Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (28 page)

Bock's arguments were in line with the views held by the High Command. In the Fuehrer's headquarters it was believed that the Russians were at the end of their tether and that one last effort would be enough to defeat them completely.

This optimism was not shared by Bock and his staff—neither by Greiffenberg nor by Lieutenant-Colonel von Tresckow, the Chief of Operations; they knew the condition of the troops and realized that only a short span of time was left before the onset of the severe winter weather. But Bock nevertheless regarded the offensive as the preferable alternative to spending a desolate winter in the field, a winter which might give Stalin plenty of time to get his second wind.

Halder was pleased with the attitude of Army Group Centre, as indeed was Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Com- mander-in-Chief Army. They both favoured a resumption of the offensive, since they regarded this as the only chance to conclude the campaign victoriously.

Halder already had the operation orders in his pocket, and now he announced them. The objectives were mapped out ambitiously. Guderian's Second Panzer Army was to take the traffic junction of Tula and its well-equipped airfield, and then drive south-east of Moscow through Kolomna to the ancient city of Nizhniy Novgorod on the Volga, now called Gorkiy—250 miles beyond Moscow.

In the north Ninth Army was to move east across the Volga-Moskva Canal with Third Panzer Army, and then wheel towards Moscow as the left prong of a pincer movement.

In the centre a frontal attack was to be made by Fourth Army on the right and 4th Armoured Group on the left.

The date for the start of the offensive was not yet laid down. Field-Marshal von Bock was in favour of starting at once, but the supply situation demanded that it be delayed for a few more days.

This account shows that the German High Command, though it may have had some cause to doubt the usefulness of this last great offensive operation of 1941, did not resume the offensive against Moscow solely at Hitler's pressure—as Zhukov claims. Field-Marshal von Bock, whatever his reasons, was a determined champion of the new offensive.

Moscow had been his objective at all times and at every phase of the campaign. On this point he found himself in full agreement with the Army High Command, which time and again declared Moscow to be the most important objective. The anxiety to reach Moscow before the end of the year was entirely understandable.

For one thing the general strategic situation demanded it.

Was Army Group Centre to dig in along a front line a thousand miles long? With only a single infantry division as a reserve behind the fighting line—and otherwise a vast empty hinterland controlled by partisans? Was the initiative to be left to the Russians to launch continuous local attacks? Were the German troops to watch Stalin use Moscow as an ideal marshalling yard for bringing up fresh forces from all parts of his great empire and employing them against the thin and frozen German lines? That, surely, would have been the wrong solution.

But there was yet another important consideration. Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief Army, his Chief of the General Staff, and more particularly Field-Marshal von Bock and Colonel-General Guderian, had been urging Hitler ever since the battle of Smolensk to give them the green light for the attack on Moscow. They had resisted his plan of first pressing ahead with the battle of Leningrad in order to clear the flank for the offensive against Moscow. They had opposed his operation against Kiev, and had ceaselessly implored, persuaded, and warned him that Moscow itself must be the principal military objective.

Hitler, on the other hand, had from the outset opposed the views of his General Staff. He did not believe that the capture of Moscow was all-important. He maintained that the course of operations must show whether Moscow could be taken. "Russia will be defeated when we possess Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland in the north, and when we have the grain of the Ukraine and the industrial area of the Donets in the south," was his argument. Strangely enough, and contrary to his usual custom, he had in the end allowed himself to be swayed away from his favourite target of Leningrad.

At any rate, Moscow was not his pet objective. It was and continued to be the pet objective of his General Staff. Now he had given in to his generals. Were Brauchitsch, Halder, von Bock, and Guderian now to go to him and say, "Sorry, we cannot make it: because of the unfavourable terrain and winter weather we shall have to dig in 30 or 20 miles from our target."

No: they wanted the offensive to be continued. They wanted to take Moscow. And they believed that they were able to do so, whether or not 330 Russian divisions had been destroyed.

