Volckmann hated these tactics but simultaneously admitted being fascinated by them. Never before had he been exposed to this kind of warfare: psychological warfare. It made for a very interesting case study, one that Volckmann documented well. However, he was relatively certain that the propaganda machine would not affect most of his local support.
239
The Japanese occupation could not erase Filipino support for America so easily. Yet, there were indications that a few Filipinos were steadily buying in to the propaganda. The Japanese could be successful over time if—and only if—they could convince the Filipinos that there was no hope of victory and that America really
had
forgotten about them. That message had already convinced some Filipinos to cast their lot with the Japanese. Hired as spies and informants, they were paid regular salaries by the Kempai Tai and given bonuses for information that led to the capture of American officers. To augment their ground forces, the Japanese also impressed several Filipinos into constabulary units. Although a number of Filipinos voluntarily accepted their conscription, many did so only out of fear.
240
But however effective their propaganda machine may have been, the Japanese often did more to negate their own success. While trying to win “hearts and minds,” the Japanese brutally tortured and killed those who were suspected of aiding guerrillas. These detestable tactics angered many of the Filipinos and hence, the Japanese not only undermined their own progress, they unwittingly gave the Filipinos more reasons to support Volckmann.
241
Once he had secured the civilians’ support, Volckmann then had to determine how he was to use it. The support structure provided by Filipinos fell into two categories: combat support and combat manpower. Combat support persons could either be regular civilians or volunteer guerrillas assigned to non-combat roles. These individuals provided Volckmann’s unit with food, water, technical and intelligence support, and other non-combat related specialties. It appears that Volckmann understood that these persons were the ones he needed to bring into his orbit first. Support personnel were critical, as their logistics provided his only lifeline. At the time, no other means existed for obtaining food or supplies. Technical support enabled Volckmann to maintain radio communication with his subordinate commands and, later, with General MacArthur in Australia, while the intelligence network provided Volckmann with continuous “eyes on the ground.” Although USAFFE possessed a working knowledge of the North Luzon landscape, it was nowhere near as intimate as the natives who had lived there for generations.
Indeed, the centerpiece of the civilian auxiliary was the intelligence network. Knowledge of the enemy, terrain, and weather were all critical to Volckmann’s guerrilla forces. And for intelligence gathering to be effective, it had to be a continuous process. The Filipinos he employed in this regard were indispensable. The Japanese would not normally suspect an average Filipino lingering in the vicinity of their garrisons, particularly since many Japanese outposts were located near settled areas or trading centers. The USAFIP-NL
intelligista
could easily and inconspicuously blend in with a crowd—a luxury that Volckmann and his American cohorts did not have.
Because intelligence operations had strategic implications, longrange planning was critical. The USAFIP-NL G2 files indicate that collecting intelligence centered on five priorities: evaluation of enemy forces and capabilities, interrogation of prisoners, proliferation of special agencies, psychological warfare, and infiltration.
242
Evaluating enemy strengths and dispositions was the first logical step in conducting the intelligence operation. After being displaced into the mountains by the 1942 anti-guerilla campaign, Volckmann had to assess where the priority targets were and how to coordinate strikes on them. Assessing these targets, Volckmann directed his agents to analyze the largest garrisons, supply points, and infrastructure landmarks that linked the Japanese units together.
243
Creating special agencies required a little more thought. To effectively promulgate his war plans, Volckmann had to take into account factors beyond the realm of enemy activity. These factors included weather, civilian activity, and the like. To fulfill this need, Volckmann established “watcher” groups to monitor airfields, shipping ports, and the coastline. Airfield watcher stations kept a close vigil on all operational airfields, while port watchers recorded the types and number of ships entering and departing North Luzon ports. Having coast watchers was an old practice from the earliest days of the U.S. Army and, consequently, it seems to be one of the few pieces of conventional doctrine that Volckmann used in the early stages of his guerrilla campaign. Operating in small teams, coast watchers provided information on the principal shipping lanes surrounding Luzon.
