Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (94 page)

In the meantime, on April 22, 1887, in its twenty-sixth session, the Treaty Revision Conference decided to offer extreme concessions to the foreigners in order to obtain the abolition of extraterritoriality. They agreed that within two years after the exchange of documents of ratification of new treaties, all of Japan would be opened to foreigners. Rights and privileges enjoyed by Japanese citizens would be extended to resident foreigners. Within two years, the Japanese legal system would conform in every respect to practices in the West. All laws would be translated into English (the translations would be considered the original texts) and sent to foreign governments within sixteen months. Consular courts would continue to exist for another three years after opening the country to foreigners. Most judges passing on cases in which foreigners were involved would be of foreign nationality.
³⁴
The Japanese seemed ready to yield to any foreign demand, provided that their country was symbolically recognized as an equal by ending the hated extraterritoriality.

Not all Japanese were willing to make such concessions. Tani Tateki (also known as Tani Kenj
ō
, 1837–1899), the minister of agriculture and commerce, recently returned from Europe,
³⁵
was appalled by what he considered to be the moral laxness of the times, and he spoke his mind. It
ō
had heard rumors that Tani had praised Rousseau and other French exponents of people’s rights and attacked the government, and he interpreted this as meaning Tani had been infected by seditious radical ideas. The emperor, getting word of this, was profoundly disturbed that a cabinet minister should entertain such views. He had Sasaki Takayuki ask Tani face to face his political views.

Tani, a believer in
kokusui
(the genius of the nation), was anything but an advocate of people’s rights, as he quickly convinced Sasaki. But in July, before resigning his post, he issued a stinging attack on the government’s policies. He demanded that efforts to obtain treaty revision be discontinued and that action be taken to correct the worsening moral situation. Like Nishimura, Tani was shocked by the decadence and extravagance of those addicted to dancing at the Rokumeikan, and he deplored the hardships the people were suffering because their money was being wasted in the attempt to Europeanize the country. He informed It
ō
of his belief that efforts to secure treaty revision should be speedily discontinued. Tani presented the same view to the cabinet, where it led to a bitter argument with Inoue Kaoru. But despite the hostility, Tani persisted, denouncing policies that, he said, were advocated without consideration of their lasting harm. Inoue and the others claimed that revising the treaties was necessary in order to end extraterritoriality, but, Tani asked, would it not be worse to allow foreigners to meddle in the country’s internal affairs? He accused the Foreign Ministry of acting in secret without consulting anyone else and asked that the opinions of all the other ministers be sought lest some grave error be committed.
³⁶

It
ō
and Inoue were infuriated and quickly retorted that at a time when Japan was taking the advanced countries of the West as its model in all things, it was unavoidable that its laws be revised to accord with those of the West. Tani, realizing that his recommendations would not be accepted by the cabinet, decided to take a bold step. On July 20 he obtained an audience with the emperor at which he related in detail his reasons for opposing treaty revision and for believing that the corruption of the times must be corrected. He requested the emperor to ask the opinions of his advisers as to whether treaty revision was desirable, suggesting in particular that Kuroda Kiyotaka, who had recently returned from Europe, be consulted. The emperor listened attentively but made no comment. Tani withdrew and immediately afterward submitted his resignation.

Tani’s request reveals that he was familiar with the views critical of the administration earlier expressed in discussions of men close to the emperor—including Sasaki Takayuki, Hijikata Hisamoto, and Motoda Nagazane. When Tani returned from abroad and they discovered that he shared their doubts about treaty revision, they decided to work with him and to search for others of like mind. Many influential men in the government (including Kuroda Kiyotaka) openly expressed opposition to the agreement for treaty revision.

When the emperor asked Motoda’s opinion, he replied that he believed Tani had spoken out of loyalty and that nobody in the whole country could disagree with his denunciation of the evils of the time. Motoda was sure that unless the concessions made to foreign countries in order to obtain treaty revision were at once discontinued, incalculable disaster would result.
³⁷

About this time Gustave Boissonade, a Frenchman who served as a legal expert to the cabinet, expressed his opposition to the agreement for treaty revision. He attempted unsuccessfully to present his objections to Inoue Kaoru, and when he stated his position to Yamada Akiyoshi, the minister of justice, Yamada said he was unable to consider the matter because it was outside his competence. At this point Inoue Kowashi, the cabinet librarian, who had grave doubts about the advisability of treaty revision, secretly visited Boissonade and listened to his arguments against the agreement. Boissonade was convinced it would cause the nation great harm. Inoue Kowashi, persuaded, decided to use his every effort to end treaty revision.

Boissonade tirelessly presented position papers to members of the cabinet explaining why revision must be stopped. He contended that it would inevitably harm Japanese prestige, weaken security, and lower Japan’s position. He attacked every provision of the agreement, including the use of foreign judges: they would have to be paid a salary that satisfied them, which would be a considerable drain on national resources. He warned that the Japanese people, indignant at the harm to Japanese interests and the damage to national prestige, might revolt once new treaties were approved that might lead to foreign intervention.
³⁸

Inoue Kowashi wrote Inoue Kaoru on July 12 stating his reasons for opposing the agreement, declaring that it would reduce Japan to the level of a semi-independent state. He predicted also that the country would be divided into two camps, for and against the revisions, which might lead to open conflict and immense losses. In the end, Inoue Kaoru was forced to recognize the turmoil that his plans had created. He saw that if he plunged ahead without modifying his original agreement with the foreign powers on the operation of Japanese courts, it would cause a national crisis. At the conference meeting on July 18 he informed the delegates that the Japanese government had decided it was necessary to make certain changes in the treaty with respect to the courts.

