Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (10 page)

The Self-Staging of a Plebiscitary

Dictatorship: The NS-Regime Between

“Uniformed
Reichstag
”, Referendum and

Reichsparteitag

Markus Urban

Over the past 20 years, research has increasingly focused on some aspects

of National Socialist rule that had long been excluded from scholarly in-

vestigation. Based on a strict distinction between rulers and the ruled, in-

vestigations during the initial post-war decades did not give a serious ac-

count of such factors as willingness for consensus, emotional mobilization,

or the effects of social promises such as that of the
Volksgemeinschaft
(people’s community). Any attempt to investigate these subjects usually raised

suspicion that their analysis would run the risk of being taken in by Nazi

propaganda slogans, and that therefore such investigation would add noth-

ing of interest to our knowledge.

Only recently have more and more historians tried “to use social reality

as a point of departure” and to “investigate the dimensions of consent and

rejection, participation and refusal, sharing sympathy with, or looking

away” (Bajohr and Wildt 2009, 10). If we take up this more recent focus on

social practices
in the exercise of power we can understand that even apparently one-dimensional propaganda measures, such as elections and refer-

endums under the conditions of a dictatorship, are legitimate objects of

scholarly inquiry.

Continuity and the Expectation of Social Upheaval

at the Beginning of NS Rule

In view of the turbulent political dynamics that the National Socialist sei-

zure of power developed, especially during the first months of 1933, many

observers and supporters of the NS regime at the time expected funda-

mental socio-political upheavals that would correspond with the character

40

M A R K U S U R B A N

of a national revolution. Ideas that were floated and then quickly re-

jected—including a new calendar that would replace the names of the

months with old Germanic names—attest to the extent of change thought

possible for a limited period of time. Similar expectations were held that

fundamental changes would be made in the political sphere of the newly

created
Führerstaat
, too. It is therefore possible to understand why, during the weeks following the break-up of all the opposition parties, consideration was also given to disbanding the NSDAP (
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei
). After all, Hitler, in his manifesto, had originally conceived of the Party as a means for establishing the dictatorship, rather than as a long-term instrument of power. The NSDAP, however, remained intact, as did

the institution of the
Reichstag
—the national parliament, which during the
Weimar Republic
had been continually defamed by National Socialists as a mere “talking shop”. Similarly, the National Socialists left women’s suffrage, which had been introduced in 1919, unscathed, even though Hitler

himself had stressed that the sphere of political activity belonged exclu-

sively to men. By way of illustration, even the request by a local mayor of

the district of Moers to discontinue using electoral registers because they

would not be necessary any more was rejected by his superiors (Bracher

1971, 32).

Within a short time it became evident that proclamations made during

the
Weimar Republic
could no longer be taken at face value. Rather, the leading National Socialists took a pragmatic view of the hated political

apparatus of the
Weimar Republic
and its various institutions, and modified them to achieve their own goals. Most initiatives, however, remained in the

planning phase and were eventually abandoned because, in Hitler’s poly-

cracy of administrative bodies, the decision-makers normally blocked one

another’s initiatives. This was especially the case regarding the project to

reform the
Reich
, which many observers expected to see at the beginning of the Third Reich, and which Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick tried to push

through in the early years. An important component of the stranded

Reichsreform
would have been the formation of a Party senate that would

have had an advisory function and been responsible for the election of the

Führer
’s successor (Hitler 1933, 501; Hubert 1992, 164–78). But, although a hall for the prospective sixty members had already been set aside in the

Brown House in Munich, and although Hitler had even announced it pub-

licly in September 1939, it was never actually established.

