History of the Second World War (15 page)

But on the evening of the 25th Gort took the definite decision to retreat to the sea, at Dunkirk. Forty-eight hours earlier, the German panzer forces had already arrived, on the canal line only ten miles from the port. On the 26th the British Cabinet allowed the War Office to send him a telegram approving his step and ‘authorised’ him to carry out such a retirement. Next day a further telegram told him to evacuate his force by sea.

That same day the Belgian Army’s line cracked in the centre under Bock’s attack, and no reserves were left at hand to fill the gap. King Leopold had already sent repeated warnings to Churchill, through Admiral Keyes, that the situation was becoming hopeless. Now, at a stroke, it was so. Most of Belgium had already been overrun and the army had its back close to the sea, penned in a narrow strip of land that was packed with civilian refugees. So in the late afternoon the King decided to sue for an armistice — and the ‘cease fire’ was sounded early the next morning.

The Belgians’ surrender increased the danger that the B.E.F. would be cut off before it could reach Dunkirk. Churchill had just sent King Leopold an appeal to hold on, which he privately described to Gort as ‘asking them to sacrifice themselves for us’. It is understandable that the encircled Belgians, already aware that the B.E.F. was preparing to evacuate, did not see that appeal in the same light as Churchill. Nor was King Leopold willing to follow Churchill’s advice that he should himself ‘escape by aeroplane before too late’. The King felt that he ‘must stay with his Army and people’. His decision may have been unwise in the long view, but in the circumstances of the time it was an honourable choice. Churchill’s subsequent criticisms of it were hardly fair, while the violent denunciations made by the French Prime Minister and press were grossly unjust — considering the way that the Belgian downfall had been produced by the collapse of the French defence on the Meuse.

The British retreat to the coast now became a race to re-embark before the German trap closed — notwithstanding bitter French protests and reproaches. It was fortunate that preparatory measures had begun in England a week before — although on a different assumption. On the 20th Churchill had approved steps ‘to assemble a large number of small vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets on the French coast’, with the idea that they might help in rescuing bits of the B.E.F. that might be cut off as it tried to push south into France, under the existing plan. The Admiralty lost no time in making preparations. Admiral Ramsay, commanding at Dover, had been placed in operational control on the previous day, the 19th. A number of ferry-craft, naval drifters and small coasters were at once collected for what was called ‘Operation Dynamo’. From Harwich round to Weymouth sea-transport officers were directed to list all ships up to a thousand tons.

In the days that followed the situation became rapidly worse, and it was soon clear to the Admiralty that Dunkirk would be the only possible route of evacuation. ‘Dynamo’ was put into operation on the afternoon of the 26th — twenty-four hours before the Belgian appeal for an armistice, and also before the Cabinet had authorised the evacuation.

At first it was not expected that more than a small fraction of the B.E.F. could be saved. The Admiralty told Ramsay to aim at bringing away 45,000 within two days and that it was probable the enemy would by then have made further evacuation impossible. Actually, only 25,000 were landed in England by the night of the 28th. It was fortunate that the period of grace proved considerably longer.

For the first five days the rate of evacuation was restricted by an insufficiency of small boats to carry troops from the beaches to the ships waiting offshore. This need, though pointed out by Ramsay originally, had not been adequately met. But the Admiralty now made more extensive efforts to provide them and to man them, the naval personnel being reinforced by a host of civilian volunteers — fishermen, lifeboatmen, yachtsmen, and others who had some experience in handling boats. Ramsay recorded that one of the best performances was that of the crew of the fire-float
Massey Shaw
from the London Fire Brigade.

At first, too, there was much confusion on the beaches, owing to the disorganised state of the troops waiting to embark — at that time largely base personnel. Ramsay considered that it was aggravated ‘by the fact that Army officers’ uniform is indistinguishable from that of other ranks’, and found that ‘the appearance of Naval officers, in their unmistakable uniforms, helped to restore order. . . . Later on, when troops of fighting formations reached the beaches these difficulties disappeared.’

