Living Silence in Burma (6 page)

Thus, although Burma was nominally a democracy, earlier authoritarian traditions partly informed the way that politics operated in post-independence Burma. The establishment of a freer society had permitted the proliferation of newspapers, independent associations and political parties. Still, a winner-takes-all mentality remained the norm, and frequent instances of political violence and abuse of power hampered the development of a democratic culture.

Beginnings of militarization

Most Burmese citizens in the 1950s viewed the Burmese armed forces, or the
tatmadaw
, with respect. Along with the AFPFL, the
tatmadaw
was credited with playing a significant role in bringing about independence and in rescuing the country from dismemberment by insurgent forces. The Burmese population in the lowlands was eager to see peace restored in their towns and villages, and most were relieved when the various forces were pushed back by the
tatmadaw
.

The
tatmadaw
had begun as a small, disorganized army, but it was quickly professionalized through intensive battle experience and
institutional development initiated by military men who had trained at military academies abroad. To guarantee a degree of financial independence, the military set up its own profit-making corporation. The corporation originally ran shops selling bulk goods, but it soon expanded into the import–export business and became a major player in the domestic economy.
²³
Boosted by its military and economic successes, the
tatmadaw
increasingly identified itself as playing an essential role in the country’s internal affairs.

Meanwhile, as 1958 approached, hereditary Shan
sawbwas
, or princes, and young Shan leaders began debating the status of the Shan states in public meetings. According to the 1947 constitution, the Shan
sawbwas
could continue to govern their territories as principalities and could serve in one of the two houses in the state council, with elected representatives serving in the other. They also had the right to leave the union in 1958 if political integration wasn’t working out. The central government wanted Shan State to stay in the union, but among the Shans feelings were mixed. Some princes close to the government supported the union, while a number of Shan university students and others favoured independence. Many Karennis felt the same. This concerned
tatmadaw
leaders, who did not want any of the ethnic states to secede.

At the same time, some military officers were openly voicing discontent with parliamentary rule. They disliked the government’s willingness to rehabilitate insurgent left-wing politicians and resented civilian interference in their affairs. They were also disturbed by the disorderliness of the parliamentary system, in which politicians were constantly attacking each other and seemingly doing little to resolve the country’s problems. The AFPFL continued to dominate the parliament, but it split into two antagonistic groups, the Clean and the Stable AFPFL, in April 1958. Each group tried to outmanoeuvre the other by wooing army and militia leaders and ethnic representatives in the government. Rumours spread that a group of military officers were plotting a coup.

In September 1958, General Ne Win and two other senior officers, Maung Maung and Aung Gyi, took power. Prime Minister U Nu tried to limit the damage to the constitutional government by inviting General Ne Win to form a caretaker government. U Nu announced that the handover had been voluntary, but it became clear later that he had had little choice in the matter.
²⁴
The public did not initially oppose the caretaker government, because the elected parliament was in such disarray. Rangoon was filled with squatters who had fled the dangers of life outside the capital. Huts lined many of the city’s thoroughfares and covered vacant lots, and
the drains were like open latrines. If a military government could do a bit to clean up the cities and restore order, it was welcome.

Under the caretaker government, known in Burmese as the
Bogyoke
(General’s) government, General Ne Win achieved several successes. He concluded a significant border demarcation agreement with China which led to better relations between the two governments. He also convinced the Shan and Karenni hereditary leaders to give up their powers and allow for the election of all political representatives in their states. Most importantly to those in the cities, he kept food prices low and moved the squatter communities to newly established satellite towns.
²⁵

Thoughtful individuals, however, viewed the government’s handling of the squatters with concern. The squatters were given only twelve to twenty-four hours’ notice before military trucks picked them up, and many were unable to bring all their things with them. The new sites were not adequately prepared as residential areas, and the new residents had to make do as best they could. In this and other projects, the army showed little respect for the people it was supposedly helping.

The caretaker government was sensitive to criticism and imprisoned numerous journalists for daring to critique its actions. And much to civil servants’ annoyance, battlefield commanders were brought in to replace or work alongside bureaucrats. After the general’s government extended its term twice beyond the original six-month period, pressure increased for an election to restore democracy.

General Ne Win complied, and the election date was set for February 1960. Nevertheless, some military leaders hoped to influence the outcome, and some Stable AFPFL politicians flaunted their connections with high-ranking officers, thinking this would win them the support of the people. But they miscalculated, for the voters wanted the military to return to barracks and were annoyed by its attempts to manipulate the election. At the same time, many Burmese Buddhist voters were drawn by U Nu’s pledge to make Buddhism the state religion. They gave a landslide victory to his ‘Clean’ faction of the AFPFL, which had been reorganized as the
Pyidaungsu
, or Union, Party.

Among the ethnic nationalities, however, discontent with U Nu and other senior Burmese politicians was growing. Despite their promises, the parliamentary governments of the 1950s had done very little to develop the minority regions. Moreover, the central government had relinquished few powers to the ethnic states, and the
tatmadaw
’s presence in areas of insurgency had often resulted in the suspension of the rule of law. Most upsetting to Christian minorities, U Nu pushed a law through parliament
making Buddhism the state religion. In doing so, he went against General Aung San’s insistence on keeping the state secular. With majority rule, it seemed that the ethnic minorities could do little to stop measures supported by the far more numerous Burman representatives. Frustrated Kachins began talking about armed resistance.

