Authors: Alan Maki
Later, I asked Petty Officer First Class Mojica—we called him Mo—to be my interpreter during the visit to Ba To’s hamlet. I knew that Mo could speak the southern
and northern Vietnamese dialects perfectly, and, most important, I knew that I wouldn’t have to worry about the Sam Giang district chief confiscating the ordnance and/or M-60 machine gun from Ba To and his strategic hamlet. Mojica was only too glad to accompany me, and understood the urgency of the situation. Mo was a very valuable man to have around.
Mojica had become a legend among the SEAL and MST folks over the years. Mobile Support Team’s home command was Boat Support Unit-1 of Naval Operations Support Group 1, located at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California, and Mo had served with MST in 1967 at Nha Be when I was with SEAL Team 1’s Foxtrot Platoon. MST had delivered us from some tight situations in the T-10 area of the Rung Sat Special Zone.
By October 1971, Mojica had been in ’Nam for approximately seven years. He had married a very cute, petite Vietnamese lady—who was also of the Hoa Hao faith—and had a gaggle of kids. Mo had also spent a couple of tours with SOG—a special operations outfit cover named Studies and Observation Group—at the spook base in Da Nang from ’64 to ’66 as a crewman on the Norwegian-built “Nasty” class, eighty-foot PTF boats, which could speed along at a cool forty-five knots. As a crewman, he had some very interesting experiences north of the DMZ.
Later, we had tae kwon do practice from 1630 to 1830 hours. It was a long, hard, and hot workout. Because Captain Kim was a very good instructor, most of us were doing very well.
The next morning, I got up early and put together a cleaning kit for the M-60 machine gun for Ba To. Later, Doc, Compton, and I worked on our newest Dinh Tuong province enemy OB situation map with overlays.
After lunch, Same and I went down to our two ordnance
conex boxes and completed staging all of the ordnance that Doc, Mo, and I would be taking to Ba To’s hamlet the following day. The list was as follows: two cases of 40 mm HE (144 rounds), one case of M18A1 antipersonnel claymore mines (six each), 40 mm white para flares (40 rounds), miscellaneous fragmentation grenades; smoke mini-grenades, CS mini-grenades, 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm linked ball ammo for the M-60, etc. It was little enough, I thought.
At 1645 hours Same and I worked on our third tae kwon do pattern until 1800 hours. At approximately 2000 hours, the Sam Giang district subsector, at Vinh Kim village, came under heavy attack. From our stairway, we watched and listened to that night’s action, which was taking place approximately five to six kilometers northwest of Dong Tam. We couldn’t help but wonder how Major Bigelow, Captain Campbell, and the rest of the Army boys were doing. There were a lot of mortar and rocket explosions and small arms fire and tracers going everywhere. There were at least two Huey gunships and one Night Hawk—a Huey with a large spotlight—circling the village. It was a great night for operating—it was raining.
The sixth of October was to be a long and interesting day. After breakfast, I spent a few minutes preparing my field gear for Hayden’s operation that night.
By 0830 Doc Holmes, Mojica, and I had loaded the assorted ordnance and M-60 machine gun aboard the sector ship, a Huey slick, and landed near Ba To’s war-torn hamlet. Ba To and his followers were happy and excited to see us. The feelings were mutual. Their smiles got brighter when they saw all of the ordnance and the M-60 being off-loaded. It was good to hear that Ba To’s immediate family hadn’t suffered any casualties.
After things had settled down some, and while Doc
Holmes was compassionately caring for the hamlet folks’ medical needs, I introduced Mojica to Ba To. There was an instant admiration and respect between them. Without further ado, I paid Ba To 16,000 piasters ($58.18) for his services during August and September. After he had peeked inside the sealed envelope, his grin got even bigger. Suddenly, hope showed in his eyes for his small Hoa Hao village.
Afterward, Ba To told Mo and me that he knew the exact location of the VCI’s South Cai Lay district HQ. Ba To’s defection-in-place action agent—no doubt a Hoa Hao—would rendezvous with us and guide us to the VCI HQ. His only requirement was that we pay him 20,000 piasters immediately after the operation. His bona fides would be based on the success of the operation and his willingness to Chieu Hoi to the Vietnamese authorities. The source also stated that he would have to bring out his wife and four children.
