Authors: Professor Michael Hardt,Antonio Negri
Tags: #Philosophy, #Political, #Political Science, #General, #American Government
demonstrate one aspect ofthese new segmentations. Where the
extremes ofwealth and poverty have increased and the physical
distance between rich and poor has decreased in global cities such
as Los Angeles, Sa˜o Paulo, and Singapore, elaborate measures have
to be taken to maintain their separation. Los Angeles is perhaps
the leader in the trend toward what Mike Davis calls ‘ fortress
architecture,’’ in which not only private homes but also commercial
centers and government buildings create open and free environ-
ments internally by creating a closed and impenetrable exterior.12
This tendency in urban planning and architecture has established
in concrete, physical terms what we called earlier the end ofthe
outside, or rather the decline ofpublic space that had allowed for
open and unprogrammed social interaction.
Architectural analysis, however, can give only a first introduc-
tion to the problematic ofthe new separations and segmentations.
The new lines ofdivision are more clearly defined by the politics
oflabor. The computer and informational revolution that has made
it possible to link together different groups of labor power in real
time across the world has led to furious and unrestrained competition
among workers. Information technologies have been used to
weaken the structural resistances oflabor power, in terms ofboth the
rigidity of wage structures and cultural and geographical differences.
Capital has thus been able to impose both temporal flexibility and
spatial mobility. It should be clear that this process ofweakening
the resistances and rigidities oflabor power has become a completely
political process oriented toward a form of management that maxi-
mizes economic profit. This is where the theory ofimperial adminis-
trative action becomes central.
The imperial politics oflabor is designed primarily to lower
the price of labor. This is, in effect, something like a process of
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primitive accumulation, a process ofreproletarianization. The regu-
lation ofthe working day, which was the real keystone to socialist
politics throughout the past two centuries, has been completely
overturned. Working days are often twelve, fourteen, sixteen hours
long without weekends or vacations; there is work for men, women,
and children alike, and for the old and the handicapped. Empire
has work for everyone! The more unregulated the regime of exploi-
tation, the more work there is. This is the basis on which the new
segmentations ofwork are created. They are determined (in the
language of the economists) by the different levels of productivity,
but we could summarize the change simply by saying that there is
more work and lower wages. Like God’s broom sweeping across
society (this is how Hegel described the imposition ofbarbarian
law, principally at the hands ofAttila the Hun), the new norms of
productivity differentiate and segment the workers. There are still
places in the world where poverty allows for the reproduction of
labor power at a lower cost, and there are still places in the metropo-
lises where differences of consumption force a lower class to sell
itselffor less, or really to submit itselfto a more brutal regime of
capitalist exploitation.
Financial and monetary flows follow more or less the same
global patterns as the flexible organization oflabor power. On the
one hand, speculative and finance capital goes where the price of
labor power is lowest and where the administrative force to guaran-
tee exploitation is highest. On the other hand, the countries that
still maintain the rigidities oflabor and oppose its full flexibility
and mobility are punished, tormented, and finally destroyed by
global monetary mechanisms. The stock market drops when the
unemployment rate goes down, or really when the percentage of
workers who are not immediately flexible and mobile rises. The
same happens when the social policies in a country do not com-
pletely accommodate the imperial mandate offlexibility and mobil-
ity—or better, when some elements ofthe welfare state are pre-
served as a sign ofthe persistence ofthe nation-state. Monetary
policies enforce the segmentations dictated by labor policies.
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Fear ofviolence, poverty, and unemployment is in the end
the primary and immediate force that creates and maintains these
new segmentations. What stands behind the various politics ofthe
new segmentations is a politics ofcommunication. As we argued
earlier, the fundamental content of the information that the enor-
mous communication corporations present is fear. The constant
fear of poverty and anxiety over the future are the keys to creating
a struggle among the poor for work and maintaining conflict among
the imperial proletariat. Fear is the ultimate guarantee ofthe new
segmentations.
Imperial Administration
After we have seen how traditional social barriers are lowered in
the formation of Empire and how at the same time new segmenta-
tions are created, we must also investigate the administrative modal-
ities through which these various developments unfold. It is easy
to see that these processes are full of contradictions. When power
is made immanent and sovereignty transforms into governmentality,
the functions ofrule and regimes ofcontrol have to develop on a
continuum that flattens differences to a common plane. We have
seen, however, that differences are, on the contrary, accentuated
in this process, in such a way that imperial integration determines
new mechanisms ofthe separation and segmentation ofdifferent
strata ofthe population. The problem ofimperial administration is
thus to manage this process of integration and therefore to pacify,
mobilize, and control the separated and segmented social forces.
In these terms, however, the problem is still not clearly posed.
