Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (251 page)

38.
Jonathan Haslam,
The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), p. 8.

39.
Katsuno Shun,
Sh
wa tenn
no sens
(Tosho Shuppansha, 1990), p. 60.

40.
Walter Lafeber,
The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations
(W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), p. 172.

41.
Shimada, “The Extension of Hostilities, 1931–1932,” pp. 306–7.

42.
Fujiwara Akira, “Nitch
sens
ni okeru horyo gyakusatsu,” in
Kikan senss
sekinin kenky
9 (Autumn 1995), p. 18.

43.
Ibid., p. 19.

44.
Ibid.

45.
In his “Monologue,” Hirohito noted that he had brought an end to the fighting in Shanghai. “When the suspension of hostilities occurred on March 3,” it was “because I had expressly ordered Shirakawa beforehand not to expand the conflict.” His decisive action in an area where Britain and the United States had substantial interests should be contrasted with his silence and lack of reflection about having sanctioned the aggression in Manchuria. See
STD
, p. 28; Fujiwara Akira et al.,
Tettei kensh
: Sh
wa tenn
‘dokuhakuroku'
(
tsuki Shoten, 1991), p. 82.

46.
Fujiwara Akira, “‘Tenn
no guntai' no rekishi to honshitsu,” in
Kikan sens
sekinin kenky
11 (Spring 1996), p. 67. During the China war, Japanese pilots shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner often committed suicide on their return. Around the time of the Nomonhan Incident in 1939, repatriated noncommissioned officers were frequently court-martialed, and some felt compelled to commit suicide. The reverse side of this battlefield psychology was the organized murder of Chinese prisoners of war.