Clinical Handbook of Mindfulness (25 page)

dala activation is associated with negative emotional experience (particu-

larly fear), perhaps by increasing perceptual sensitivity to negative stimuli

(Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Duncan, Rauch, & Wright, 2007).
Activation in the

PFC, particularly in lateral and dorsal regions, has been associated with

both decreased amygdala activation and the deliberate diminishment of neg-

ative emotional responses (i.e., emotion regulation), perhaps via ventral

and medial PFC regions
(Phelps, 2006;
Urry et al., 2006).
Together, analysis of amygdala and PFC regions provides a window into the processes

of emotional reactivity and regulation, thereby opening opportunities to

study the neural correlates of mindful processing of emotionally provocative

stimuli.

In a study addressing this topic, Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, and Lieber-

man
(2007)
examined whether more mindful individuals would show less

reactivity to emotionally threatening (negative) picture stimuli, as measured

by fMRI-assessed amygdala activation and stronger regulation of emotional

responses through prefrontal cortical mechanisms. The study found that, rel-

ative to those lower in mindfulness, higher MAAS scorers were less reactive

to threatening emotional stimuli, as indicated by an attenuated bilateral amyg-

dala response and greater prefrontal cortical activation (in dorsomedial, left

and right ventrolateral, medial, and right dorsolateral PFC) while labeling

those stimuli. Also, a stronger inverse association between these areas of the

PFC and the right amygdala was found among higher MAAS scorers. This lat-

ter result suggesting a greater emotion regulatory capacity through mindful-

ness may come through enhanced prefrontal cortical inhibition of amygdala

responses.
Ochsner, Bunge, and Gross (2002)
have suggested that this pattern of activations may be associated with a “turning down” of evaluation

processes, thus switching from an emotional mode of stimulus analysis to an

unemotional one. This is consistent with the receptive, non-evaluative phe-

nomenology of mindfulness described already, in which objects and events

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

75

in focal attention are simply observed, without attempts to alter or ana-

lyze them.

There is also initial evidence that mindfulness can diminish reactivity to

threat and subsequent distress in social situations, and in particular that

which commonly arises when connectedness is lost due to social exclusion,

an experience that people are highly motivated to avoid (e.g.,
Allen & Knight,

2005).
Creswell, Eisenberger, and Lieberman (2007)
tested whether mindful attention incurred protective benefit against distress when facing exclusion

by members of a peer group and whether this greater equanimity in the face

of exclusion was due to reduced reactivity to this form of social threat, mea-

sured by brain imaging of regions known to be implicated in the experience

of social pain and distress.

Undergraduates participated in a virtual ball-tossing game with two other

“participants” (actually a computer) while undergoing fMRI. In the first

task block, each participant was included in the ball-tossing game, while

in the second block, the participant was excluded during the majority of

the throws. After the task, participants reported their perceptions of social

rejection during exclusion. Results showed that MAAS-assessed mindfulness

predicted lower perceived rejection. Further, this association was partially

mediated by reduced activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC),

a region activated during social distress
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams,

2003).
These findings are consistent with the study of romantic couple conflict described already, in suggesting that mindfulness predicts a more sub-

dued response to social threat, in this case, apparent rejection by peers, and

that this attenuated response is due, in part, to reduced evaluative reactivity

to that threat.

The findings also provide a window into the role of mindfulness in alter-

ing the expression of self in social contexts. Theory and research suggest

that personal identity, or the self-concept, is strongly influenced by the opin-

ions and reactions of others, and negative evaluative reactions to rejection

occur because the individual’s sense of self-worth is invested in, or contin-

gent upon, validation by others (e.g.,
Leary
,
2004).
However, if a sense of self that is grounded in experiential processing is operational, events like rejection that impinge upon the self-concept may be less threatening than they

otherwise might be (Brown, Ryan, Creswell, & Niemiec, 2008).

While this notion requires further study, there is initial evidence that the

experiential focus (EF) described by both mindfulness scholars and phe-

nomenologists has neural referents that are distinct from the narrative, con-

ceptual focus that is commonly the default mode of processing.
Farb et al.