The segmentation ofthe multitude has in fact been the condition
of political administration throughout history. The difference today
lies in the fact that, whereas in modern regimes of national sover-
eignty, administration worked toward a
linear
integration ofconflicts and toward a coherent apparatus that could repress them, that is,
toward the rational normalization ofsocial life with respect to both
the administrative goal ofequilibrium and the development of
administrative reforms, in the imperial framework administration
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becomes
fractal
and aims to integrate conflicts not by imposing a
coherent social apparatus but by controlling differences. It is no
longer possible to understand imperial administration in the terms
ofa Hegelian definition ofadministration, which is grounded on
the mediations ofbourgeois society that constitute the spatial center
ofsocial life; but it is equally impossible to understand it according
to a Weberian definition, that is, a rational definition that is based
on continuous temporal mediation and an emerging principle ofle-
gitimacy.
A first principle that defines imperial administration is that in
it
the management of political ends tends to be separate from the management
of bureaucratic means.
The new paradigm is thus not only different from but opposed to the old public administration model of the
modern state, which continually strove to coordinate its system of
bureaucratic means with its political ends. In the imperial regime,
bureaucracies (and administrative means in general) are considered
not according to the linear logics oftheir functionality to goals,
but according to differential and multiple instrumental logics. The
problem ofadministration is not a problem ofunity but one of
instrumental multifunctionality. Whereas for the legitimation and
administration ofthe modern state the universality and equality of
administrative actions were paramount, in the imperial regime what
is fundamental is the singularity and adequacy of the actions to
specific ends.
From this first principle, however, there arises what seems to
be a paradox. Precisely to the extent that administration is singular-
ized and no longer functions simply as the actor for centralized
political and deliberative organs, it becomes increasingly autono-
mous and engages more closely with various social groups: business
and labor groups, ethnic and religious groups, legal and criminal
groups, and so forth. Instead of contributing to social integration,
imperial administration acts rather as a disseminating and differentiating
mechanism.
This is the second principle ofimperial administration.
Administration will thus tend to present specific procedures that
allow the regime to engage directly with the various social singulari-
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341
ties, and the administration will be more effective the more direct
its contact with the different elements of social reality. Hence admin-
istrative action becomes increasingly autocentric and thus functional
only to the specific problems that it has to resolve. It becomes more
and more difficult to recognize a continuous line of administrative
action across the set ofrelays and networks ofthe imperial regime.
In short, the old administrative principle ofuniversality, treating
all equally, is replaced by the differentiation and singularization of
procedures, treating each differently.
Even though it is difficult now to trace a coherent and universal
line ofprocedure, such as the one that characterized modern sover-
eign systems, this does not mean that the imperial apparatus is
not unified. The autonomy and unity ofadministrative action is
constructed in other ways, by means neither ofthe normative
deduction ofcontinental European juridical systems nor ofthe
procedural formalism of Anglo-Saxon systems. Rather, it is created
by conforming to the structural logics that are active in the construc-
tion ofEmpire, such as the police and military logics (or really the
repression ofpotential subversive forces in the context ofimperial
peace), the economic logics (the imposition ofthe market, which
in turn is ruled by the monetary regime), and the ideological and
communicative logics. The only way that administrative action
gains its autonomy and legitimate authority in the imperial regime
is by following along the differentiating lines of these logics. This
authorization, however, is not direct. Administration is not strategi-
cally oriented toward the realization ofthe imperial logics. It submits
to them, insofar as they animate the great military, monetary, and
communicative means that authorize administration itself.
Adminis-
trative action has become fundamentally non-strategic, and thus it is legitimated through heterogeneous and indirect means.
This is the third principle ofadministrative action in the imperial regime.
Once we have recognized these three ‘‘negative’’ principles
ofimperial administrative action—its instrumental character, its
procedural autonomy, and its heterogeneity—we have to ask what
allows it to function without continually opening violent social
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antagonisms. What virtue affords this disarticulated system of con-
trol, inequality, and segmentation a sufficient measure of consent
and legitimation? This leads to the fourth principle, the ‘‘positive’’
characteristic ofimperial administration. The unifying matrix and
the most dominant value ofimperial administration lie in its
local effectiveness.
To understand how this fourth principle can support the ad-
ministrative system as a whole, consider the kind ofadministrative
relationships that were formed between the feudal territorial organi-
zations and the monarchic power structures in Europe in the Middle
Ages, or between mafia organizations and state structures in the
modern period. In both cases the procedural autonomy, differential
application, and territorialized links to various segments ofthe popu-
lation, together with the specific and limited exercise oflegitimate
violence, were not generally in contradiction with the principle of
a coherent and unified ordering. These systems ofthe distribution
of administrative power were held together by the local effectiveness
ofa series ofspecific deployments ofmilitary, financial, and ideologi-
cal powers. In the European medieval system, the vassal was required
to contribute armed men and money when the monarch needed
them (whereas ideology and communication were controlled in
large part by the church). In the mafia system, the administrative
autonomy ofthe extended family and the deployment ofpolice-like
violence throughout the social territory guaranteed the adherence to
the primary principles ofthe capitalist system and supported the
ruling political class. As in these medieval and mafia examples, the