On September 17 It
ō
resigned as imperial household minister, though retaining his post as prime minister. At first the emperor was unwilling to accept It
ō
’s resignation, and he rejected It
ō
’s suggestion that Kuroda Kiyotaka succeed him. The Imperial House Act had yet to be framed and the property of the imperial household had not been systematically defined. It
ō
was the only one capable of dealing effectively with these matters. As for Kuroda, his character was such that the emperor would not wish him to remain long in the palace. The emperor asked Motoda Nagazane his opinion. Motoda replied that although in principle it was best in a constitutional monarchy for palace and state to be united, this depended on the particular man. In China there had been Chu-ko Liang, and in Prussia there had been Bismarck, men of great sincerity and ability. It
ō
had enormous ability, but his moral qualities were not yet sufficient. His continued presence in the palace might prove harmful. Motoda urged the emperor to accept It
ō
’s resignation as imperial household minister.
³⁹

The emperor was loath to lose It
ō
, but in the end he accepted his resignation and appointed Hijikata Hisamoto to succeed him. Kuroda was named minister of agriculture and commerce. Motoda’s recommendation that Inoue be dismissed as foreign minister was effected on September 16. For the time being, It
ō
would serve as foreign minister as well as prime minister.
⁴⁰

Although these political changes greatly disturbed the emperor, his year was not entirely gloomy. On August 22 his fourth son, Prince Michihito, was born to Sono Sachiko. On August 31 Prince Yoshihito, whose ninth birthday was that day, was confirmed both as heir to the throne and as the “true child” (
jisshi
) of the empress. That evening, with the emperor, the empress, the dowager empress, and Yoshihito in attendance, a birthday party was held. Thirty-nine members of the imperial family and palace officials were invited. The emperor, happy and relaxed, called one after another of the guests to his side. With his own hands, he poured saké for the empress dowager, the empress, and Yoshihito. Soon the dining room was filled with happy shouts induced by the liquor. The emperor commanded various people to sing and dance. The chronology of his reign comments that probably so joyful an occasion, shared alike by ruler and ruled, had never before been witnessed.
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There were indeed few such moments in the emperor’s life.

Chapter 40

During much of 1888, Emperor Meiji was prevented by illness from performing his ritual duties or attending field maneuvers and graduation ceremonies. The most severe illness, which lasted from February 7 until May 5, was diagnosed as catarrhal pneumonia.
¹
After the emperor had passed out of danger, his doctors recommended that he recuperate at a salubrious site along the coast, but he refused to leave the palace, obsessed as always with a sense of monarchical duty.
²
Later that year, he suffered from disabling colds, but his dislike of doctors was so intense that he paid no attention to their advice. On various occasions, especially when he was ill, the empress took his place, receiving envoys from Siam, launching a warship, or inspecting the medical and scientific facilities of T
ō
ky
ō
Imperial University.

The record of the court physicians was dismal, but the emperor, still clinging to traditional “Chinese” medicine, was reluctant to replace them.
³
One more of the emperor’s children, Michihito, died of meningitis on November 12, despite the efforts of the court physicians (and despite also the ministrations of army and navy surgeons called in at the last moment). Another daughter (the emperor’s sixth) was born to Sono Sachiko in September. As usual, there was a banquet to celebrate the birth, but surely most of those present, remembering how many of the royal children had died, must have wondered whether their toasts to the health of the infant Princess Masako would have much effect.

Early in the new year, the emperor listened as usual to lectures: by Fukuba Bisei on the section of the
Records of Japan
describing the reign of the emperor Keik
ō
, by Motoda Nagazane on a passage in the
Doctrine of the Mean
, and by Nishimura Shigeki on “the meaning of autonomy” from Henry Wheaton’s
Elements of International Law
.
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The choice of subjects for these lectures reflects the continuing efforts made to achieve a balance in the emperor’s education among Japanese historical traditions, Chinese moral teachings, and Western practical learning.

Among the few intimate glimpses we get of the emperor at this time, one is of particular interest. Believing that a portrait of the emperor more recent than the photographs taken by Uchida Kuichi in 1872 was needed for presentation to foreign monarchs and other dignitaries, Imperial Household Minister Hijikata Hisamoto asked the Italian artist Eduardo Chiossone, an employee of the Printing Bureau, to prepare a suitable likeness. The simplest way would have been to take a photograph, but the emperor’s dislike of being photographed made this impossible. Not long before, It
ō
Hirobumi had repeatedly begged the emperor to allow a new photograph to be taken, but the emperor refused each time. Realizing how unlikely it was that the emperor would change his mind, Hijikata asked Chiossone to sketch his features secretly, promising to take responsibility if anything went amiss.

After securing the consent of the chamberlains and other officials, Hijikata waited for a suitable occasion. The day chosen was January 14, when the emperor dined out. Chiossone, hidden behind a sliding partition, carefully sketched in crayon the dragon countenance, the emperor’s posture, and the changes of expression as he chatted.
⁵
Hijikata was delighted with the finished Chiossone portrait and decided to show it to the emperor, first apologizing for not having secured his permission in advance. When the emperor saw the portrait, he said not one word, of either approbation or displeasure. Hijikata wondered what the emperor’s silence signified, but he could not very well ask for an explanation. Just at this time, a request was received from Europe for the emperor’s picture. Hijikata asked him to sign for presentation a photograph of Chiossone’s portrait. The emperor did so, to the great relief of Hijikata, who interpreted this as meaning that he was pleased with the portrait.
⁶
From this time on, photographs of Chiossone’s picture (based on his original sketches) were widely distributed to foreign royalty and schools around the country, and generations of children bowed in reverence before the imperial portrait (
goshin’ei
). The picture was so realistic that most people assumed it was a photograph.
⁷