(2007)
conducted an induction-based study with both MBSR graduates and

novices trained to use two types of attentional focus upon positive and

negative personality trait stimuli designed to arouse self-reference. The EF

entailed a present-centered, non-conceptual attention to thoughts, feelings,

and bodily states, using meta-awareness to return attention to present expe-

rience when distracted by thoughts or memories (i.e., mindfulness). A nar-

rative focus (NF) was characterized by analysis of the meaning of the trait

words and their application to self in an ongoing stream of thoughts that

is also characteristic of rumination, mind wandering, and resting attention.

Among other findings, the study found that EF yielded reductions in midline

cortical region activity associated with NF in both novices and mindfulness

76

Kirk Warren Brown and Shari Cordon

trainees, particularly the medial PFC (mPFC). These mPFC reductions were

more marked and pervasive among those previously trained in mindfulness.

While still nascent, this neural process-based research converges with sub-

jective report-based research reviewed above in suggesting that the phe-

nomenological or mindful mode of processing is associated with diminished

emotional reactivity to negative stimuli and enhanced regulation of emo-

tional response, perhaps through an engagement of attention upon immedi-

ate experience that permits a disentanglement from the conceptual networks

that link subjective experiences across time to promote anxiety, regret, sad-

ness, and other unpleasant, self-referential emotions. This process research

also offers a glimpse into the neural mechanisms that may underlie the more

equanimous subjective experience that mindfulness is theorized to foster

(e.g.,
Analayo, 2003;
Brown & Ryan, 2003).

Conclusions and Future Directions

This chapter had two primary aims: First, we sought to clarify the nature

of mindfulness by taking a “view from within” the conscious mind’s dual

modes of processing experience. Husserlian phenomenology and Buddhist

theories were shown to converge on several points in the description of a

phenomenology of experience within which the subjective nature of mind-

fulness may be better understood. Second, we sought to describe the impli-

cations of this experiential approach to life for a key feature of subjective

experience, namely, emotions. Findings from recent research using trait mea-

sures and state inductions of mindfulness are convergent in showing that this

quality of presence is associated with more balanced emotional content, par-

ticularly a relative paucity of unpleasant emotional experience. Mindfulness

also appears to promote less reactivity to events that can provoke emotional

distress and more efficient regulation of that distress when it occurs. Studies

using neural imaging have begun to offer clues about the cortical and sub-

cortical substrates for the more sanguine subjective experiences that more

mindful individuals report.

These studies of emotional content and process provide insight into the

mechanisms by which mindfulness foster emotional well-being, and by impli-

cation, mental health. Mindfulness is believed to promote emotional well-

being through multiple means (e.g., Baer, 2003; Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro

et al., 2007), and the present review suggests support for the claim that

mindfulness is associated with diminished evaluation of stimuli (or what has

also been called acceptance and non-judgment), perhaps through an imme-

diacy of contact with them. Another explanation for the emotional bene-

fits of mindfulness is the receptive, non-defensive processing of experiences

that present emotional challenges. Studies reviewed here suggest that willing

exposure, a greater willingness to tolerate or remain experientially present

to unpleasant stimuli without cognitive reactivity, may help to explain the

role of mindfulness in producing greater emotional balance and more effec-

tive emotion regulation in the face of emotionally challenging events and

experiences.

These descriptive and explanatory conclusions must be considered provi-

sional, however, because studies of mindful traits and states are still relatively

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

77

few, existing samples are comparatively small, and most studies have used

correlational designs – all factors that limit the ability to make causal con-

clusions about mindfulness and emotional experience and well-being. As the

field of mindfulness research matures, opportunities for building a firmer

foundation of knowledge are numerous. Two are briefly noted here. First,

better assessment of mindful traits is needed to more accurately reflect the

scholarly descriptions of this mode of processing. In this endeavor, schol-

arship on both conscious states and cognitive science will be invaluable

for detailing the subjective quality of experience that mindfulness involves.

Second, the advent of experimental research to study mindful states offers

excellent opportunities to observe the nature and outcomes of mindful,

or experiential processing in real time. The value of such research lies not

only in disclosing the nature and functional significance of mindfulness, but

also in helping to address fundamental questions about how the conscious

mind processes experience and how such processing may be optimized to

enhance emotional experience and human welfare in general.

Acknowledgements:
Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by

NIH grant R01 AG025474-02 to the first author. We thank Melissa Glennie,

Laura Kiken, Jonathan Shear, and Evan Thompson for helpful comments and

suggestions on a previous draft.

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