Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (37 page)

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W E R N E R J . P A T Z E L T

working against the goal that elections or plebiscites are supposed to have,

at least in terms of their external appearance: that the preferences of the

people be transformed into decisions on offices or policies. Thus, if people

become used to elections, then they also become used to being aware of

the
opportunities for manipulation
. As a result, chances increase that those members of the political class will be criticized or even rejected who are

responsible for such manipulative practices. On balance, elections possess

great
structural ambiguity
: they can serve to both establish and shatter a dictatorship, and everything depends on how one handles them (Schedler

2002, 49).

Functional Causes of Elections in Dictatorships

Functions are services rendered by one element of a system for the whole.

They can, in a first dimension, be differentiated in terms of instrumental

functions and symbolic functions. Instrumental functions are services that

have concrete and “technical” consequences. In this sense elections deter-

mine the actual composition of a parliament. Symbolic functions are, by

contrast, services by which meaning is attached to actions or structures, or

by which frames of interpretation are shaped. For example, elections sug-

gest that those in power really want to act in accordance with the priorities

of those who are being governed. In a second dimension, a distinction can

be made between manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are

services that are announced and openly expected. The manifest functions

of elections include the transformation of popular preferences into policy

choices. Latent functions, by contrast, are services that are rendered along-

side, but in the shadow, of openly announced or overtly expected services.

This does not mean, however, that they are any less important. Latent

functions of elections include, for example, providing political friends

with—possibly well endowed—seats in parliament, and thereby promoting

allegiance and loyalty.

Functions are rendered by persons within structures. And structures, ir-

respective of how they came into existence, usually consolidate and stabi-

lize themselves to the degree to which they can provide useful, or at least

welcome, functions for the overarching system. But what benefits do spe-

cifically elections provide for dictatorships? If one arranges their functions

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141

for authoritarian regimes from those that are the least sustainable to the

most stabilizing for the system, the following effects can be seen.
First of
all
, ever since the democratic principle started its triumphal march around the world, elections have been the only convincing means to achieve legitimacy for a political system. However, dictatorships try to harvest the

fruits of democratic legitimacy without exposing themselves to the risks

connected to real democracy. Therefore, in dictatorial regimes elections

fulfill their democratic legitimization function only for those members of

the population who are ideologically blind or politically naïve, and even

then this is only the case as long as the people are prepared to take the

appearance of democracy for democracy itself.

Second
, elections in dictatorships serve for purposeful “impression man-

agement”. The central impression to be achieved is that the regime is based

on mass support. To this end, elections are not only held but also made as

“democratically convincing” as possible by means of political symboliza-

tion and propaganda. In the GDR the practices used for this purpose

stretched from candidate nomination rituals via appealing election slogans

to highly ceremonial conduct in the polling station. In this way, a demo-

cratic façade can be erected in front of a dictatorial regime. The goal is to

make credible that the political system upholds high democratic standards,

possesses a high degree of ethical value, and thus deserves support. This

works quite well among the truly committed supporters of the system,

sufficiently well among those who are politically naïve, and quite often

even among inadequately informed external observers. A lot of external

political or economic support usually depends upon their verdict, and this

is why effective
impression management
can also yield indirect domestic

advantages for those in power.

Third
, elections in dictatorships are suitable for rendering voters uncertain of their own beliefs, which is sometimes called “preference falsifica-

tion” (Smith 2006, 18–20). By means of an election process that is con-

vincingly staged from the nomination of candidates to the announcement

of the election results, and in particular if there is a nearly unanimous vote,

the impression can be manufactured that almost the whole population is

loyal to the system, or at least takes a neutral position. Those opposed to

the system, perhaps including oneself, then seem to be a negligible minor-

ity. As soon as such an impression is given, the “spiral of silence” is set in

motion (Noelle-Neumann 2001): oppositionists experience themselves as

isolated from the rest of society, begin to refrain from expressing their

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W E R N E R J . P A T Z E L T

views, and thus less and less opposition to the system can actually be

heard. As a consequence, more and more dissenting citizens gain the im-

pression that they are in a hopelessly inferior minority. By the same token,

an atmosphere of unanimity is created. Although this may be only a veil

over the actual situation of the system, such an atmosphere usually dis-

courages citizens who in fact are discontented or opposed to the regime

from articulating their views publicly or even semi-publicly. This stabilizes

any dictatorship. In the course of time, even non-voting may become a real

political act that is viewed by the regime as evidence of non-compliance.

Therefore it will be met with sanctions, which in turn tend to increase the

participation rates in the election. For naïve observers their unanimous

results will then look very impressive.

Fourth
, elections in dictatorships offer convenient opportunities to distribute or withdraw favors, albeit in small doses. This is known as their

“accommodation function” (Magaloni 2010). It works particularly well if

access to economic wealth or social status is easily available through politi-

cal positions, but would be difficult to achieve on one’s own or even

against the ruling establishment. Whoever is at the top of a dictatorial

power pyramid under such circumstances can confer favours on party

members from the second or third ranks—for example, with nomination

for election, or with support during election campaigns for lucrative or

influential offices. By the same token, dictatorial leaders can also punish

their followers with great accuracy—by refusing to nominate them as a

candidate, by hindering them in the election campaign, or by falsifying the

election result. Moreover, authoritarian elections offer to political leaders a

seemingly legal opportunity to distribute the spoils of their seizure of

power to loyal followers, like revenue from state-run companies, personal

sinecures, or benefits from current patronage opportunities. And because

approval rates could fall far below 100 per cent in the next election, which

the ruling clique would like to avoid, it even seems to be rational to pay for

loyalty in this way—and to expect, on the part of the people, such benefits

as a fair price for undisputed support.

If one examines these four functions of elections in dictatorships, it be-

comes clear that, even though they are occasionally risky, it is extremely

advantageous for dictatorships to hold elections regularly. Doing so is

particularly rational if the rules of the regime are such that the opposition

parties can operate, but will not be able to achieve anything but a small

share of the votes or of power. Therefore, we should not be surprised if

E L E C T I O N S I N M O D E R N D I C T A T O R S H I P S

143

dictators take even manipulated elections quite seriously: they really are a

very useful instrument of power—of course in the hands of the ruling

clique, but not in the hands of the people.

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