T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P

41

Theory and Practice of the Elections and Referenda

in the Third Reich

The Experimental Phase (1933–1934): Returning to “Old Germanic

Legal Forms”

Since genuine changes to constitutional law did not occur, procedures for

elections and referenda in the Third Reich largely followed those estab-

lished during the
Weimar Republic
, whose constitution had not been re-

pealed, as many opponents and supporters of the new regime had expected

it would be. The
Reichstag
was brought into line after a few months, as were all other state institutions. But, after the illegal arrest of the KPD (German

Communist Party) representatives and the enforced self-disbandment a

little later of all other parties, the newly-formed
Einheitsparlament
(Unity Parliament), in which a number of so-called “guest auditors” served alongside the National Socialist members, remained intact. Although the
Reichs-

tag
technically retained its right to legislate, it would later become a body of mere acclamation, with Hitler using it as a public forum to announce decisions that had already been made and that would then be formally ap-

proved by the delegates in attendance. Shortly after seizing power, the new

regime launched the
Gesetz über Volksabstimmung
(Plebiscite Law) of July 14, 1933—ostensibly strengthening the element of direct democracy that had

already been a component of the
Weimar
constitution. The fact that a law forbidding the formation of new parties was enacted on the very same day

shows clearly that the plebiscite law was first and foremost an act of Na-

tional Socialist
Symbolpolitik
. Beyond a few concrete changes, such as the abolition of the quorum agreement for referenda, it was designed to

demonstrate both the rejection of old-style parliamentarianism and the

alleged strengthening of the popular voice in the authoritarian state.

At this stage, however, the regime was apparently determined to use the

referendum as a means of legitimizing its power. The official reason given

for the introduction of referenda—namely, to address the “great and mov-

ing questions concerning the entire nation in an ennobled manner using

legal forms that go back to ancient Germanic times” (Uhde 1936, 47)—

should not be dismissed as pure propaganda, however. For, regardless of

the truth of this statement, there were conservative elites who were con-

42

M A R K U S U R B A N

vinced that the only solution to the failure of the
Weimar System
was a return to pre-modern forms of “democracy”.1

The fact that the referendum was used twice within the space of a year

is not surprising, for Hitler had been looking for a suitable way to demon-

strate the German people’s support for the government since the summer

of 1933. Finally, on November 12, 1933, a
Reichstag
election, together with a plebiscite on Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, were

held; and, on August 19, 1934, voters were called upon again to confirm in

a plebiscite the transference of presidential power from Hindenburg, who

had recently died, to Hitler. As Jung points out in his detailed analysis, the

election results announced reveal the relative success of the regime, even

though the numbers can have little validity given the prevailing conditions

in the totalitarian state. A closer look at the results of November 1933

shows that the plebiscite with 95.1 per cent of the valid votes received

nearly one million more “yes” votes than the list of the NSDAP in the

Reichstag
election held separately on the same day. Researchers consider this a great victory for the Nazi regime and an indicator of public support,

despite the numerous infringements of voter independence, which made

the free, equal and secret casting of votes in many cases impossible.

For example, the “right to vote” was declared a “duty to vote”, which is

the reason why potential non-voters were visited at home by a
Schleppdienst

and taken to the polling station. And, as at National Socialist fundraising

campaigns, small badges were given to those who had already voted, which

made identifying those who had not yet done so easier. Furthermore, op-

ponents of the regime could never be sure that the confidentiality of the

ballot would be observed, since in some areas ballot papers were marked

so that voters could be identified later.2 Also, in many places, an attempt

was made to normalize the practice of not using the polling booth to vote

in, the consequence of which was that anyone who insisted on using the

polling booth to preserve their anonymity attracted suspicion. For this

reason, Victor Klemperer is right to view his “no” vote and his wife’s ab-

——————

1 The former Chancellor Franz von Papen had declared months earlier that “We have learned from the Middle Ages, from institutions that have been preserved to the present day, that there are natural and real forms of democracy that have nothing to do with mass opinion, mass scourging and mass abuse”. Speech of February 24, 1933, quoted from Hubert (1992, 44).

2 Cf. also the essay by Frank Omland in this volume. Uhde’s claim that the “basic election principles (general, equal, direct, secret) had not been touched up to that point” was pure fiction in 1935 (Uhde 1936, 23).