Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (68 page)

260

F R A N K O M L A N D

The Election Campaigns of a
Volksgemeinschaftspartei

and its Myth of the
Führer

For the NSDAP, what was important in ballots was mobilizing the elector-

ate. To achieve this, they made use in their propaganda of all the mass

media available to them and ran election campaigns that were very modern

for the time. These campaigns comprised lectures for NSDAP members,

mass gatherings and public parades, as well as visual propaganda, photo

montages and posters. Electoral advertising was ever-present in the press,

in the cinema, on the radio, in employees’ meetings, and in schools. For

shopkeepers it was obligatory to decorate their stores, for business asso-

ciations to call for support for the regime, for newspapers to proclaim the

regime’s apparent successes and their devotion to the
Führer
. In addition, there were radio addresses by members of the regime and the
Gauleiter
, and specially-made propaganda films about current events in the world. As part

of the attempt to guide the press, the ministry of propaganda prescribed

not only
what
should be published in the newspapers, but also
where
and
how
. In 1933 and 1934, there still were some deviations from these prescriptions, but in 1936 and 1938 the instructions to the press had become

firmly established (Bohrmann and Toepser-Ziegert 1984). What is apparent

is that the Party used the modes of propaganda that they had already used

in the
Weimar Republik
, and added their own modes, which were available

to them as the single power in a single-party state (Paul 1990; Reichel 2006,

139, 198; Omland 2006a, 42–52, 93–100, 132–41, 166–73).

The Hitler regime used the election campaigns to drive forward the for-

mation of the
Volksgemeinschaft
, and as a means of mobilizing its own

members and supporters. Their purpose was to promote a sense of soli-

darity and to work meaningfully for those who understood the Party as a

movement
. The propaganda activities also gave the SA-Party militia, which during the
Weimar Republik
had violently fought against political competitors from the left, a new role within the new single-party state.

As a party that pretended to represent the German people as a whole,

the
Volksgemeinschaftspartei
NSDAP sought to motivate every member of

the electorate to vote “yes” either of their own free will, or through social

pressure, or through force. To this end, the Party gave itself two to four

weeks’ campaign time before every election and plebiscite between 1933

and 1938. Only in August 1934, when, after the death of Hindenburg,

Hitler aimed for the
Reichspräsident
-office, did the Nazi propaganda ma-

“ G E R M A N Y T O T A L L Y N A T I O N A L S O C I A L I S T ”

261

chine choose another strategy. Since the Party wanted to present itself as

being “deeply saddened” by Hindenburg’s death, it largely abstained from

mobilizing the masses through parades, public meetings and propaganda

posters. Even gatherings with local political representatives were banned

and
Gauleiter
Hinrich Lohse from Schleswig-Holstein merely gave a short

radio address (Omland 2006a, 89–96; Wendt 1995, 123–25). After a week

of national mourning, there was a little less than a week left for campaign-

ing, which was mostly confined to newspaper articles. Moreover, only a

few public appearances were made by the most prominent Party and SA

leaders as well as by members of the government; in Kiel, for example, by

Rudolf Heß. Nonetheless, the execution of the SA leadership a month ago

and relatively widespread criticism regarding the unification of the presi-

dential and
Reichskanzler
roles led in 1934 to a decline in public support for the regime. “Hitler’s attempt to benefit from Hindenburg’s charisma and

to appear presidential” (Herbst 2010, 275–79) had suffered a setback. In

the plebiscite of 1934, Hitler suffered a relative defeat, which the National

Socialist leadership tried, in vain, to explain.
Reichspropagandaminister
Goebbels noted in his diary on August 22:

The election’s over. Foreign press so-so. Broadsheets, good. But our failure is still the main topic [...] Midday with the
Führer
. Many there. Discussed reasons for failure. Everyone looked to blame everyone else (Goebbels 1934, 475).13

As a consequence, from 1936 onwards, election campaigns became the

sole responsibility of the
Reichspropagandaminister
. He organized the two subsequent election campaigns with great professionalism, since a decline

in support for the Party could simply not be allowed to happen again.

Fundamentally, the NSDAP and the regime made the basis of every

ballot the person of Adolf Hitler. What the electorate was led to believe

was that they were no longer voting for or against a particular issue or the

NSDAP, but for or against the
Führer
personally, and this was designed as an additional psychological block to voting against the regime. This was

achieved through slogans such as “
Volksgenosse
! The
Führer
needs your vote! Don’t let him down: vote yes!”,14 and through photomontages, reports and appeals in campaign speeches: “The world should hear what we

think; the world should know what we believe: one
Volk
, one
Reich
, one

——————

13 Goebbels (1934, 475). Compare Kershaw’s evaluation (1987, 68, 71).

14
Norddeutsche Nachrichten
, November 11, 1933.

262

F R A N K O M L A N D

Führer
”.15 Banners, installations and enormous portraits of Hitler were

omnipresent in the public space.

Each election campaign closed with a mass parade to a central place,

the broadcasting of a speech by Hitler, a prayer of thanksgiving and, fi-

nally, an oath of loyalty to “
Führer, Volk
and
Vaterland
”. This was all staged according to the concept of propaganda invented during the Weimar

Republic and based on Hitler’s charisma and the myth of the
Führer

(Herbst 2010, 260; Kershaw 1987, 25–31; 63, 68). “Undoubtedly the effect

of the plebiscites staged in 1933, 1934, 1936 and 1938 [...] reflected genuine

widespread approval and admiration for Hitler’s accomplishments and

persuaded waverers to fall in line”, according to Ian Kershaw (Kershaw

1987, 258). Through basing the election campaigns on the personality of

Adolf Hitler, the regime made every act of voting an act of acclamation for

the
Führer
. In the election campaigns, Hitler was portrayed as the
Messiah
of the German people, and his politics aroused pseudo-religious expectations

that every problem could be overcome (Omland 2006a, 46–50).

The Staging of the Ballots

The NSDAP consciously celebrated the Sunday ballot day as a public holi-

day for the
Volksgemeinschaft
(Omland 2006a; Reichel 2006, 262–82). The

National Socialists’ political performances were extraordinary events that

were designed to transcend everyday routine and bring the German people

into close contact with National Socialist ideology. “In a city, there are

always days that stick out from the grayness of everyday life, that stay in

the memory and that people can talk about for a long time. The eve of the

election as well as the election day itself is one of those days that offer a

glorious, illuminating finale to the election preparations”.16 As a means of

self-promotion for the Nazi regime, these days were designed “to express

publicly the power and unity of state and Party and to compel the popula-

tion to make gestures of homage and devotion” (Hörtnagel 1998, 134–35).

The staging of the ballot was meant to win over the electorate to the side

of the regime and, through a mixture of “wonderful show” and social con-

——————

15
Kieler Neueste Nachrichten
, April 7, 1938: “The whole world should hear what we believe in!”

16
Flensburger Nachrichten
, November 13, 1933: “Flensburg is National Socialist”.

“ G E R M A N Y T O T A L L Y N A T I O N A L S O C I A L I S T ”

263

trol, to influence those opposed to the regime to support the new state.

The events of the ballot day followed the rituals of a political celebration:

In almost every street, there are enormous banners with core slogans pointing out the importance of November 12. Huge, imposing posters are urging people to vote

tomorrow, and to vote “yes” in support of the regime. Countless ground-floor

windows have small posters in them, and almost every shop window in Kiel has a