PŪRVĀ AND UTTARA MĪMĀṂSĀ
Mīmāṃsā
, “enquiry,” is the name of two very different systems of Hindu theology which have one thing in common: out of the statements of
śruti
they develop a complete theology.
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
(often simply called
Mīmāṃsā)
, the “earlier enquiry” has
dharma
as its proper subject and the
karma-kāṇḍa
of the Vedas as its scriptural source.
Uttara Mīmāṃsā
, the “latter enquiry,” better known as Vedānta, has
brahman
knowledge as its subject and the
jñāna-kāṇḍa
of the Veda as its scriptural basis. Though historically there was a considerable amount of friction between the two systems, they are also in many ways complementary and are considered to be the two most orthodox of the six systems. Certainly they are the two
darśanas
that come closest to the idea of theology as developed in the West.
Essentials of Pūrva Mīmā
ṃ
sā
At the end of the “Short History of Vedic Religion” (p. 68), Pūrva Mīmāṃsā was mentioned as the most orthodox form of Vedic exegesis, and some of its texts and its history were described, that need not be repeated here.
Athato dharma-jijñāsa
, “Now, then, an enquiry into
dharma,”
is the first sentence of
the Jaimini Sūtras
. It goes on to explain:
“Dharma
is that which is indicated by Vedic injunctions for the attainment of the good”.
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The Mīmāṃsakas took it for granted that the performance of sacrifices was the means to attain everything and that the Veda was meant to serve this end alone. Despite their insistence that the Veda was
a-pauruṣeya
, not man-made, and infallible revelation, they were prepared to drop all those parts of the Veda as non-essential which had nothing directly to do with sacrificial ritual. “The purpose of the Veda lying in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda which do not serve that purpose are useless; in these therefore the Veda is declared to be non-eternal.”
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Classical Mīmāṃsā does not admit the existence of any
īśvara
as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Mīmāṃsakas even formulate arguments which positively disprove the existence of God.
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The world, in their view, has always been in existence and the only real agent of a permanent nature was the sacrifice, or rather its unseen essence, the
a-pūrva
. Sacrifice, therefore, is the only topic that really interests the Mīmāṃsakas. The texts treat of the eternity of the
Veda
, of the means to its correct understanding and of the validity of human knowledge as preliminaries to this question.
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Many times we read in the
Brāhmaṇas:
“Desiring heaven one should perform sacrifice.” Consequently the Mīmāṃsākas emphasize that “desire for heaven” is the basic presupposition for performing a sacrifice. Besides animals,
devas
and the Vedic
ṛṣis
, women and
śūdras
are categorically excluded from the performance of sacrifices. So are those who lack sufficient wealth or suffer from a physical disability.
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The theory of
a-pūrva
is intended to explain the infallible effect of a sacrifice. The Mīmāṃsakas say that the
a-pūrva
is related to the verb of the Vedic injunction because this expresses something as yet to be accomplished. More subtly Mīmāṃsa distinguishes between principal and secondary
a-pūrva.
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The
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
is very brief in its description of the state to be achieved through sacrifice, namely
svarga
(heaven). Mīmāṃsākas are probably convinced that one cannot know much about it. By its very own principles it must come to the conclusion that passages in the Vedas which describe heaven, not enjoining certain acts, cannot be taken as authoritative. One
sūtra
says: “That one result would be heaven, as that is equally desirable for all.”
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To which the commentator adds: “Why so? Because heaven is happiness and everyone seeks for happiness.” The
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
does not mention the term
mokṣa
at all. Śabara declared that the statements concerning heaven found in the
Mahābhārata
and the Purāṇas can be neglected because these books were composed by men; and also that Vedic descriptions of heaven were mere
arthavāda
, without authority.
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Later Mīmāṃsākas, perhaps influenced by Vedānta, introduce the term
mokṣa
into their vocabulary and describe it as not having to assume a body after death.
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They also offer a description of the way to liberation: becoming disgusted with the troubles that one has to undergo during life on earth, finding the pleasures of the world to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, one comes to lose all interest in, and longing for, pleasures. Turning one’s attention toward liberation, one ceases to perform acts that are prohibited and which lead to misfortune, as well as acts that are prescribed but only to lead to some sort of happiness here or hereafter. One attenuates all previously acquired karma by undergoing the experiences resulting from it, and destroys the sole receptacle or abode of these experiences by the knowledge of the
ātman
. Virtues such as contentment, self-control and so forth prevent the further return of the soul into this world. Finally the soul becomes free, a
mukta.
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With their interest in language and analysis the Mīmāṃsakas are often close to the Grammarians, who developed a philosophical school of their own. Important epistemological observations can be found already in the
Śābara-bhāṣya.