The first heavy air attack came on the evening of the 29th and ‘it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date’. Its preservation was the more important because the majority of the troops were embarked from the harbour and less than one-third from the beaches.

In the next three days the air attacks increased, and on June 2 daylight evacuation had to be suspended. The fighters of the R.A.F., from airfields in southern England, did their utmost to keep the Luftwaffe at bay, but, being outnumbered and unable to stay long over the area because of the distance, they could not maintain anything like adequate air cover. The oft-repeated bombing attacks were a severe strain on the troops waiting on the beaches, though the soft sand blanketed the effects. Far more material damage was done over the sea where the losses included six destroyers, eight personnel ships, and over 200 small craft — out of a total of 860 British and Allied vessels of all sizes employed in the evacuation. It was very lucky that the German Navy made very little attempt to interfere, either with U-boats or E-boats. Happily, too, the evacuation was favoured by extremely good weather.

By May 30, 126,000 troops had been evacuated, while all the rest of the B.E.F. had arrived in the Dunkirk bridgehead — except for fragments that were cut off during the retreat. The defence of the bridgehead against the enemy’s encircling advance on land now became much firmer in consequence. The Germans had missed their opportunity.

Unhappily the French higher commanders in Belgium, still conforming to Weygand’s impossible plan, had hesitated to retreat to the sea and to do so as quickly as possible along with the British. As a result of that delay nearly half of what was left of the French First Army had been cut off on the 28th near Lille, and were forced to surrender on the 31st. Their gallant three-day stand, however, helped the escape of the remainder, as well as the British.

By midnight on June 2 the British rear-guard embarked and the evacuation of the B.E.F. was complete — 224,000 men had been safely brought away, and only some 2,000 were lost in ships sunk en route to England. Some 95,000 Allied troops, mainly French, had also been evacuated. On the next night every effort was made to bring away the remaining Frenchmen, despite increasing difficulties, and 26,000 more were saved. Unfortunately a few thousand of the rear-guard were left — and this left sore feelings in France.

By the morning of the 4th, when the operation was broken off, a total of 338,000 British and Allied troops had been landed in England. It was an amazing result compared with earlier expectations, and a grand performance on the part of the Navy.

At the same time it is evident that the preservation of the B.E.F. ‘to fight another day’ would have been impossible without Hitler’s action in halting Kleist’s panzer forces outside Dunkirk twelve days before, on May 24.

At that moment there was only one British battalion covering the twenty-mile stretch of the Aa between Gravelines and St Omer, and for a further sixty miles inland the canal line was little better defended. Many of the bridges were not yet blown up, or even prepared for demolition. Thus the German panzer troops had no difficulty in gaining bridgeheads over the canal at a number of places on May 23 — and it was as Gort said in his Despatch, ‘the only anti-tank obstacle on this flank’. Having crossed it, there was nothing to hold them up — and stop them establishing themselves astride the B.E.F’s lines of retreat to Dunkirk — except the halt that Hitler imposed.

It is clear, however, that Hitler had been in a highly strung and jumpy state ever since the breakthrough into France. The extraordinary easiness of the advance, the lack of resistance his armies had met, had made him uneasy — it seemed too good to be true. The effects can be followed in the diary that was kept by Halder, the Chief of the General Staff. On the 17th, the day after the French defence behind the Meuse had dramatically collapsed, Halder noted: ‘Rather unpleasant day. The Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us.’

That was the day when Guderian was suddenly pulled up when in full stride for the sea. Next day, noted Halder: ‘Every hour is precious . . . Fuhrer HQ sees it quite differently . . . unaccountably keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the best way to min the whole campaign.’ Not until late that evening, when Halder was able to assure him that the follow-up infantry army was wheeling into line along the Aisne as a flank shield, did Hitler agree to let the panzer forces sweep on.

