History of the Second World War (11 page)

On the 27th Hitler gave explicit orders to his military advisers to prepare comprehensive plans for an invasion of Norway if necessary. The special staff formed for the purpose met for the first time on February 5.

That day the Allied Supreme War Council met in Paris, and Chamberlain took Churchill with him. At this meeting plans were approved for preparing a force of two British divisions and a slightly smaller French contingent as ‘Aid to Finland’ — they were to be ‘camouflaged as volunteers’ in an endeavour to diminish the chances of an open war with Russia. But an argument developed over the route of their despatch. The British Prime Minister emphasised the difficulties of landing at Petsamo, and the advantages of landing at Narvik — particularly ‘to get control of the Gallivare ore-field’. That was to be the main object, and only a part of the force was to push on to Finland’s aid. The British arguments prevailed, and it was arranged that the force should sail early in March.

A fateful incident occurred on February 16. A German vessel, the
Altmark,
which was carrying British prisoners back from the South Atlantic, was chased by British destroyers and took refuge in a Norwegian fiord. Churchill sent a direct order to Captain Vian of H.M.S.
Cossack
to push into Norwegian waters, board the
Altmark
and rescue the prisoners. Two Norwegian gunboats were on the scene, but they were overawed and the subsequent protest of the Norwegian Government about the intrusion into their waters was rebuffed.

Hitler regarded the protest as merely a gesture to hoodwink him, and was convinced that the Norwegian Government was England’s willing accomplice. That belief was nourished by the passivity of the two gunboats and by the reports of Quisling that the action of the
Cossack
had been a ‘pre-arranged’ affair. According to the German admirals, the
Altmark
affair was decisive in swinging Hitler in favour of intervention in Norway. It was the spark that set fire to the powder trail.

Hitler felt that he could not wait for Quisling’s plans to develop, especially as German observers in Norway reported that Quisling’s party was making little progress, while reports from England indicated that some action in the Norwegian area was being planned, together with the assembly of troops and transports.

On the 20th Hitler sent for General von Falkenhorst and appointed him to command and prepare an expeditionary force for Norway, saying, ‘I am informed that the English intend to land there, and I want to be there before them. The occupation of Norway by the British would be a strategic turning movement which would lead them into the Baltic, where we have neither troops nor coastal fortifications . . . the enemy would find himself in a position to advance on Berlin and break the backbone of our two fronts.’

On March 1, Hitler issued his directive for the complete preparation for the invasion. Denmark was to be occupied, too, as a necessary strategic stepping stone and safeguard to his lines of communication.

But even now it was not a definite decision to strike. The records of Raeder’s conferences with Hitler show that Hitler was still torn between his conviction that ‘the maintenance of Norway’s neutrality is the best thing’ for Germany and his fear of an imminent British landing there. In presenting the naval plans on March
g
he dwelt on the hazards of undertaking an operation ‘contrary to all the principles of naval warfare’, while at the same time saying that it was ‘urgent’.

In the following week the state of anxiety on the German side became more feverish. On the 13th it was reported that British submarines were concentrated off the south coast of Norway; on the 14th the Germans intercepted a radio message which ordered Allied transports to be ready to move; on the 15th a number of French officers arrived at Bergen. The Germans felt that they were certain to be forestalled as their own expeditionary force was not yet ready.

How were things actually going on the Allied side? On February 21 Daladier urged that the
Altmark
affair should be used as a pretext for the ‘immediate seizure’ of the Norwegian ports ‘by a sudden stroke’. Daladier argued: ‘Its justification in the eyes of world opinion will be the more easy the more rapidly the operation is carried out and the more our propaganda is able to exploit the memory of the recent complicity of Norway in the
Altmark
incident’ — a way of talking which was remarkably like Hitler’s. The French Government’s proposal was viewed with some doubt in London, as the expeditionary forces were not ready and Chamberlain still hoped that the Norwegian and Swedish Governments would agree to the entry of Allied troops.

