Just 2 Seconds (21 page)

We've seen that if you identify a suspect and you position your body and attention accordingly, your task is easier than the attacker's task. He has to perform a precision feat using fine motor skills under the worst possible conditions. You have to perform a fairly imprecise feat, using gross motor skills, and you will do so having already removed the most effective advantages an attacker can have: surprise and concealment. In this sense, concealment doesn't mean an actual obstacle that blocks your view -- concealment means the lack of suspicion that blocks an
accurate
view of an attacker.

Most successful attackers were able to evade suspicion, thus retaining surprise and concealment. Your suspicion can pull off that concealment; once you SEE a person, you won't be surprised if he acts in precisely the way you anticipated he might. And once he
knows
you SEE him, a good part of his mental energy will be devoted to worry and uncertainty about being interfered with.

Now, is it actually true that Suspects Exist Everywhere? It's true because we create them. We create them out of the raw material provided by the situation, out of their behavior, their appearance, out of choices they make as we observe them. At another time and place, this same person might not appear suspicious to us. And if absolutely nobody in view meets the threshold for our suspicion, then we must lower the threshold and try again. The goal is not to find excellent suspects -- but rather to find the best suspects among the people present.

If you create a suspect and watch him, you are energetically communicating "I see you," and if you position yourself so that he is within arm's reach, then he's not likely to commit an attack. You both know he cannot succeed. In the event that he attacks, you've moved your Moment of Recognition to the earliest possible instant -- and you have also done something far more powerful: You have influenced his Moment of Commitment, delayed it, likely forever.

You might be concerned that while focusing on a suspect who turns out not to be an attacker, you'll miss someone nearby who actually
is
an attacker. We now know, however, that if the attack comes from four people away, at least you are there in the moment, in the Now with the attacker. In other words, it's better to be off by four people, than to be off by four hours or four days, lost in thought. It's better to be near the wrong person and
present
(pre-sent), than to be directly next to the right person, yet a hundred miles away in thought.

The fast response of Secret Service agent Dennis McCarthy during Hinckley's attack on President Reagan illustrates the value of SEE: Before the President arrived at the hotel that day, McCarthy had been called over to observe a man named Mickey Crowe who had shown up at many of Reagan's public appearances. McCarthy and another agent were suspicious of Crowe and took positions close to him so as to have advantage in the event he moved toward the President. McCarthy later reported: "We had no idea that the real problem, Hinckley, was standing only a few feet from Crowe at this time." The suspicion about Crowe helped focus McCarthy's mind, and helped him be present on the sidewalk that day. "As the shots rang out," McCarthy reported, "my reaction was more instinctive than conscious."

McCarthy later theorized that his interest in Crowe might have had another benefit, discouraging Hinckley from shooting at Reagan as the President first arrived at the hotel: "Hinckley must have recognized us as Secret Service agents, and we were very close to him."

Just as lay people might assume, protectors are responsible for observing people around their protectee. But observing is the secondary responsibility; the primary responsibility is to be in position to respond in the event of an attack.
Observation occurs along the route, but effective response is the destination.

Imagine being responsible for responding to any of, say, fifty people along what's about to be your protectee's foot-route. From this pool of candidates, rank the ones most likely to be attackers. Look at each one attentively and knowingly, without any concern that they'll feel self-conscious -- and in fact, with the specific wish that they feel self-conscious. Then choose the highest-ranking candidate and observe that person with the anticipation that he might make an alarming move. Get into position to respond in the event your best suspect acts. Statistically, it's highly unlikely that any of the people you ever select will be attackers, but your SEE-ing them will nonetheless have value, deterring unwanted behaviors other than attack.

Also, the fact that a person you identify turns out not to be an attacker doesn't make your selection wrong. As we discussed in
Chapter 3
, you are not giving your mind an assignment it will quickly tire of (Look for Assassins), but rather an assignment that offers a frequent mental payoff: Identify suspects. The assignment is to see and register behaviors that are Pre-Incident INdicators (PINs) and to consider them valid and worthy of your attention without regard to whether or not they eventually escalate to attack. Here are just a few behavioral PINs, as examples:

• Hands out of view
  
• Positioning so as to intersect with the protectee
  
• Rigidly maintaining the same position
  
• Breathing erratically or holding the breath
  

AMMO

In our firm's academy, we teach protectors about subtle behaviors we've seen people display before they tried to jump up on a stage or make some other inappropriate approach to a protectee. In this training we call AMMO (for Audience Management, Monitoring, and Observation), we describe a number of stereotypical pre-incident behaviors:

The Inspector
displays a high level of interest in protectors, security personnel, and security procedures. When looked at directly, he quickly looks away. The Inspector behaves differently than most bystanders, who tend to be more interested in the show or event, and uninterested in security personnel and procedures.

The Organizer
constantly reaches into a bag, purse, or briefcase, seemingly rearranging items, or looking for something. An obvious concern is that this person will pull out a weapon, but it might also be a letter or package he wants to hand to your protectee. Whatever his purpose, his continued interest in the items he is carrying is the call for your attention.

