience and

one’s memory of it would be quite different than if one were giving full atten-

tion. When attention is used to make bare or direct contact with the world,

the basic capacities of consciousness – attention and awareness – permit the

individual to “be present” to reality as it is rather than to habitually react to

it. Even the usual psychological reactions that may occur when our attention

is engaged – thoughts, images, verbalizations, emotions, impulses to act, and

so on – can be observed as part of the ongoing stream of consciousness.

For example, in the moment-to-moment experience of anger or some other

emotion, it can be known in its cognitive, affective, somatic, and conative

manifestations.

It is important to note that the suspension of the second-order mode of

processing described here does not imply an objectification of, or disso-

ciation from, our experience; in fact, the process is exactly the opposite.

When cognitive elaborations are set aside, the phenomenological attitude

creates an intimacy with conscious experience, a “view from within” the

world
(Varela & Shear, 1999)
rather than set apart from it as an independent perceiver
(Legrand, 2007;
Thompson & Zahavi, 2007).
Indeed, as noted above, from this intimate perspective not only external events but also internal experiences, including the operations of the mind, can be experienced

attentively.

This opens the question of who is doing the looking or, said differently,

who is the self simply attending to what is? A number of philosophical tra-

ditions propose that there are two selves that correspond to the modes of

processing outlined here (e.g.,
Gallagher, 2000).
The “narrative self” is that coherent set of cognitive activities that establish and maintain an ongoing

narrative or set of stories about ourselves and our place in the world. This

conceptual model of self and the world forms a powerful cognitive filter

through which second-order processing can take place; so powerful that