At the meeting of the War Cabinet on March 8, however, Churchill unfolded a scheme of arriving in force off Narvik and throwing a detachment of troops ashore immediately — on the principle of ‘displaying strength in order to avoid having to use it’. At a further meeting on the 12th the Cabinet ‘decided to revive the plans’ for landings at Trondheim, Stavanger, and Bergen as well as at Narvik.

The force landed at Narvik was to push rapidly inland and over the Swedish frontier to the Gallivare ironfield. Everything was to be ready for putting the plans into execution on March 20.

But then the plans were upset by Finland’s military collapse and her capitulation to Russia on March 13 — which deprived the Allies of the primary pretext for going into Norway. In the first reaction to the cold douche, two divisions which had been allotted for the Norway force were sent to France, though the equivalent of one division remained available. Another sequel was the fall of Daladier, and his replacement as Prime Minister of France by Paul Reynaud — who came into power on the surge of a demand for a more offensive policy and quicker action. Reynaud went to Lon don for a meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council, on March 28, determined to press for the immediate execution of the Norwegian project that Churchill had so long been urging.

But there was no need now for any such pressure — for, as Churchill has related, Chamberlain had become ‘much inclined to aggressive action of some kind at this stage’. As in the spring of 1939, once he had taken his resolve he jumped in with both feet. Opening the Council, he not only argued strongly for action in Norway but also urged the adoption of Churchill’s other favourite project — that of dropping by air a continuous stream of mines into the Rhine and other rivers of Germany. Reynaud expressed some doubt about the latter operation, and said he would have to obtain the agreement of the French War Committee. But he eagerly embraced the Norwegian operation.

It was settled that the mining of Norwegian waters should be carried out on April 5, and be backed by the landing of forces at Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger. The first contingent of troops was to sail, for Narvik, on the 8th. But then a fresh delay arose. The French War Committee would not agree to the dropping of mines in the Rhine lest it should bring German retaliation ‘which would fall upon France’. They showed no such concern about the retaliation that would fall on Norway from the other operation — and Gamelin had even emphasised that one of its aims was ‘to draw the enemy into a trap by provoking him to land in Norway’. Chamberlain, however, tried to insist that both operations should be carried out, and arranged with Churchill that the latter should go over to Paris on the 4th and make a fresh effort — which did not succeed — to persuade the French to adopt his Rhine plan.

That meant a short deferment of ‘Wilfred’, the Norwegian plan. It is strange that Churchill was agreeable to it, for at the War Cabinet meeting the day before, reports had been presented from the War Office and Foreign Office showing that large numbers of German ships were concentrated, with troops on board, at the ports nearest to Norway. Rather absurdly it was suggested — and astonishingly, believed — that these forces were waiting in readiness to deliver a counterstroke to a British descent on Norway.

The start of the Norwegian operations was postponed three days, until the 8th. That further delay proved fatal to its prospects of success. It enabled the Germans to get into Norway just ahead of the Allies.

On April 1 Hitler had finally made up his mind and ordered the invasion of Norway and Denmark to begin at 5.15 a.m. 011 the 9th. His decision followed a disturbing report that Norwegian anti-aircraft and coastal batteries had been given permission to open fire without awaiting higher orders — which suggested that the Norwegian forces were being made ready for action and that if Hitler waited any longer his chances of surprise, and success, would vanish.

In the dark hours of April 9 advance detachments of German troops, mostly in warships, arrived in the chief ports of Norway, from Oslo right up to Narvik — and captured them with little difficulty. Their commanders announced to the local authorities that they had come to take Norway under German protection against an Allied invasion that was imminent — a statement that the Allied spokesmen promptly denied, and continued to deny.

As Lord Hankey, a member of the War Cabinet at the time, stated:

 . . . from the start of planning to the German invasion, both Great Britain and Germany were keeping more or less level in their plans and preparations. Britain actually started planning a little earlier . . . both plans were executed almost simultaneously, Britain being twenty-four hours ahead in the so-called act of aggression, if the term is really applicable to either side.

