Hinduism: A Short History (48 page)

The state of
mokṣa
or freedom “is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss, but a state of perfect qualitylessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness.”
¹⁶
Concerning the way to reach it we read in the
Daśa-pādartha Śāstra:

One who seeks eternal emancipation ought to devote himself to

or morality,

or liberality,

or austerities, and

. From these comes supreme merit which leads to the attainment of emancipation and

or knowledge of ultimate truth. “Prosperity” is enjoyment of pleasure in

or heaven. Knowledge of ultimate truth brings

or permanent liberation, when merit and demerit have been completely destroyed and

and

no longer come in contact with each other, that is when the nine things are no longer produced.

Dharma and
adharma
together form
adṛṣṭa
which supports the cycle of
saṃsāra
, of attraction and aversion, and continuously drives the
ātman
back into bodily existence. The activity which is guided by the feeling of the particular existence depends on
avidyā;
when a person realizes that things as such are only varying combinations of atoms of the particular elements, all affection and aversion ceases. If the right knowledge of the self is achieved, egotism and all selfish activity ceases. When
adṛṣṭa
is no longer produced, the transmigratory cycle comes to an end. On the other hand,
ātman
is never completely without
adṛṣṭa
, because the series of births is beginningless. When the soul has rid itself of its gross body it still is and remains attached to the subtle body, even in
pralaya
, the dissolution of the universe. Time, place and circumstances of birth, family and duration of life are all determined by
adṛṣṭa
and it is not possible ever to destroy it completely.

Kaṇāda’s
sūtra
do not require an
īśvara
. The substances are eternal; movement is due to the impersonal, eternal principle of
adṛṣṭa
. Later authors introduce an eternal, omniscient, and omnipresent
Īśvara
who is responsible for the universal order of atoms and their movements. This Vaiśeṣika-God, however, resembles very much the
deus otiosus
of deism.
Ātman
and the
aṇu
do not owe their existence to a creator, they are eternal and independent.
Īśvara
differs from the
ātman
only insofar as he is never entangled in
saṃsāra
. He gives laws to the world but never interferes with it subsequently. He winds up the clockwork and lets it run its course.

Nyāya
was, even in ancient times, composed of two parts:
adhyātma-vidyā
, or metaphysics, and
tarka-śāstra
, or rules of debate, often simply called logic. Thus the
Nyāya Sūtra
, famous for its acute analysis of discursive thought as such, also has substantial sections on suffering, soul, and salvation. It begins with the following aphorism: “It is the knowledge of the true character of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the highest good: (1) The Means of Right Cognition; (2) The Objects of Right Cognition; (3) Doubt; (4) Motive; (5) Example; (6) Theory; (7) Factors of Inference; (8) Cogitation; (9) Demonstrated Truth; (10) Discussion; (11) Disputation; (12) Wrangling; (13) Fallacious Reason; (14) Casuistry; (15) Futile Rejoinder and (16) Clinchers.”

Logic is here practiced for the sake of salvation. That gives greater weight to the
Nyāya Sūtra
within Hinduism than a book on logic would normally have within a religious tradition. Logic as a way to truth is a means of liberation: “Suffering, birth, activity, mistaken notions, folly-if these factors are cancelled out in reverse order, there will be
mokṣa.”
¹⁸

S. K. Sarma makes an important point when he states:
“Nyāya
is not logic in the strict sense of the word. It is a system of philosophy. It is true that it lays stress on inference or reasoning as a means to correct knowledge, but it is not formal. It is not a mere devīce for correct thinking, but a well-thought-out and complete metaphysical thesis.”
¹⁹

A definite break in the development of
Nyāya
took place in the twelfth century, which marks the rise of
Navya-Nyāya
or the New Logic. Whereas the earlier works had been concentrating on the elucidation of the categories, as enumerated in the
Nyāya Sūtra
, the
Tattva-cintamani
by Gaṅgeśa, the major work of the new school, emphasized the
pramāṇas
, the means of valid cognition, devoting one chapter each to perception
(pratyakṣa)
, inference
(anumāna)
analogy
(upamāna)
, and verbal testimony
(śabda)
.

In spite of the intention to keep the description non-technical it should be said that
Navya-Nyāya
not only developed a highly complex epistemology but also created a technical language with the help of newly coined terms and thus initiated a quite peculiar style of philosophical writing in India which stands out for its brevity and precision. The development of
Navya-Nyāya
and the focusing upon
pramāṇas
instead on the categories of the
Nyāya Sūtra
did not prevent the continued production of works of the “old school” alongside the flourishing “new logic.” Works in both branches keep appearing even in our day.

The special field of
Navya-Nyāya
is epistemology. It acknowledges four legitimate means of finding truth:
pratyakṣa
or sense perception,
anumāna
or inference,
upamāna
or analogy, and
śabda
or scriptural authority.
pratyakṣa
is the perception that results from the contact of one of the senses with its proper object: it is definite, uncontradicted and unassociated with names.
Anumāna
is of three kinds:
pūrvavat
or from cause to effect,
śeṣavat
or from effect to cause, and
samanyato dṛṣṭa
or from common characteristics.
Upamāna
is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.
Śabda
is defined as the testimony of reliable authority, which may also transcend one’s own experience.