I was careful to have Mojica explain to Ba To that we were very interested and that I didn’t think there would be any problems getting the 20,000 piasters or getting the informant and his family safely out of the area. I also told him that first I needed the approval of my superiors, and that I would notify him as soon as possible. Shortly afterward, when Doc finished issuing his plentiful supply of salt tablets and malaria pills, we returned to Dong Tam in time for lunch. However, there was little time for eating.
RM2 Roger Hayden presented his first combat warning order as a patrol leader at 1300 hours. Roger demonstrated good self-confidence, control, and follow-through. His basic briefing went as follows:
A. He presented a brief statement of the enemy and friendly situation in the vicinity of the target at grid coordinates XS078585.
B. The mission was the interdiction of a ten- to thirteen-man unit of the VC Dong Thap 1st Regiment Rear Services unit and their staging area.
C. General Instructions:
1. Personal gear: strobe light with different colored lenses, penlite, snaplink with Swiss seat, Sylva compass, K-bar knife with MK-13 day/night flare, morphine styrette, two quarts water, two LRRPs, water purification tablets, first-aid kit, para flares and smoke grenades, minifrag and mini-CS grenades, etc.
2. Personnel assignments and specific duties:
First Fire Team:
BM2 Knepper, point, M-16/XM-148 rifle/grenade launcher, prisoner handling gear
RM2 Hayden, P/L, M-60 machine gun (heavy), serum albumin
HM1 Holmes, radioman, XM-177E2, PRC-77 radio with extra battery and handset
SN Eberle, rear security, Stoner machine gun (heavy), serum albumin
Chief Muoi, two PSB operatives, and Son, M-16s
Second Fire Team:
RM1 Smith, point, M-16/XM-148 rifle/grenade launcher with Singlepoint, prisoner handling gear
EM2 Chamberlain, APL, M-60 machine gun (heavy), serum
RMSN Compton, radioman, Stoner machine gun (light), PRC-77 radio with extra battery and handset
EMFN Same, rear security, Stoner machine gun (heavy)
Three PSB operatives, M-16s
3. Visual Recon by PL and APL that morning.
4. Time Schedules:
a. Visual Reconnaissance: 0900-1000H
b. PLO: 1930-2030H
c. Equipment check: 2130H
d. Depart for Seawolves helo pad and rehearsals: 2145H
e. Depart Dong Tam: 2200H
f. Arrive target: 2230H
g. Depart target: 2315H
h. Arrive Cai Be: 2330H
i. Arrive Dong Tam: 2345H
j. Debrief at SEAL hootch: 0015H, all personnel involved
At 1930 hours, Hayden presented his patrol leader’s order as follows:
I. Situation:
A. Enemy forces: covered earlier.
B. Weather: probable rain.
C. Terrain: targeted hootches surrounded by rice paddies. One small canal running between the hootches. The closest tree line is located 600 meters to left flank with another approximately 1,200 meters to our right.
D. Identification: Dong Thap 1st Rear Services cadre/guerrillas staging area.
E. Location: grid coordinates XS078585.
F. Enemy activity: source says the guerrillas have had a nasty habit of harassing the villagers and their PSDF (People’s Self-Defense Force).
G. Enemy strength: ten to thirteen ugly Communist pigs with eight AK-47s, one M-16, one SKS, and one K-54.
H. Source of information: Chief Muoi, PSB, Cai Be Subsector. Enemy OB was cross-checked with our platoon’s enemy OB situation map with overlays and files.
I. Friendly forces:
1. ARVN outpost: XS062584, XS062590,
XS062598, XS088598, and XS100580, and Chief Muoi with five PSB operatives plus Son, our interpreter.
2. U.S. Navy: two Seawolves and two Sea Lord slicks from HAL-3; and two Black Ponies with Smitty’s old mate and mentor Lt. (jg) Sam from VAL-4.
II. Mission: Assault and destroy the Dong Thap 1’s Rear Services cadre (10-13 armed men) and their staging area.
III. Execution:
A. Concept of operation:
1. Flight plan: The Black Ponies will rendezvous with us near the target. Our Seawolves and Sea Lords will follow Route 66 (Kinh Song My Tho) to QL-4 (national highway) until it turns south at the Cai Lay/Cai Be district line. From there we will take a straight azimuth of 315 degrees for 12½ klicks to the vicinity of our target. The Black Ponies will vector our helos to the vicinity of the target and drop para flares directly over our target just before our insertion. Time at the target shouldn’t be more than forty-five minutes.
