Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (248 page)

19.
Ibid., pp. 129–30.

20.
Masuda Tomoko, “Seit
naikakusei no h
kai,” in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenky
jo, ed.,
Gendai Nihon shakai, 4 rekishiteki zentei
(Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), pp. 193–94.

21.
Ostrower,
Collective Insecurity
, pp. 94–96.

22.
Shimada Toshihiko, “The Extension of Hostilities, 1931–1932,” in
Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident,
1928–1932
(Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 287; Hatano, “Mansh
jihen to ‘ky
ch
' seiryoku,” pp. 121–22, 123, n. 64.

23.
After World War II the
New York Times
, on June 24, 1946, accused Shidehara of being an “accomplice of the militarists,” who had “helped to confuse the world about an event which the Japanese later extolled as the beginning of the Second World War.”

24.
Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” p. 164. After the failure of the March coup incident, many middle-echelon officers became convinced that military action in Manchuria was the essential precondition to political reform at home.

25.
Harada nikki
,
dai nikan,
p. 81, cited in Hatano, “Mansh
jihen to ‘ky
ch
' seiryoku,” p. 126.

26.
KYN, dai gokan
, p. 265.

27.
Otabe Y
ji, “Nii ten niiroku jiken, shub
sha wa dare ka,” in Fujiwara Akira et al., eds,
Nihon kindaishi no kyoz
to jitsuz
3, Mansh
jihen—haisen
(
suki Shoten, 1989), p. 81; and, in the same volume, Abe Hirozumi, “Nihon ni fuashizumu wa nakatta no ka,” p. 206.