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The Compendium has some instructive cases in which protectees being moved through crowds were killed even though they were literally surrounded by protectors and aides. Perhaps the most chilling such case is the assassination of Mexican Presidential Candidate Donaldo Colosio. While moving through the kind of enthusiastic crowd that politicians adore (and protectors abhor), protectors were present all around, but the people were so close that when an arm extended and placed a handgun against Colosio's head, it wasn't effectively noticed until it was fired.

Ropelines and Barricades

Ropelines and barricades can help to compel some white space where it might not otherwise exist.
Appendix 1
has a letter that can be given to protectees to help them understand their role in their own safety. We'll note a few of the guidelines here. Though ropelines and barricades improve white space, if protectees reach over the barricade into the crowd they lose many of the advantages. Accordingly, the letter to the protectee advises:

When you are moving along a ropeline or barricade doing a press-the-flesh event, the first and most important step you can take is a step backwards. The best practice is standing back two or more feet from the ropeline/barricade so that people have to reach out far toward you in order to connect, and you have to reach out just a bit toward them --
if you choose to.

When you stand back two feet from the barricade, you'll profoundly improve the experience for yourself while also helping your protectors be more effective, less intrusive, and less obvious.

The candidate in the following photos does this very well, standing back a full two feet from the barricade.

Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive

Standing in this way, you can choose whom you touch and how you touch.
The idea is that you are far enough back that they actually cannot reach you at all unless you extend an arm or hand to them.

Many candidates unwisely stand right up against the barricade -- terrible because protectors have no space into which they can respond. In those poorly done situations, the ropeline or barricade disappears entirely -- and that's when you see protectors having to shove and be intrusive.

In the better situation,
the ropeline or barricade should be clearly visible to you at all times,
and you decide how close to the barricade you will be, not allowing members of the public or campaign staff to decide how close to the barricade you will be. By standing back two or more feet, you always have available a step forward to avoid falling if someone tugs you and gains some leverage over you. By standing back, you reduce the leverage people have; they are leaning way forward and they have poor footing, not you.

Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive

This positioning is good.

Never reach into the crowd; never reach over the barricade.

In contrast with the protectee who is very good at standing back from ropelines and barricades, here's an example of the commonly seen mistake that's best to avoid: Reaching over the barricade.

Photo from AP Images

Photo by Jason Reed/Reuters TK

Instead of ever reaching over a ropeline/barricade, you want the whole hand-to-hand contact to happen on
your
side of the barricade, where you can decide who and how you touch, to whom you extend your hands. As important, when everything happens on your side of the barricade,
your protectors can see and respond.

Another important guideline is to avoid full handshakes; it's best to just take hold for a second of the tips of fingers, like the protectee does in these photos:

Photo by TK

Photo by TK

This way, you can release easily and you are not giving a grip they can use to tug you toward them and get you off-balance. You'll also be able to connect with more people in the time available.

(Note: The letter in
Appendix 1
has other information for protectees that is very valuable and important.)

ACE (Access, Concealment, Escape)

For close-quarter attacks to be successful, attackers want three specific advantages that can be described with the acronym ACE (Access, Concealment, and Escape).

Access

The attacker needs to be able to get close enough to launch an effective attack.

Concealment

The environment or situation must afford an assailant some concealment. This might be actual cover or concealment in the form of visual obstructions that make it difficult for protectors to see the attacker (a wall, a plant, people in a crowd). Or it might be concealing intent with behaviors that make it difficult for protectors to assess intent (wearing clothing or accessories that reduce suspicion, holding a "prop" like a radio or clipboard, displaying a credential, etc.).

Escape

Though escape is not a requirement of attack (most close-quarter attackers in the U.S. did not want, plan, or expect to get away after their attacks), escape is nonetheless an issue that many attackers consider. Environments or situations that offer escape options are attractive to a larger pool of persons who might consider attack, so making escape less likely (and making it
appear
less likely) is an important aspect of effective protection.

Note on escape: We can say with certainty that all bank robbers wish to escape; otherwise, what's the point? We cannot say the same thing about all assassins. Some make no escape plans, while others hope to escape. Targets who have protectors with them offer a close-quarters attacker a fairly low likelihood of escape. Conversely, there are several cases of targets who did not have protectors present whose attackers wanted to escape and did (
Solanis #9
,
Bardo #34
,
Cunanan #56
,
Palme #117
,
Hani #209
,
Stojicic #273
,
Lindh #392
,
van Gogh #406
, for example). So it is not accurate to say close-quarters attackers never have an escape plan, or never try, or never care about escape. Either way, "No escape possible" can be an intimidating thought to add to an attacker's fear of failure. Protectors who project an aura of "you won't succeed here" can cause a would-be attacker to switch targets (such as Bremer switching from Nixon to Wallace).

When someone with sinister intent is present in an environment that offers Access, Concealment, and Escape, they hold the ACE, in effect, and it can trump all other cards.

Protectors can develop a sense for assessing every environment the same way an attacker might, measuring these three factors. This can become second nature, such that when the thought of ACE comes into your head, even for an instant, you listen. ACE is not a signal of danger but rather a signal of vulnerability. When you detect that vulnerability, there are usually simple precautions that can mitigate it, most notably: Move closer to your protectee, move closer to suspects, move between the protectee and people in the area, increase White Space, etc.

Protectors too can hold the ACE:

Access
Access to the protectee and/or to people who could launch an attack.

Cover
Resources and proximity that afford protectors the ability to cover the protectee in the event of attack.

Escape/Evacuation
An unblocked, fast way out.

Experienced protectors frequently take the temperature of each environment, assessing who holds the ACE: Does this environment help people conceal intent? Can one of these people get to my protectee? Can I? Does this environment and this moment offer an escape option for an attacker? Does it offer easy departure for us?