The Sweater
appears hot, uncomfortable, and nervous. He might literally be sweating, as if under pressure or stress. The Sweater might show other signs of agitation and anxiety, constantly moving in his seat, shifting his weight from one foot to the other, unable to remain still. Basically, the person is uncomfortable in a situation in which most people appear happy.

The Fashion Plate
wears unusual clothes. Or he might wear clothes in an unusual manner, or wear clothes inappropriate to the weather or situation. The classic Fashion Plate is the person wearing an oversized heavy coat on a warm day.

The attack on Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos (
Compendium Case #79
) gives a good example of The Fashion Plate. The attacker stood in line with several award recipients who were about to walk across the stage. He wore black clothing while all the other award recipients wore white. When it was his turn to receive an award, he drew a large machete knife from the sleeve of his black coat and began swinging it wildly at Mrs. Marcos. (She received knife wounds requiring 70 stitches.) Many protectors were present. Had just one of them applied Suspects Exist Everywhere (in other words, been able to truly SEE), this attacker would have emerged as an obvious candidate. Had any protector taken one step toward the attacker and assumed a position of advantage prior to the attack, it could have been foiled, or even prevented outright through deterrence.

(c) BBC Channel

The attacker had intended his outfit to convey that he was a priest. Some of the protectors assumed precisely that, and followed the perhaps predictable inclination to be less concerned about a priest. Applying SEE, however, this individual would get
more
attention, not less -- in spite of, and even because of the fact that he was wearing a uniform.

Attacker Arthur Bremer, who shot and paralyzed presidential candidate Governor George Wallace (
Compendium Case #13
), was also a Fashion Plate. By wearing many Wallace-for-President buttons, he hoped to be taken as an avid supporter, a ploy that likely worked on some of the people present.

Presidential assassin Leon Czolgosz (
Compendium Case #1394
) was another Fashion Plate, wearing a handkerchief wrapped around his hand and wrist. It was concealing a handgun.

The Traveler (also Known as Musical Chairs)
moves all over the place at a public appearance, gradually repositioning closer to the protectee. At a venue with seating, this person switches seats often, getting closer to the stage with each move. The Traveler might also seek to test the limits of audience management or crowd control procedures. Most attendees accept the seat or position assigned to them. The Traveler persistently seeks a position that would provide advantage for an attacker.

The Grouch,
unlike most people out to catch a glimpse of a public figure, is aloof, seemingly uninterested, bored, or unhappy, and that's the call for attention. The Grouch can also be identified by the behavior of the people around him: It might not be clear why, but you'll see that the people nearby don't like him. Their body language, expressions, glances, exchange of comments with friends all reveal that they do not like this man -- and that is your PIN.

The Joiner
attempts to enter restricted areas by trying to make it appear he is with groups or people who are authorized. This person has arrived alone, but pretends to belong with others in order to get closer to the protectee. If passing through an access point, the Joiner is usually the last person in the group; he might gesture or otherwise imply that he is a member of the group without those people observing him do so. In a sense, attackers who pretend to be fans, or who join a receiving line apply a version of this strategy -- but the Joiner is more overt and brazen: He wants protectors to think he is authorized to be going where he tries to go.

Yigal Amir, assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (
Compendium Case #251
) provides an example of the Joiner. At some points, there were people around who assumed he was a member of the Prime Minister's entourage.

(c) Channel 2, Isreal

Amir, and the muzzle flash from his gun (Frame 4).

A variation on this theme occurred during the 1996 attack on Liberian President Charles Taylor (
Compendium case #535
). By appearing to be part of the President's motorcade, the attackers drove into the grounds of the Executive Mansion.

The Bluffer
is a close cousin of the Joiner. Frequently seen attempting to breach security at events, the Bluffer enters with no credential other than a lot of bravado and bluster. The archetypal Bluffer is male, dressed in a navy blue suit (usually ill-fitting), with an American flag pin stuck in his left lapel. He approaches screeners looking either at his watch or at some fixed point on the other side of the checkpoint, never making eye contact with protectors. When asked for credentials, he keeps up the act, going through his papers and pockets, remarking that he had it just a minute ago. He might say he must have misplaced the credentials in his rush to get to the event, or might assure the protector that once he's allowed inside, he'll make sure someone at the appropriate level will come and let the protector know he had authorization to enter. Said one Secret Service Agent who had encountered Bluffers throughout his career, "I can think of no reason this approach is attempted so frequently -- other than its high success rate."

The Secret Team
is the opposite of the Joiner, involving two or more people who are working together, but pretend not to be. A Secret Team might try to conceal communications among its members by using hand signals, two-way radios, cellular phones, text-messaging devices, etc. Secret Team members might be observed making an exchange -- i.e., a man walks up to another, passes something, then moves on without speaking. Another example: You saw them interacting outside the venue or saw them arrive together, but they are now acting as if unconnected.