But Germany’s final spurt was faster and more forceful. She won the race by a very short head — it was almost a ‘photo-finish’.

One of the most questionable points of the Nuremberg Trials was that the planning and execution of aggression against Norway was put among the major charges against the Germans. It is hard to understand how the British and French Governments had the face to approve the inclusion of this charge, or how the official prosecutors could press for a conviction on this score. Such a course was one of the most palpable cases of hypocrisy in history.

Passing now to the course of the campaign, a surprising revelation is the smallness of the force which captured the capital and chief ports of Norway in the opening coup. It comprised two battlecruisers, a pocket battleship, seven cruisers, fourteen destroyers, twenty-eight U-boats, a number of auxiliary ships, and some 10,000 troops — the advance elements of three divisions that were used for the invasion. At no place was the initial landing made by more than 2,000 men. One parachute battalion was also employed — to seize the airfields at Oslo and Stavanger. This was the first time that parachute troops had been used in war and they proved very valuable. But the most decisive factor in the German success was the Luftwaffe; the actual strength employed in the campaign was about 800 operational planes and 250 transport planes. It overawed the Norwegian people in the first phase, and later paralysed the Allies’ countermoves.

How was it that the British naval forces failed to intercept and sink the much weaker German naval forces that carried the invading detachments? The extent of the sea-space, the nature of the Norwegian coast, and the hazy weather were important handicaps. But there were other factors, and more avoidable handicaps. Gamelin records that when, on April 2, he urged Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to hasten the despatch of the expeditionary force, the latter replied: ‘With us the Admiralty is all-powerful; it likes to organise everything methodically. It is convinced that it can prevent any German landing on the west coast of Norway.’

At 1.25 p.m. on the 7th British aircraft actually spotted ‘strong German naval forces moving swiftly northward’ across the mouth of the Skaggerak, towards the Norwegian coast. Churchill says: ‘We found it hard at the Admiralty to believe that this force was going to Narvik’ — in spite of a ‘report from Copenhagen that Hitler meant to seize that port’. The British Home Fleet sailed at 7.30 p.m. from Scapa Flow, but it would seem that both the Admiralty and the admirals at sea were filled with the thought of catching the German battlecruisers. In their efforts to bring these to battle they tended to lose sight of the possibility that the enemy had a landward intention, and lost a chance of intercepting the smaller troop-carrying warships.

Since an expeditionary force was already embarked and ready to sail, why was it so slow to land and eject the German detachments before they had time to establish their grip on the Norwegian ports? The prime reason is contained in the last paragraph. When the Admiralty heard that the German battlecruisers had been spotted, they ordered the cruiser squadron at Rosyth ‘to march her soldiers ashore, even without their equipment, and join the Fleet at sea’. Similar orders were sent to the ships in the Clyde that were loaded up with troops.

Why did not the Norwegians put up a better resistance against such a small invading force? Primarily, because their forces were not even mobilised. Despite warnings from their Minister in Berlin and urgings from the Chief of their General Staff, the order for mobilisation was not given until the night of April 8/9, a few hours before the invasion. That was too late, and the swift-moving invaders disrupted the process.

Moreover, as Churchill remarks, the Norwegian Government at the time was ‘chiefly concerned with the activities of the British’. It was unfortunate, and also ironical, that the British mine-laying operation should have absorbed and distracted the Norwegians’ attention during the crucial twenty-four hours before the Germans landed.

As for the Norwegians’ chance of rallying from the opening blow, this was diminished by their lack of fighting experience and an out-of-date military organisation. In no way were they fitted to cope with a modern Blitzkreig, even on the small scale applied to their case. The weakness of the resistance was all too clearly shown by the speed with which the invaders raced along the deep valleys to overrun the country. If the resistance had been tougher, the melting snow on the valley-sides — which hampered outflanking manoeuvre — would have been a more serious impediment to the German prospects of success.