Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (81 page)

Volga, b) to organize crossing in such a manner that crushes in the process

of leaving the ship are avoided, and c) to hurry up with building the theater

and shops on the other side of the Volga.”68 “We’re voting for you—you

take care of nourishing the working people and living space.”

Reasons to refuse to vote for the candidate were given in the following

manner, for instance, in 1962: “I don’t want to vote—I live in a base-

ment.” “My name is (name), and I do not want to vote because we were

insulted by the worker of the city soviet S., whom we had consulted in a

matter of living space (address, date, name).” “Give us more to eat. I vote

nay.” “If you nourish us, I’ll promise to vote.” “We’re malnourished and

don’t need anybody, let them go […]” “I believe neither in God nor in

building communism. I vote nay.”69

——————

66 Ibid., opis’ 228, delo 231, l. 69.

67 Ibid., l. 73.

68 Ibid., opis’ 226, delo 767 (1953), l. 8; opis’ 227, delo 489 (1959), l. 242.

69 Ibid., opis’ 228 (1962), delo 206, ll. 73, 78, 80, 82.

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305

Personal statements about Khrushchev usually were not very positive.

Unlike Stalin, the writers simply could not recognize a dignified leader in

him who embodied their image of the “good Tsar”. In 1962, utterances

read: “Put Nikita on the leash and let the people live.” “Down with Khru-

shchev, he’s torturing us all to death.” “Khrushchev caught up with China,

but a steep rise turned into a steep face, but we’re voting for you just so we

can applaud him.”70 Negative remarks on Stalin or Brezhnev were hard to

find during their time of rule.

Conclusions

Soviet elections played an important part in the political communication

between the regime and its subjects in order to successfully stabilize the

regime. Stalin established elections in 1936/1937 with two primary func-

tions in mind: first, elections were about the celebration of the unity of

people and ruler. They were an inclusive offer to every Soviet citizen. With

each person winning the right to vote, those voting nay excluded them-

selves and had to be annihilated as enemies of the people. It was therefore

a great risk to utter that you were against the regime. Second, “democracy”

according to Stalin meant that the voters could openly criticize local offi-

cials for not taking enough care of the people’s public and private welfare.

This was in accordance with the political culture of the “good Tsar” and

stabilized the regime. The election campaigns were thus designed as cam-

paigns to purge the local authorities. The need for a 100 per cent voter

turnout was reflected in the behavior of local officials, who were responsi-

ble for the campaigns, until the mid-1980s. The interest in each single vote

forced the local authorities to pay at least some attention to matters of

local public and private welfare. In practice, this meant that voters and

local officials, both under the risk of repression, started to bargain: the

authorities had to offer something in return for the desperately needed

vote. In order to function, the regime forced everybody to make use of

these corruptive practices, but to keep them invisible. This “bargaining

character” of the elections, maintaining its importance until the very end of

the regime, served the interests of both local officials and voters. As it

——————

70 Ibid., l. 234; cf. also Kozlov and Mironenko (2005, 233–37).

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S T E P H A N M E R L

allowed the regime to solve conflicts that could otherwise have caused

dissatisfaction and destabilization, it served the ruler as well.

The Soviet voting system was a crazy construction. The elections were

called a proof of “democracy”, even though there was no choice between

candidates, and the ballot was called “secret” although the vast majority of

the people voted openly, putting those who used the booths under suspi-

cion of voting against the regime. These contradictions were evident to

everybody, and often criticized by the voters. Therefore, they cannot be

interpreted as accidental. In the end, by having to take part in the voting

process, everybody learnt his lesson about the discrepancy between rheto-

ric and practice in the Soviet Union. It forced even those in opposition to

the regime to vote for the candidate, and the regime made this as simple as

possible for them: they just had to carry a sheet of paper a few steps before

throwing it into the ballot box. Taking this into account, voting was above

all an annual exercise of moral corruption for the Soviet people, causing

lasting effects on political thought. We may read this as a “corruptive prac-

tice” as well, and this legitimized the unspoken corruptive practices as a

core element allowing the Soviet regime to function, although everybody in

its rhetoric declared corruption as the worst evil, which was used as an

explanation for every shortcoming of the regime (Merl 2010a). Voting was

primarily about accepting a contradictory regime, and making the best of it

for one’s personal interests. The extent to which this was an act of com-

munication is evident from the provision of a sheet of paper and a pencil

to allow everybody to write a message to the ruler, the “good Tsar”, on the

ballot, strengthening the myth of the paternalistic state.

After the end of Soviet rule, the most important change seen from be-

low today is that the people had lost the bargaining power of their vote.

They are no longer forced to vote, but this also means that nobody neces-

sarily cares about their vote. They can choose between candidates, but the

winner is still determined from above. The conception of the voting proc-

ess has not changed profoundly. Voting remains a patriotic act, and voting

still serves to unite the people with the ruler. The ruling Party of power is

not coincidentally called “United Russia” (
Edinnaia Rossiia
). The majority of the people still longs for the “good Tsar” to take care of their public and

private welfare.
Edinaia Rossiia
is serving that desire. The missing link is that the local authorities are no longer under pressure to bargain for the

votes.

E L E C T I O N S I N T H E S O V I E T U N I O N , 1 9 3 7 – 1 9 8 9

307

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