Zhukov is mistaken in thinking that Hitler ordered the resumption of the winter offensive against Moscow in defiance of the wishes of his High Command. Consequently the sensational theory that he had supported Hitler against a

war-weary High Command and by planting on him faked figures of prisoners had lured Army Group Centre to its doom—as Prince Kutusov had done to Napoleon—must fall to the ground.

"The days of waiting are over"-Cavalry charge at Musino— On the Volga Canal-Within five miles of Moscow-Panic in the Kremlin—Stalin telephones the front—40 degrees below zero Centigrade—Battle for the motor highway—Men, horses, and tanks in ice and snow—Everything stop.

D-DAY for the "Autumn offensive 1941" was 19th November. The troops did whatever they could to prepare themselves for this last difficult battle. The determination to make one more all-out effort is reflected in the Order of the Day of Fourth Panzer Group announcing the launching of the offensive. It is typical of a great many others.

To all commanding officers in Fourth Panzer Group.

The days of waiting are over. We can attack again. The last Russian defences before Moscow remain to be smashed. We must stop the heart of Bolshevik resistance in Europe in order to complete our campaign for this year.

This Panzer Group has the great fortune to be able to deal the decisive blow. For that reason every ounce of strength,

every ounce of fighting spirit, and every ounce of determination to annihilate the enemy must be summoned.

One of the key-points of the battle of Moscow was situated in the area of Fourth Panzer Group, between Shelkovka and Dorokhovo. It was there that the old postal road—the historic road taken by Napoleon—the modern motor highway, and the Smolensk-Moscow railway intersected with the great north—south route from Kalinin to Tula.

Whoever held Shelkovka and Dorokhovo and the high ground outside controlled this vital communications centre.

The 10th Panzer Division had taken Shelkovka at the end of October. But the Russians were still established on the high ground. Just as the 7th Infantry Division from Munich relieved it—this division also included the first volunteers of the "French Legion," known as 638th Infantry Regiment— the first Soviet counter-attack burst right into the middle of these movements and opened a string of exceedingly ferocious engagements.

Stalin had brought up his 82nd Motorized Rifle Division from Outer Mongolia for the recapture of Shelkovka. The attack of this Mongolian crack unit was effectively supported by two armoured brigades, also fresh troops brought into the fighting line, and by multiple mortars and army artillery. The German 8-8-cm. anti-aircraft guns, now used against ground targets, could not be everywhere at the same time. The men from Munich were simply helpless against the solid swarms of T-34s, and thus the 7th Infantry Division had to give up the cross-roads after suffering heavy casualties. The fact that the Soviets once more controlled the Shelkovka-Dorokhovo area was to have far-reaching consequences.

All the troops of XL Panzer Corps in the Ruza area found their only supply road cut. The 10th Panzer Division, engaged in costly fighting on the causeway between Pokrovskoye and Skirminovo, was left without ammunition, without fuel, and without food; it was also unable to send its wounded out of the fighting line. Units of the "Reich" SS Division, urgently needed for supporting 10th Panzer Division, were held up idly at Mozhaysk, unable to reach their destination.

The way in which this dangerous situation was cleared up is described by Captain Kandutsch, Intelligence officer at XL Panzer Corps headquarters, whose original report is extant:

"The same evening I was ordered by Colonel von Kurow-ski, the Chief of Staff, to reconnoitre towards the crossroads at 0400 the following morning and to report as quickly as possible whether the Motorcycle Battalion, 'Reich' SS Division, could be moved up. At 0400 hours I set out from our headquarters at Ruza, accompanied by Corporals Schutze and Michelsen on a motor-cycle with sidecar. Since no armoured scout car was available I had to make my reconnaissance in a staff car. As far as the Moskva bridge at Staraya Russa everything was quiet; the road to Makeykha was under sporadic harassing fire from enemy artillery, and Makeykha itself was the target of repeated sudden artillery bombardments. At 0515 I picked up a maintenance party NCO of Communication Battalion 440 in order to have a telephone-line laid in the direction of the crossroads. At 0540 communication was restored with Captain Gruscha, commanding Mortar Battalion 637, about two miles south of Makeykha.