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The first major commentary on Pāṇini’s
sūtras
, the
Mahā-bhāṣya
by Patañjali (which is ascribed to the second century B.C.E.) contains questions concerning the nature and function of words. The most famous name in Indian linguistic philosophy, however, is Bhartṛhari (c.500 C.E.) whose
Vākya-padīya
has been studied with great interest by Western scholars in recent years. His system is also called
sphoṭa-vāda
after its most characteristic teaching which compares the sūdden appearance of meaning at the enunciation of a word with the process of the sūdden ejection of liquid from a boil.
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Uttara Mīmā
ṃ
sā or Vedānta
Athāto brahma-jijñasa
, “Now, then, an enquiry into
brahman;’
begins the
Vedānta Sūtra
, also called
Brahma Sūtra
, which is ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa, and forms the basic text of Vedānta
darśana
. The 550
sūtras
, purporting to summarize the teaching of the Upaniṣads, are usually so short – often consisting of not more than one or two words – that without a commentary they remain incomprehensible. In all probability there had been a living tradition of Vedāntins in which the meaning of the
Vedānta Sūtra
was passed on from one generation to the next. As the Upaniṣads themselves took great care to maintain the
guru paraṃparā
, the succession of authorized teachers of the
vidyā
contained in them, so also the systematized aphoristic
sūtra-text
and its meaning was preserved in a carefully guarded tradition, the beginning of which we are unable to identify.
According to Indian tradition there had been other
Brahma Sūtras
before the one composed by Bādarāyaṇa. The most famous of these predecessors must have been an Ācārya Bādarī who is credited with having written both a
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra
and a
Vedānta Sūtra.
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Other
ācāryas
, whose names are found in ancient texts as forerunner to Bādarāyaṇa include Kārṣṇājini, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āsmarāthya, Kāṣakṛtsna, Kaśyapa, Vedavyāsa – all mentioned in the extant
Brahma Sūtra –
whose works have not been preserved. In all probability Bādarāyaṇa’s
sūtra
impressed his contemporaries as being superior, so that in the course of time it completely replaced the others.
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The
bhāṣyas
, or commentaries to the
Brahma Sūtra
, have gained authoritative position in the recognized ten branches of Vedānta, combining a textual exegesis with other living traditions, as we saw earlier when dealing with Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism.
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The oldest of the extant complete commentaries is that by Śaṅkarācārya. We know that there had been earlier commentaries associated with names like Bhartṛprapanca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Upavarṣa, Bodhāyaṇa (whose authority is several times invoked by Rāmānuja against Śaṅkara), Brahmānaṇḍi, Ṭaṅka, Brahmadatta, Bhāruci, Sundarapāṇḍya, Gauḍapāda and Govinda Bhagavatpāda, the
guru
of Śaṅkaracārya.
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As the commentators, expounding the most diverse theological views, demonstrate, the original
Brahma Sūtra
is merely a kind of general frame for a further development of ideas, which are left fairly vague and undetermined. Looking at the bare
sūtras
without a commentary one can only give a general idea of their structure without discussing their import.
The
Vedānta Sūtra
is divided into four
adhyāyas
, chapters, each subdivided into four
pādas
, literally “feet” or parts, which again are made up of a varying number of
sūtras
or aphorisms.
The entire first
adhyāya
is devoted to a discussion on
brahman: brahman
is the sole and supreme cause of all things. Systems which teach otherwise are rejected as heretical. The detailed polemics against the Sāṁkhya system is continued into the second
adhyāya
which also refutes Vaiśeṣika theories. Toward the end of the second
pāda
the
Bhāgavata
system is mentioned. The comments on this part of the text (II,2,42–48) are a classic example of the wide diversity that exists in the commentaries. Śaṅkara understands the
sūtra
to say that the
Bhāgavata
system is untenable; Rāmānuja sees in it a recognition and justification for the
Bhāgavata
system. The next two
pādas
show the origin of the various phenomena that go into the making of the universe. The third
adhyāya
discusses the
jīvātman
, the individual living being. The condition and circumstances of the soul after death and the various states of dream, dreamless sleep, etc. are inquired into. A long series of
sūtras
deals with meditation and the types of
brahman
knowledge. The fourth
adhyāya
takes up again the topic of meditation and ends with a description of the
brahman-knower’s
fate after death.