Two days later these reached the coast, cutting the communications of the Allied armies in Belgium. That brilliant success seems to have temporarily drowned Hitler’s doubts. But they revived as his panzer forces swung northward, especially after the momentary alarm caused by the British tank counterattack from Arras, slight as this was. His panzer forces, which he regarded as so precious, were now heading towards the zone occupied by the British, whom he looked on as particularly tough opponents. At the same time he was uneasy as to what the French in the south might be planning.

On the surface it appears to have been unlucky for Hitler that he chose to visit Rundstedt’s headquarters on the morning of May 24, a crucial moment. For Rundstedt was a wary strategist, careful to take full account of unfavourable factors and avoid erring on the side of optimism. For that reason he was often a good corrective to Hitler, by providing a coolly balanced estimate — but it did not benefit German chances on this occasion. In his review of the situation he dwelt on the way that the tank strength had been reduced in the long and rapid drive, and pointed out the possibility of having to meet attacks from the north and south, particularly the latter.

Since he had, the night before, received orders from Brauchitsch, the Army Commander-in-Chief, that the completion of the encirclement in the north was to be handed over to Bock, it was the more natural that he should be thinking of the next phase in the south.

Moreover, Rundstedt’s headquarters were still at Charleville, near Sedan — close behind the Aisne, and in the centre of the German front facing south. That location fostered a tendency to focus on what was in front and give less attention to what was happening on the extreme right flank, where victory seemed to be assured. Dunkirk only came into the corner of his eye.

Hitler ‘agreed entirely’ with Rundstedt’s reservations, and went on to emphasise the paramount necessity of conserving the panzer force for future operations.

On his return to his own headquarters in the afternoon, he sent for the Commander-in-Chief. It was ‘a very unpleasant interview’, and ended in Hitler giving a definite halt order — Halder that evening mournfully summarised its effect in his diary:

The left wing, consisting of armoured and motorised forces, which has no enemy before it, will thus be stopped in its tracks upon direct orders of the Fuhrer. Finishing off the encircled enemy army is to be left to the Luftwaffe!

Was Hitler’s halt order inspired by Rundstedt? If Hitler had felt that his halt order was due to Rundstedt’s influence, he would almost certainly have mentioned it, after the British escape, among the excuses he gave for his decision, for he was very apt to blame others for any mistakes. Yet in this case there is no trace of his ever having mentioned, in the course of his subsequent explanations, Rundstedt’s opinion as a factor. Such negative evidence is as significant as any.

It seems more likely that Hitler went to Rundstedt’s headquarters in the hope of finding further justification for his own doubts and for the change of plan he wanted to impose on Brauchitsch and Halder. In so far as it was prompted by anyone else, the initial influence probably came from Keitel and Jodl, the two chief military members of his own staff. There is particular significance in the evidence of General Warlimont, who was in close touch with Jodl at the time. Astonished on hearing a rumour of the halt order, he went to ask Jodl about it:

Jodi confirmed that the order had been given, showing himself rather impatient about my enquiries. He himself took the same stand as Hitler, emphasising that the personal experience that not only Hitler but also Keitel and himself had in Flanders during the First World War proved beyond any doubt that armour could not operate in the Flanders marshes, or at any rate not without heavy losses — and such losses could not be borne in view of the already reduced strength of the panzer corps and their tasks in the impending second stage of the offensive in France.*

Warlimont added that if the initiative for the halt order had come from Rundstedt, he and the others at O.K.W. would have heard of it; and that Jodl, who was on the defensive about the decision, ‘certainly would not have failed to point to Field-Marshal von Rundstedt as the one who had initiated or at least supported that order’ — as that would have silenced criticism, because of Rundstedt’s ‘undisputed authority in operational matters among all senior general staff officers

One other reason, however, for the halt order was revealed to me at the time — that Goring appeared and reassured the Fuhrer that his air force would accomplish the rest of the encirclement by closing the sea side of the pocket from the air. He certainly overrated the effectiveness of his own branch.*

* p. 197.