Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (96 page)

The constitution was publicly pronounced at a ceremony held later that morning. Members of the imperial family, the cabinet, high-ranking nobles, governors of prefectures, judges, and high-ranking representatives of other organs of the state, as well as the ministers of foreign countries, assembled to hear the emperor’s rescript. He paid tribute not only to his ancestors but also to his subjects, the descendants of loyal subjects of his ancestors. Together, he promised, they would promote the glory of the empire, both at home and abroad, and strengthen for all time to come the work of his ancestors.
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After reading these words, the emperor presented the Constitution of the Empire of Great Japan to the prime minister, Kuroda Kiyotaka, in a symbolic gesture indicating that he was bestowing the constitution on the nation. The description of the ceremony by Dr. Erwin Baelz, the German physician who served the imperial family, evokes the scene:

In front of the Emperor, somewhat to the left, were ranged the ministers of State and the highest officials. Behind were the chief nobles, among whom I noticed Kamenosuke Tokugawa, who, but for the Restoration, would now be Shogun; also Prince Shimadzu of Satsuma, the only one who (though wearing a western uniform) had his hair dressed in the old Japanese style. He cut a strange figure! Immediately to the left of the Emperor were the diplomatic corps. The gallery surrounding the hall had been opened to the other high officials and to a number of foreigners. The Empress followed with the princesses and the court ladies. The Empress wore a European dress, pink, with a train. On either side of the throne a high dignitary now stepped forward, one of them Duke Sanjo, formerly imperial chancellor, each of them with a roll of parchment. The one Sanjo held was the constitution. The Emperor took the other document, opened it, and read it in a loud voice. It contained the decision to give the people voluntarily the promised constitution. Then the Emperor handed the charter itself to the prime minister, Kuroda, who received it with a deep reverence. Thereupon the Emperor nodded and left the hall, followed by the Empress and suite. The whole business lasted about ten minutes. Meanwhile salutes were being fired, and bells were being rung everywhere. The ceremony was dignified and brilliant. The only trouble was that the throne-room, a very fine apartment, is colored red, and was therefore too dark.
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The 1889 constitution was the most advanced possessed by any Asian country and was more liberal than those of many European countries; but the insistence on the “sacred and inviolable” person of the emperor and the rights of sovereignty invested in him indicates how far the constitution was from granting sovereign power to the people.
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The granting of the constitution nevertheless marked the beginning of representative government in Japan. An imperial edict, issued on the same day, stated that a parliament would be convened in 1890 and that the constitution would go into effect the same day.

As part of the celebrations, the newly created Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun and the Paulownia Flower was bestowed on It
ō
Hirobumi. It was recommended that (to balance this award to a Ch
ō
sh
ū
man), the prime minister, Kuroda Kiyotaka (from Satsuma) should be similarly decorated, but Meiji refused, even though Motoda spoke in support of the award to Kuroda.
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In an effort to heal old wounds on this felicitous occasion, some men who had been put to death as rebels were not only pardoned but decorated: Saig
ō
Takamori was promoted to the senior third rank, and Yoshida Sh
ō
in to the senior fourth rank.

That same day, when the minister of education, Mori Arinori, was about to set out for the palace to attend the ceremonies, a man requested an audience. Mori asked someone to attend to the visitor and was leaving the house when the visitor leaped on him and severely wounded him with a knife. The assailant, Nishino Buntar
ō
, was killed immediately. It was discovered that Nishino had been informed that Mori, on a visit to the Great Shrine of Ise, not only had failed to remove his shoes on entering the sacred building but had lifted with his cane the curtain hiding the sacred mirror and peeped in. Nishino was so enraged by Mori’s actions, considering them a profanation of the divine presence and an insult to the imperial family, that he decided to kill Mori.

In the statement of vindication found on his body, Nishino wrote that he had traveled to Ise to verify that Mori had actually committed the offense and was satisfied that the rumor was not false. (However, after Mori’s death an investigation conducted by the vice minister of education concluded that there was no truth to the rumor.) Mori died the next day. The emperor sent a message expressing grief and appreciation of Mori’s achievements and promoted him posthumously to the senior second rank.
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Once the excitement of the constitution’s proclamation had died down, members of the government returned to unfinished business, especially treaty reform.
Ō
kuma believed that it was essential to destroy the unity with which the European and American governments tended to act vis-à-vis Asia. He decided therefore to conduct separate negotiations with each of the different countries. A new treaty had been concluded with Germany in November 1888, and in December,
Ō
kuma gave the American minister a draft of a revised treaty with the request that it be expeditiously approved by the American government. He promised that regardless of what other countries might decide, American citizens would enjoy the benefits of the new treaty. If other countries claimed the same benefits under the most-favored-nation clause, they would be informed that unless they also accepted the end of extraterritoriality, they would not receive the benefits.

Ō
kuma was aware that unless Japan was able to persuade European nations to accept the revised treaties, the treaty with America would not mean much. But he believed that if he could tell other countries that a new treaty was about to be signed between Japan and the United States, this would encourage their ministers in Japan to work for a similar settlement.
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The treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed by
Ō
kuma and the American minister, Richard B. Hubbard, marked a major step toward the end of extraterritoriality. The treaty would take effect on February 11, the same day as the proclamation of the constitution. The Japanese rushed the signing because they feared that the new Republican administration might not approve of actions taken by Hubbard, a Democratic appointee.
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As might have been foreseen, Britain opposed the treaty revision, even though the Japanese had devoted their greatest efforts to persuading the British to agree. On December 29, 1888,
Ō
kuma reminded the British minister that Britain was the country from which Japan imported most and that trade between the two countries amounted to one-third of Japan’s total foreign trade. About half the foreign nationals residing in Japan were British, and their interests far exceeded those of any other country. According to
Ō
kuma, the Japanese had not forgotten how much they owed Sir Harry Parkes for his help at the time of the Restoration, but gratitude might turn to hatred if Britain kept blocking treaty reform. If Britain accepted revision, the other countries would follow, and the Japanese would truly be grateful for British support. This newly emerged nation, with a population of 40 million, an army of 180,000 troops, and a fleet of dozens of warships, would become Britain’s ally.