Schools of Vedānta
In connection with the history of Vaiṣṇavism, Vaiṣṇava (theistic) schools of Vedānta were mentioned, reacting against the (non-theistic) Advaita interpretation given by Śaṅkara. Similarly, in the context of Śaivism, Śaiva-Vedānta schools were briefly described. In the following, therefore, the focus will be on Advaita Vedānta and its history. Advaita Vedānta is only one of the ten recognized schools of Vedānta philosophy. However, it not only has acquired a certain prominence in India due to Śaṅkara’s genius, but is also the best (and often the only) known system of Hindu philosophy in the West.
Śaṅkarācārya, according to many the greatest Vedāntin and perhaps the greatest of India’s philosophers, born, according to tradition, in 788,
70
near Kāladi in today’s Kerala, became a
saṃnyāsi
at the age of eighteen. He vanquished all his opponents in debate, established four headquarters in the South, East, North and West of India for the missionaries of his doctrine, the
Daśanāmi Saṃnyāsis
, wrote numerous books and died at the age of thirty-two.
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He constructed his Advaita-Vedānta upon principles set forth by Gauḍapāda in his
Kārikā
to the
Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad.
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Gauḍapāda is thought to be Śaṅkara’s
prācārya
, that is, his
guru’s guru
. Śaṅkara’s commentary on these
Kārikās
may be the earliest and most concise statement of his philosophy, later expanded in the
Śarīraka-bhāṣya
, his famous commentary on the
Brahma Sūtras
.
As all Indian philosophical theologians do, Śaṅkara clarifies his epistemological position in the introduction to his main work. He offers his own critique of the process of acquiring knowledge and states that all subject-object knowledge is distorted by
adhyāsa
, superimposition, which falsifies knowledge in such a way that the subject is unable to find objective truth. Quoting the familiar example of the traveler mistaking a piece of rope on the road for a snake (or vice versa) he proceeds to call all sense-perception into question as possibly misleading due to preconceived, superimposed, ideas. But though all object-cognition can be doubted, the existence of the doubter remains a fact. Every perception, be it true, doubtful or mistaken, presupposes a subject, a perceiver. Even if there were no objective perception at all, there would still be a subject. It cannot be proved, nor does it have to be, because it precedes every proof as its inherent condition. It is distinct from all objects and independent.
Ātman
is pure consciousness which remains even after
manas
, rational thought, has passed away.
Ātman
is ultimately
sat-cit-ānanda
(truth/reality-consciousness-bliss). Śaṅkara does not regard the world of things as “pure illusion” (as his opponents accuse him of doing): the world is neither
abhāva
, non-existence, nor, as Buddhist idealism has it,
Śūnyatā
, emptiness. For Śaṅkara the Buddhists are the archantagonists of
brahman
-knowledge; using Buddhist patterns of thought (which later earned him the title “Crypto-Buddhist” by zealous Vaiṣṇavas) he sets out to reestablish Brahmanism. Sense objects, in his view, are different from fiction, but they also differ from reality in the ultimate sense. In order to understand Śaṅkara’s statements one must always see them in the frame of reference in which they are made: all his assertions are explicit or implicit comparisons with absolute reality, which alone is of interest to him. The “natural” person does not know how to distinguish between relative and absolute being, between “things” and “being,” between
ātman
and
non-ātman
. This is the congenital
avidyā
, a nescience that we are not even aware of. It is this ignorance which keeps a person in
saṃsāra. Atman
is
brahman
– that is good Upaniṣadic doctrine; the self of a person is identical with the ground of all being.
Brahman
, however, is invisible, impervious to any sense or mind-perception:
brahman
is not identical with any one particular thing. Some Upaniṣadic passages speak of a “lower” and a “higher” Brahman,
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they speak of the immutable supreme
brahman
and also of the
īśvara
who is creator, Lord and ruler of the world. Śaṅkara takes those passages as the occasion to introduce his most controversial distinction between
brahman saguṇa
and
brahman nirguṇa
, the Supreme with attributes and the Supreme without attributes, the
īśvara
of religious tradition, and the absolute and unqualified reality, a no-thing. According to Śaṅkara
īśvara
is only a temporal manifestation of
brahman
, creator for as long as creation lasts. Śaṅkara is credited with numerous beautiful hymns to the traditional Lords of religion, to Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Devī.
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Devotion is one of the stages which one has to go through, but not a stage to remain at: the ultimate goal is deliverance also from God, a complete identification with the Reality, which neither develops nor acts, neither loves nor hates but just
is
. The process of achieving this complete liberation is a cleansing process that separates the
ātman
from all untruth, unreality, and temporality. The doing away with
avidyā
, obscuring ignorance, is in itself already
vidyā
, knowledge that is identical with being. In this
vidyā
the self experiences its identity with
brahman nirguṇa
, the pure and immutable reality.