In the meantime, U Nu continued to meet with ethnic leaders to discuss their demands. He offered amnesties to ethnic fighters who surrendered, but he was finding it difficult to work out a settlement with the Shans and Karennis, who were considering seceding. Most Burman politicians continued to oppose increased political autonomy for the ethnic minorities. As Dr Ba Maw, a Burman who served as prime minister during the Japanese occupation, put it: ‘The Burmese as a rule show a big-race mentality in their dealings with the smaller native races; they find it hard to forget their long historical domination over those races.’
²⁶
Even though some of the ethnic areas had never been under Burman domination, most Burmans still very much wanted the minority areas to remain part of modern Burma.

By 1961, Shan and Kachin nationalists were organizing resistance armies along the lines of the Karen. They increasingly felt that negotiating with the government was pointless. Still, older and more prominent minority leaders remained committed to working out a solution with the elected government. It was on 2 March 1962, during a high-level seminar on federal issues attended by Prime Minister U Nu and senior Shan representatives, that General Ne Win again seized power. This time, U Nu, members of his government and many Shan leaders were arrested.

General Ne Win’s colleague, Brigadier Aung Gyi, justified the coup by insisting that the union was in danger of disintegrating. A month after the coup, General Ne Win declared that parliamentary democracy, as practised so far, had not worked. The new military government, it was implied, could manage the country’s affairs more effectively.

Even though most people had voted against the military-backed Stable AFPFL in 1960, two years later they were willing to give the military another chance. In part, people were disappointed with how democratic rule had functioned, and there was hope that General Ne Win would act in the nation’s best interest. Others were cynical about government in general. Burmese have traditionally identified the government as one of the five enemies, the others being fire, water (floods and storms), thieves and malevolent people. Ordinary people had never had much control over the political process and felt it was best just to get on with life regardless of who was in power.

The major political parties stayed quiet, but some student groups did make statements against the coup. Within the military itself, particularly among those who had worked with the British before independence, there was also some opposition. One man who was a high-ranking naval officer at the time later said: ‘Some of us worried that now Ne Win was here to stay. We did get from the British the idea of the separation of politics and the military.’ Bo Let Ya, a popular member of the Thirty Comrades, sent out word that all former military comrades should state as a group that the military should not stay in power. He was arrested.

General Ne Win had already eliminated many of his rivals within the military the year before. Telling U Nu that they had been involved in election irregularities in 1960, he had eleven senior officers expelled from the army and others transferred to inactive posts. Although General Ne Win had started life with little promise, having dropped out of university and worked as a postal clerk, he had come a long way. He was admired for being a man of action and, as one of the Thirty Comrades, he was viewed as untouchable. He had expanded the army from a few thousand men in 1948 to 100,000 in 1962, and with his close rivals removed, the lower ranks were willing to follow him obediently, whether out of respect or fear.

In retrospect, one can ask how things might have been different if General Aung San had lived. Perhaps democratic norms would have gradually developed, and the ethnic groups’ political demands would have been resolved at the negotiating table. But growing political tensions and a legacy of authoritarianism had inhibited the development of a stable, open society. Having rid themselves of the British, the Burmans had found a renewed pride in their numerical dominance and their heritage as a conquering race, and this hindered their ability to understand and resolve the ethnic nationalities’ demands. Because of the civil war, the military often ignored due process in areas where it operated, and politicians were able to use pocket armies not only to go after bandits but also to intimidate their opposition. Although the government did seek to develop the country, there was little substantive dialogue between politicians and the people in their constituencies, and too many politicians were consumed with their own personal interests. As a result, democracy was only superficially rooted in Burma, and the military was able to take over with little resistance.

2 | The Ne Win years, 1962–88

    One Energy Minister said, ‘To spare the wood, use charcoal.’ But you see charcoal is made from wood. Those kind of people were governing. (U Po Khin)

The Revolutionary Council, 1962–74

After the 1962 coup, General Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council immediately set about imposing order, and the universities were one of the first targets. The military regime announced stricter regulations for university students, one particularly irksome rule being that dormitories were locked at 8 p.m. to prevent students from going out to visit friends or chat in tea shops. Angry students broke through the locked doors to shout in protest for three successive nights. As the protests continued, the students’ union took over the leadership.

On the afternoon of 7 July, students held a mass meeting in the assembly hall of the Rangoon University student union building. Then, they went out to demonstrate for about an hour. Just as they were dispersing, riot police stormed the campus and took over the student union. According to witnesses, a riot began, with the police firing tear-gas and students throwing stones. Some students also lit fireworks, increasing the chaos. Students shouted insulting slogans against General Ne Win, while soldiers entered the campus with their guns ready. When the protest did not immediately break up, they began shooting. Over one hundred students were apparently killed, although the government admitted to only fifteen deaths.
¹
In the early hours of the next morning, the military blew up the student union building, the centre of student activism since colonial days.

While General Ne Win succeeded in stopping the student protests, his recourse to such extreme measures provoked bitterness against the regime. U Pyone Cho, a university student at the time, recalled:

    You didn’t find a lot of students that were really political at that stage. But because of the killing and all, that really made students start thinking. And from then on, every month there would be a book of poems. And every 7th [July], people would wear black [in commemoration of the killings]. I won’t say all the students, but quite a few.

The university was closed for four months, and as students travelled back to their home towns, they brought with them news of what had happened. The event was kept alive through the memorial song ‘Old Union’, set to the tune of a popular song, ‘Old City of Pagan’. But the crackdown on students was just a taste of what was to come.