The objects of knowledge are:
ātman
, the body, senses, sense-objects,
buddhi
or understanding,
manas
or mind,
pravṛtti
or endeavor, rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and liberation. Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure and pain, as well as knowledge, indicate the existence of the
ātman
. The classical Aristotelian syllogism has three members – major, minor, and conclusion – the Nyāya-syllogism has five:

pratijña
or the stating of the point to be proved;

hetu
or the reason which establishes the proof;

udahāraṇa
or illustrative example;

upanaya
or corroboration by the instance;

nigamana
or inference, identical with the initial assertion.

The standard example of Indian logic for many centuries has been the following:

The mountain there in the distance is ablaze (1);

Because it is wreathed in smoke (2);

Whatever is wreathed in smoke is on fire, as e.g. a stove (3);

The mountain there is wreathed in smoke in such a manner (4);

Therefore: the mountain there in the distance is ablaze (5).

The discussion of fallacies and doubt demonstrates the lucidity and sharpness of the Naiyāyikas’ intellects. All kinds of fallacies are analyzed and the causes of doubt are explained, but the general skepticism of the Buddhists, who maintained that nothing can be known with certainty, is refuted. The polemics against Buddhism, especially the
Śūnya-vadins
, plays a large part in
Nyāya
literature. Naiyāyikas dissolve the extreme skepticism of the Buddhists with their critical realism and take the wind out of the Buddhists’ sails by disproving their teaching of emptiness and the impossibility of true cognition with the very arguments which the Buddhists have used. The Naiyāyikas seek to demonstrate that real liberation is possible through true cognition of reality. They agree with Vaiśeṣika metaphysics when they define
mokṣa
only in negative terms as “absolute freedom from pain.”
²⁰
It is a “condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable,” to be attained only after bodily death – there can be no
jīvan-mukta
.
²¹

Quite unique in Indian philosophy are the arguments for the existence of
Īśvara
, which we find in Nyāya works.
²²
The
Nyāya Kusumañjalī
states that the experience of contingency, eternity, diversity, activity, and individual existence requires an
adṛṣṭa
, an unseen cause, responsible ultimately for the joys and sorrows of human life. Above the
adṛṣṭa
of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Naiyāyikas postulate a Lord as the cause of right knowledge, of creation and destruction. “From effects, combination, support, etc. and traditional arts, authority,
śruti
and so on, an everlasting omniscient being must be assumed.” The commentary on this text explains:

The earth etc. must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects like a jar; by a thing’s having a maker we mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out of which it is to be made. “Combination” is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, initiating the

at the beginning of a creation, must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, because it has the nature of an action like the actions of bodies such as ours. “Support” etc.: the world depends upon some being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because it has the nature of being supported ... By traditional arts etc.: The traditional arts now current, such as that of making cloth, must have been originated by an independent being, from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of modern modes of writing. “From authority”: The knowledge produced by the

is produced by a virtue residing in its cause, because it is right knowledge, just as in the case of the right knowledge produced by perception. “From

The

must have been produced by a person, from its having the nature of a

like the

... At the beginning of creation there must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the cause of the measure of the

but this number cannot be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing faculty as then existing in

The Lord is qualified by absence of
adharma
, of
mithyā-jñāna
, or false knowledge, and of
pramāda
, or error, and the positive presence of
dharma
, right knowledge and equanimity. He is omnipotent, though influenced in his actions by the acts of his creatures. He acts only for the good of his creatures and acts toward them like a father toward his children.
²⁴
The Naiyāyikas also develop a theory of grace:
“Īśvara
indeed supports the efforts of people, i.e. if a person tries to attain something special, it is
Īśvara
who attains it; if
īśvara
does not act, the activity of people is fruitless.”

A good deal of
Nyāya
is so technical that it taxes the understanding even of a specialist in Western logic, not to speak of the general reader. Much of it is of interest mainly against the background of inner-Indian disputes, especially with the Buddhist logicians. It is, however, important to note that India, too, has its schools of critical logicians, and that, despite the popular opinion of Indian philosophy being merely opaque mysticism, there is also the disciplined reasoning of logic.

Tarka-śāstra
, the study of formal logic, is a difficult business and no more popular in India than anywhere else. Keśava Miśra of the fourteenth century, the author of a concise textbook which is still widely used, starts off his course in the following gruff manner: “I am writing this ‘Exposition of Reasoning’ consisting, as it does, of short and easy explanations of arguments, for the sake of the dull youth who wishes to have to learn as little as possible for the purpose of entering the portals of the Nyāya
darśana.”
²⁵

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika
has remained a living philosophical tradition even in our age. The more it is studied, the more respect it commands for its incisiveness and brilliance of definition. It could also possibly make a substantial contribution to the contemporary philosophy of science, anticipating, often by many centuries, problems which we are only now discovering.

SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

Yoga is one of the most popular and most ambiguous words in Indian literature, a word with which every Westerner seems to be familiar, as the advertisements of numerous Yoga schools suggest. Etymologically the word is derived from the root
yuj-
, to join, to unite. Pāṇini, the grammarian, explains the meaning of
yoga
as virtually identical with that of our word “religion,” union with the Supreme. Patañjali, in his
Yoga Sūtra
, defines
yoga
as “cessation of all changes in consciousness.” According to the Vedāntins
yoga
means the return of the
jīvātman
, the individual being, to its union with the
paramātman
, the Supreme Self. In a more general sense Hindu scriptures use the word
yoga
as a synonym to
mārga
, denoting any system of religion or philosophy, speaking of
karma-yoga, bhakti-yoga, jñāna-yoga
.