Despite
Ō
kuma’s pleading, Britain was not ready to accede to the Japanese request. The reply noted that Japanese laws did not conform to Western standards and gave specific instances of inadequacies in the revised treaty. If the Japanese really wanted foreigners to comply with Japanese justice, they should open the interior of the country at once. Then, after five years had passed, if the structure of the courts was established, the compilation of the codes of laws was completed, and the Japanese were able to offer guarantees concerning the satisfactory administration of the courts, the consular courts would be abolished and extraterritoriality ended. Similar conditions were laid down for revision of the tariffs.
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Doubts about the revised treaties from the Japanese side were first expressed by Mutsu Munemitsu, the minister plenipotentiary to America. He noted that for at least twelve years after the treaties were signed, foreign judges would be appointed to the supreme court. Mutsu believed this provision violated articles 24 and 58 of the constitution.
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Ō
kuma replied that there was in fact no conflict, but the dispute over foreign judges continued.

On June 11 1889, Japan and Germany signed the revised treaty. At the last moment further concessions were asked of the Japanese, but the Japanese minister to Germany, Saionji Kinmochi, appealed to the German foreign minister, Herbert von Bismarck, who yielded to the Japanese. The Japanese government, delighted with this success, asked the resident ministers to send copies of the revised treaty to their home countries.
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The successful negotiations with the United States and Germany did not end the internal opposition to the revised treaties. The
Y
ū
bin h
ō
chi shimbun
, an organ of the Kaishin-t
ō
, printed a series of fourteen articles devoted to questions and answers about the new treaties. The role of the editor, Yano Fumio (1850–1913), was to reassure those who were concerned about the possible effects of the treaties. Some people feared, for example, that the employment of foreign judges might lead to meddling by other countries in Japanese internal affairs, but Yano answered that the appointment and dismissal of these judges would be entirely in the hands of the Japanese. If, moreover, the judges were naturalized as Japanese, what danger could there be of foreign meddling? Again, in response to those who feared that opening the interior of the country to foreigners or permitting them to buy land was a threat to Japanese sovereignty, Yano insisted that there must be equality in international relations. Japanese already could travel freely in other countries and could buy land, and it was therefore unfair not to allow foreigners the same privileges. As for the fear that foreigners would buy up Japanese land, there were many more profitable investments; there was no danger of foreigners flocking to Japan to purchase land.
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Yano’s arguments were persuasively presented, but Japanese opposition to the revised treaties became increasingly vocal. The emperor sent Motoda Nagazane to ask
Ō
kuma whether there was anything to the charge that provisions of the revised treaties violated the new constitution.
Ō
kuma denied that there was, but Motoda urged the emperor to consult with It
ō
. The emperor, following Motoda’s suggestion, sent for It
ō
on July 24 to ask how naturalization laws might affect the employment of foreign judges. It
ō
initially had been favorably impressed by
Ō
kuma’s plans for treaty revision and had recommended that the emperor approve them, but as the cries of opposition became increasingly vociferous, It
ō
began to waver. On the twenty-ninth, when the emperor sent for him again, It
ō
(who said he was too ill to visit the palace) was pessimistic. He predicted future difficulties and confessed he had no solutions to offer.
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Many questions remained to be answered. First, if a major country refused to accept the revised treaty, should the present treaty with that country be revoked? Britain, the most important “major country,” showed no sign of willingness to consider revising the treaties. As foreseen, when the Japanese granted the Americans the right to trade in the interior, the British demanded the same rights under the most-favored-nation clause.
Ō
kuma refused, saying that it was still premature to consider the issue. The negotiations dragged on. In the meantime, Japan signed a revised treaty with Russia in August.

On August 14 a group of high-ranking officials, headed by Soejima Taneomi, visited the foreign minister’s residence to discuss treaty revision. General Torio Koyata (1847–1905) brought up the matter of foreign judges. He believed that hiring these judges was unconstitutional and asked why the Japanese were so quick to protect foreign interests and so indifferent to Japanese interests.
Ō
kuma admitted that there was something to this criticism but said that the harm done to Japan by extraterritoriality far exceeded that of the proposed concessions and that if the Japanese wished to get rid of the major harm, concessions were unavoidable. Torio asked if
Ō
kuma really intended to go through with treaty revision.
Ō
kuma replied that he was determined to do so but that if the emperor failed to ratify the new treaties, that would end the matter. Torio retorted that
Ō
kuma ’s only possible course was to resign and put an end to his plan.
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Opposition to the revised treaties was by no means confined to politicians. Throngs of people from the provinces arrived in T
ō
ky
ō
to demand the cancellation of treaty revision. On August 18 representatives of various organizations, including antigovernmental newspapers, convened a meeting of a nationwide Anti-Treaty-Revision League. More than 180 people attended, and for three days, beginning on the twenty-fifth, there were large-scale lecture meetings. On the twenty-second, the Nippon Club was founded as an organ of resistance to treaty revision (and to Westernization in general). A mounting campaign against treaty reform was launched in the press, and attempts were made to appeal to the emperor through his trusted advisers, especially Motoda and Sasaki Takayuki. Before long, there were calls for
Ō
kuma’s resignation and even his impeachment.
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