2. Insertion: The slicks will come in abreast on an azimuth of 230 degrees and insert both squads no more than fifty meters from the targeted hootches, which will be at twelve o’clock. First fire team will set a frontal skirmish line and take the right flank, while second fire team does the same on the left, keeping in mind that the small canal is between the two hootches. Once one of us exits the helo, then all must exit the helo.
Son, our interpreter, will
lai day!
the hootches. If the folks don’t come out, Knepper and Smitty will move forward and throw CS grenades inside the hootches and return to their positions. At that point, we’ll wait until something happens. When I give the word, we’ll move forward and set up for hootch search and seizure. After
the hootches are cleared, we’ll search the surrounding areas for any hidden VC or documents.
3. Extraction: We’ll move approximately 200 meters on an azimuth of 090 degrees and set up our two standard H formations for helo extraction. All eight corners will be marked with blue-lens-covered strobe lights. And finally, all of us will extract or none of us will extract. If one guy can’t make it, then none of us will.
4. Actions at danger areas: SOPs.
5. Actions upon enemy contact: return fire with a maximum rate of fire followed by fire and movement, fire and maneuver (leapfrog by fire team) to our extraction point.
6. Rally point: extraction point.
7. E&E: 135 degrees for 12½ klicks to high-way QL-4.
B. Coordinating Instructions:
Area of Operations: cleared through Subsector for seventy-two hours.
IV. Administration and Logistics:
A. Ammo and equip: Covered in warning order.
B. Casualty plan: Set security around the wounded and/or dead and call for maximum fire support and extraction. No one will be left behind dead or living.
C. Prisoner plan: SOPs.
1. First fire team: Knepper and Eberle
2. Second fire team: Smitty and Chambo
V. Command and Signal:
Radio comm plan:
| Unit/Call sign | Pri Freq | Sec Freq |
| Cai Be Subsector/Amateur Papa | 36.75 | 56.60 |
| Black Ponies/Roper Lion 1 | 36.75 | 60.60 |
| Seawolves/Roper Lion 2 | 36.75 | 60.60 |
| Sea Lords/Paper Lion | 36.75 | 60.60 |
At 2239 hours the Black Ponies dropped two one-million candlelight flares just prior to our insertion. At 2240 we inserted as planned before the two enemy hootches. For some reason, second fire team’s PSB operatives failed to immediately tell the inhabitants of our hootch to “come out.” I quickly yelled,
“Lai de! Toi day! Mau len!”
(Come here! Come forward! Hurry up!) Still no one came out. I hollered my message again and fired a few rounds through the thatched roof. Still there was no response.
I pulled a mini-CS grenade from my vest, looked at Chambo for his approval, because he was the assistant patrol leader, and went forward to the door of the hootch. I threw the grenade inside. After I had returned to our skirmish line, the wind shifted and blew the CS gas toward us. Chambo ordered everyone to move to right flank a few meters. Within a minute or so three women and five small children emerged from the hootch, crying and vomiting. Our PSB operatives immediately went into action and motioned for the women and children to come to our position.
In short order the Vietnamese PSB boys found out that the VC1 Rear Services folks had departed the two hootches and headed northeast just prior to our insertion.
Roger Hayden decided that we should form a wide frontal skirmish line and move northeast toward two other structures that might be filled with Communists. During our eerie, shadowed march through chest-deep water, we received word that the Seawolves were making a firing run. I instantly became concerned and asked Compton, the radioman, to find out if the run would be with miniguns or five-inch/2.75-inch rockets, and at what distance and direction from our position. No word was passed back, and I was soon to find out why.
First fire team was also in water up to their chests when Doc Holmes let out a mixture of screams and groans.
Eberle, who was forward of Doc, turned around ready to shoot whatever was killing Doc when he saw our compassionate doctor throw Roger Hayden’s broken M-60 down into the water. With that, Doc let out another series of screeches and moans while pulling at his genitals.
Crap! I thought. There can’t be saltwater crocs this far inland! Maybe it’s a python.
Eberle thought that Doc might need more than a couple of salt tablets, and asked him what was wrong.
Doc looked at Eb with eyes filled with horror and replied in an almost uncontrollable voice, “I’ve got two huge leeches hanging on my crank! Oooohhhhhh, shit. I hate these blood-sucking pud suckers! Eeeeiiiioooohhhhhh.”
There was little we could do for poor Doc at that time. I waded over to him, retrieved Roger’s M-60 from the bottom of the pond, and handed it back to Roger. All of us were fighting to control our laughter.