Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (34 page)

Authors: Voting for Hitler,Stalin; Elections Under 20th Century Dictatorships (2011)

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nism is its double dialectic: only if the period of office
both is limited and can
be extended
does a close connection arise between the office holder and the electorate; and it is precisely the desire to exercise
power
through holding an office that makes the person who wishes to realize this desire
dependent

upon those over whom he/she wishes to exercise that power. This re-elec-

tion mechanism is regularly stripped of its function in dictatorships. First,

politicians do
not
gain office by means of free and fair elections. Second, and even more important, it is not possible to vote out an office holder

even if he/she is acting completely against the wishes of the people (Smith

2006, 4). But if a state desires to be a democracy, or if a dictatorship wishes

to become a democracy, then the re-election mechanism must be put in

action both institutionally and culturally.

Elections in Dictatorships

Whoever holds elections, but nevertheless does not want to risk losing

power, has to make numerous institutional arrangements. Andreas

Schedler has shown how elections in dictatorships are run in such a way

that they conform to the structure of the authoritarian system (Schedler

2002, 41–46).
First of all,
one can set up the political system so that the elections will only be held for lower positions or for offices that have a

very limited portfolio of responsibilities, or such that the parliamentary

opposition parties continue to have little influence. In this case even free

elections and victorious opposition candidates can do little to change the

established distribution of dictatorial power.
Second
, one can ensure that the constitutional powers of the elected office holders remain in effect on

paper only. In this case, to refer to Walter Ulbricht’s famous phrase,

everything
appears democratic
, but the real power remains for the most part in the hands of the ruling party, the army, or a spiritual leader.
Third
, it is possible to systematically work towards guaranteeing the failure of the

competing opposition parties. For example, the electoral regulations can be

devised in such a way as to ensure that the opposition remains split and

cannot unify itself. Also, one can try to bribe the leaders of new, apparently

popular parties, or at least to damage their public reputation. Even political

murder or the threat of physical violence in the run up to elections may

exist for opposition politicians. Furthermore, one may find ways of exclud-

ing parties or candidates from the election.
Fourth,
the composition of the

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electorate can be manipulated in many ways: those officials who have been

entrusted with the actual staging of the elections may receive out of date or

manipulated electoral registers, and the process of electoral registration

may be made so difficult that many voters will be put off, or indeed will

fall at such hurdles as having to prove their reading and writing skills. In

addition, the election process can be organized so that the act of voting

itself is controlled publicly, or such that the use of a voting booth, which

may still be an option, effectively becomes a test of courage. Moreover, in

the run up to the elections, individual groups of citizens may be the targets

of intimidation, and ethnic, religious or cultural minorities may be weak-

ened by means of “cleansing” practices.
Fifth
, it is possible to manipulate the political views of the poorer and the less well educated population

groups, and in important cases this may even reach the stage where votes

are actually bought. Apparently there are many different options whereby

one can use the welcome appearance of elections while at the same limiting

their unwelcome political leverage.

In doing so, the election result is made more or less predictable, de-

pending on the extent to which these measures are used, and on how well

they are co-ordinated. This ranges from elections where the external ap-

pearance gives the impression of a democracy, to those where there is in

effect no choice at all for the voters. The former can be termed “competi-

tive authoritarian elections”, and the latter “closed authoritarian elections”

(Smith 2006; Levitsky und Way 2002). Between these two extremes there is

a broad transitional zone with many gradations. The same regime may even

be categorized differently from election to election, depending on how it

tries to manipulate the elections in the light of political conditions and its

current ability to assert itself.

The general characteristic of
competitive
authoritarian elections is that the opposition can theoretically, but never in practice, win the election. This

can be achieved in two ways.
First,
the competition between those in office and those in opposition can be organized through state regulations in such

a way that the opposition will certainly suffer from clear disadvantages, but

not to the extent that this would cause early withdrawal from the election.

This is known as rule-controlled competition (Lindberg 2004; Walle 2005).

One instrument for this purpose is state-controlled media that can refuse

the opposition access to the voting public. A further one is the unequal

distribution of resources for the election. For example, the government can

use cars and planes at the expense of the state, and they may even make

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use of the PR departments of the ministries, while the opposition has to

pay for everything. In addition, laws or police powers intended to ensure

public safety may be formulated in such a way that election meetings and

demonstrations held by the opposition can easily be banned. Thus, the

government enjoys clear advantages in terms of having a higher profile in

the election campaign. However, because these types of rules—as unfair as

they might be—are known in advance, the opposition can adapt itself to

them and indeed may count on particular sympathy and support, being

seen as the victim of these rules. Moreover, even in unfair elections the

opposition will have a much greater public profile than would normally be

the case, and thus it is still a rational decision for the opposition to take

part even in unfair elections. This is all the more so if elections are taking

place under the auspices of international observers. For although direct

election success may be far from attainable, participation can well be a step

towards the introduction of fair elections
in the future
.

Second
, the result of the election may be falsified, which is known as

fraudulent competition. The ballot papers cast may be manipulated—be it

that before the count fake ballot papers are planted in the
real
ballot boxes, or be it that unfavourable ballot papers are suppressed or are deliberately

counted incorrectly. In addition one may simply announce fake election

results, either by the polling stations to the central electoral authorities, or by the election authorities to the public. Of course this is a very risky form

of fraudulent manufacturing of desired election results. A regime will usu-

ally resort to this only if it no longer trusts to the implementation of unfair

rules in the election campaign, that is, if it has already started to become

weak. Due to the fact that in such cases the trust of the voters will be con-

sciously broken, in that their vote—which may well even have been a dan-

gerous one—is not respected, regimes that employ such means risk losing

support on a huge scale.

Closed
authoritarian elections take place when, in addition to all the

aforementioned tactics, the opposition is given no chance of victory at all.

There are two possible methods of achieving this. They have very differ-

ent, but in each case far-reaching consequences of a psychological, politi-

cal, cultural and institutional nature.
First
, there may be opposition parties that are allowed to take part in elections, but that are kept so weak by the

general structure of the dictatorial regime that they do not even theoreti-

cally have a chance of winning the election. Tactics employed to achieve

this aim include keeping opposition parties under the legal status of private

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associations, and making it difficult for them, by means of arbitrary state

action, to acquire and use resources such as practical and financial support,

offices and office equipment. In addition, opposition groups may be widely

prevented from expressing their views on radio, television, the Internet and

in the press; their operations can be criminalized by a compliant police

force or justice system; and similarly their supporters, members or leaders

may be terrorized and intimidated by physical acts of violence. Lastly, the

opposition parties may find themselves the target of state slur-campaigns

aimed at weakening their position.

Second
, the voting procedure itself can be set up in such a way that the opposition cannot in practice be voted for. Tried and tested means are the

following: single party lists are put forward, and the addition of further

names to the list in the voting booth makes the ballot paper invalid; there

is only a single name on the ballot paper, and to score it out or to add an

additional name would make it invalid; no voting booths are made avail-

able, or their use is met with such threats that to vote against the regime

becomes a test of courage, which, given its obvious uselessness, one does

not take upon oneself.

Types of Dictatorial Regimes and Authoritarian Elections

Close examination shows that not all forms of dictatorial regimes are

equally inclined to permit elections, that is, are not prepared to the same

degree to expose themselves to the potential risks involved. The best indi-

cators for ranking, on the one hand, dictatorial regimes, and, on the other