I found the mortar crews hard-pressed, dug in around their battery, ready to defend it against enemy attacks. After making a telephonic report to my Chief of Staff I proceeded at 0600 hours to the headquarters of the newly brought up Infantry Battalion, 267th Infantry Division, about a mile north of the crossroads, and had the telephone-line laid to it. At that moment the German counter-attack for the recapture of the crossroads was in full swing. The noise of battle was increasing all the time. The battle area was under heavy gunfire. The road itself was also being continually raked by Russian machine-guns. By having the telephone-line extended as and where the infantry gained ground I was able at 0730 hours to report to the Chief of Staff that the crossroads had been cleared of the enemy, and at 0800 I reported the arrival of the first parties from the Motorcycle Battalion, 'Reich' SS Division, who had got across the road intersection with comparatively light casualties."

At the beginning of November General Fahrmbacher's VII Corps went into action with the Bavarian 7th, the Middle Rhine-Saar 197th, and the Lower Saxonian 267th Divisions with the intention of dislodging the Russians at long last from their high ground, and of making the crossroads usable for the impending offensive. The attack was supported by 2nd Battalion, 31st Panzer Regiment, of the Silesian 5th Panzer Division.

Advancing rapidly, the tanks broke into the positions of the Mongolian brigade. But the sons of the steppes did not

yield: they attacked the tanks with Molotov cocktails. The infantry regiments in the wake of the tanks had to take position after position at bayonet point. Wherever they achieved a penetration they were instantly showered with rocket salvos. Losses were heavy on both sides.

However, after two days' fighting the Russians were definitely thrown back on this sector. Wheeled traffic again flowed freely over the crossroads of Shelkovka. The supply route on the right wing of Fourth Panzer Group was open once more.

Between 15th and 19th November the divisions of Army Group Centre mounted their final assault on Moscow, one by one in carefully timed succession. The officers, all the way down to the smallest unit, knew what was at stake.

Colonel-General Guderian writes in his memoirs that he explained to his Corps commanders that no more time must be lost. He implored them to do everything in their power to make sure the objective was reached. Colonel-General Hoepner likewise endeavoured to rouse his troops to a supreme last effort in his Order of the Day of 17th November addressed to his unit commanders :

Arouse your troops into a state of awareness. Revive their spirit. Show them the objective that will mean for them the glorious conclusion of a hard campaign and the prospect of well-earned rest. Lead them with vigour and confidence in victory! May the Lord of Hosts grant you success!

This Order of the Day is reproduced here not because of its bombast and the kind of magniloquence that is customary in a war: the significance of the document lies on an entirely different plane. It reveals that so outstanding a military leader as Hoepner, a man of great personal courage who was later to die on the gallows as one of the active conspirators against Hitler, was still convinced on 17th November 1941 that Moscow could be captured.

On 16th November Hoepner's V Infantry Corps mounted its attack against the town of Klin, north-west of Moscow on the road to Kalinin. On its left the LVI Panzer Corps of Third Panzer Army was scheduled to move forward.

Dawn was breaking near Musino, south-west of Klin—the dawn of 17th November. It was a grey and hazy morning. Towards 0900 the sun appeared through the fog as a large red disc. The observer post of a heavy battery was on a hill. About two miles farther ahead the edge of a broad belt of forest could just be made out. Everything else was flat fields under a light cover of snow. It was cold. Everybody was waiting for the order to attack.

1000 hours. Field-glasses went up. Horsemen appeared on the edge of the wood. At a gallop they disappeared behind a hill.

"Russian tanks!" a shout went up. Three T-34s were approaching over the frozen ground. From the edge of the village the anti-tank guns opened up. It was odd that the tanks were not accompanied by infantry. Why would that be? While the artillery observers were still busy puzzling out the mystery another shout went up: "Look out—cavalry to the right of the forest." And there they were—cavalry. Horsemen approaching at a trot. In front their reconnaissance units, then pickets of forty or fifty horsemen. Now the number had grown to one or two hundred. A moment later they burst out of the forest on a broad front—squadron next to squadron. They formed up into one gigantic line abreast. Another line formed up behind them. It was like a wild dream. The officers' sabres shot up into the air. Bright steel flashing in the morning sun. Thus they approached at a gallop.

"Cavalry charge in regiment strength. Spearhead of attack at 2500 yards!" The artillery spotter's voice sounded a little choked as he passed the information back over the telephone. He was lying in a hole in the ground, on a sheet of tent canvas. His trench telescope had been painted white with a paste of chalk tablets immediately after the first fall of snow. Now it did not show up against the snow blanket which, still clean and white, covered the fields and hills of Musino. Still clean and white. But already the squadrons were charging from the wood. They churned up the snow and the earth : the horses stirrup touching stirrup, the riders low on the horses' necks, their drawn sabres over their shoulders.

The machine-gun crew by the artillery observation post had their gun ready for action on the parapet. The gunner pulled off his mittens and put them down by the bolt. The gun commander's eyes were glued to his field-glasses. "2000 yards," they heard the artillery spotter shout down his telephone. He followed up with firing instructions for his battery.

Barely a second passed. And across the snowy fields of Musino swept a nightmarish vision such as could not be invented by even the most fertile imagination. The 3rd Battery, 107th Artillery Regiment, 106th Infantry Division, had opened fire at close range. With a crash the shells left their barrels and burst right among the charging squadron. The HE shells of the anti-tank guns in the village, which had only just been attacked by T-34s, landed amid the most forward Russian group. Horses fell. Riders sailed through the air. Flashes of lightning. Black smoke. Fountains of dirt and fire.

The Soviet regiment continued its charge. Their discipline was terrific. They even pivoted about their right wing and beaded towards the village. But now salvo after salvo of the heavy guns burst amid the squadrons. The batteries were firing shrapnel which exploded 25 feet above the ground. The effect of the splinters was appalling. Riders were torn to pieces in their saddles; the horses were felled.

But the terrible spectacle was not yet over. From out of the forest came a second regiment to resume the charge. Its officers and men must have watched the tragedy of their sister regiment. Nevertheless they now rode to their own doom.

The encircled German batteries smashed the second wave even more quickly. Only a small group of thirty horsemen on very fast small Cossack animals penetrated through the wall of death. Thirty out of a thousand. They charged towards the high ground where the artillery observer was stationed. They finished up under the bursts of the covering machine-gun.

Two thousand horses and their riders—both regiments of 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division—lay in the bloodstained snow, torn to pieces, trampled to death, wounded. A handful of horses were loose in the fields, trotting towards the village or into the wood. Slightly wounded horsemen were trying to get under cover, limping or reeling drunkenly. That was the moment when Major-General Dehner gave the order for an immediate counter-attack.

Out of the village and from behind the high ground came the lines of infantrymen of 240th Infantry Regiment. In sections and platoons they moved over the snowy ground towards the wood.

Not a shot was fired. Sick with horror, the infantrymen traversed the graveyard of the 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division—the battlefield of one of the last great cavalry charges of the Second World War. When they reoccupied the village of Spas Bludi the grenadiers found that their comrades of 240th Infantry Regiment, taken prisoner there after being wounded, had been done to death.

The Russian attack had been senseless from a military point of view. Two regiments had been sacrificed without harming a hair on the opponent's head. There was not a single man wounded on the German side. But the attack showed with what ruthless determination the Soviet Command intended to deny the German attackers the roads into the capital, and how stubbornly it was going to fight for Moscow.

Another illustration is found in the diary of the young Soviet lieutenant mentioned earlier, the commander of a mortar platoon on Moscow's southern front. Under 17th November we read as follows:

The battalion received the categorical order to take the fascist position on the high ground outside the village of Teploye. However, we were unable to make a single step forward because the fire of the Germans was too strong. Kryvolapov reported to Regiment that without artillery support we could not make any progress. The reply was: You will have taken that position in twenty minutes, or else the officers will face a court martial. The order was repeated six times. We attacked six times. The commander was killed. Tarorov, the adjutant, and Ivashchenkov, the Party Secretary, are also dead. The battalion has only twenty guns left.