244
Psychological warfare was Volckmann’s first line of defense against the enemy propaganda. Years later, he articulated the difference between covert (black) and overt (white) propaganda. Both, he said, were “of great importance in developing and supporting a spirit of resistance in enemy-controlled areas.” To counter the enemy’s circulation of the alleged American defeats, Volckmann responded in kind with his own newsletter. Two versions went into circulation throughout North Luzon: one to his subordinate units and the other to the civilian communities. The guerrilla newsletters recounted each milestone of the Allied advance in the Pacific, gleaned from KGEI-San Francisco and later, from Volckmann’s radio contact with MacArthur. The secondary effects of this newsletter were critical, as it began to sway those who had previously ridden the fence to throw their lot in with the Americans.
245
Infiltration rounded out the intelligence apparatus as the final ingredient to gain information on the enemy. All other tenets of the intelligence plan were limited in their scope because they could not get within the walls of the enemy’s operation. Infiltrating the Japanese military complex would not be easy but, out of necessity, Volckmann found ways to make inroads. The Japanese’s “Bureau of Constabulary” was the most likely avenue of approach. Many of Volckmann’s agents found their way into its service and disseminated information on its activities and newest missions.
246
With the Japanese Fourteenth Army employing Filipino civilians for many of its staff and clerical functions, the opportunity for infiltration was ripe.
Combat manpower provided the muscle behind Volckmann’s guerrilla force. In fact, the overwhelming majority of his guerrillas were Filipino— displaced members of either the Philippine Army or Philippine Scouts, or natives that Volckmann recruited, such as the Haliap and the Antipolo.
247
For those who did not have a military background, Volckmann devised a curriculum for tactics and drill. To his and Blackburn’s delight, they soon discovered that training natives in the art of warfare was relatively easy— for these natives were already accustomed to the Spartan lifestyle and many of them were experienced hunters, well-versed in the arts of tracking and concealment. In all, Filipino support was perhaps
the
critical element to Volckmann’s operation.
On 7 October 1943, back at “General Headquarters,” Volckmann welcomed the arrival of Dennis Molintas, who together with Bando Dagwa, had come out of hiding from the previous year’s anti-guerilla operation. Molintas, a Philippine Army Reservist and former school teacher, commanded a small group of raiders from his hideout in Benguet. He accepted Volckmann’s command and agreed that the best thing to do was focus on the training, organization, and security of guerrilla forces. When he asked about when the appropriate time would be for expanding the force, Volckmann replied that that time was
now
.
248
At present, the only thing that he required of Molintas and his charges was their loyalty and continued patience.
About one week after Molintas departed for his camp, Volckmann had yet another close encounter with the enemy. This time, however, the source of the trouble wasn’t the Japanese—it was their constabulary.
249
Since the Fall of Bataan, the “Bureau of Constabulary” had been the enemy’s best attempt at civil law enforcement. Manned entirely by Filipino conscripts, the amount of trouble that the constabulary could cause depended largely on who their local commander was. If the commander was nothing more than a reluctant conscript—as many of the Filipinos were—then he would intentionally keep his patrol officers away from any guerrilla hideouts. However, if he were a true turncoat, he would cause no shortage of problems. One such turncoat had found his way into the Kiangan precinct and was determined to make his presence known.
When the Japanese declared 14 October as the new Philippine “Independence Day,”
*
the local officials ordered a celebration in Kiangan and all Haliap were expected to attend. During the celebration, a number of Haliaps—including Kamayong—were seized by the constabulary and taken to a nearby jail.
15 October 1943. Spent most of the day answering reports from the west [presumably Calvert]. The radio news we received is only up to the 27th [September]. They sure are moving slow in the Southwest Pacific. Received more reports on the mistreatment of the Haliap people in Kiangan. Method used (a common Jap trick): tie up a man, force his mouth open under a faucet, fill him full of water, then kick him and beat him in the stomach!
250
Furious, Volckmann thought it was another Japanese hit-job. He was surprised to learn, however, that the constabulary had acted independently, and that the seizure of Haliaps had nothing to do with the war.
18-22 October 1943. The story between the civil trouble that is going on here at present seems to go back to old tribal troubles. It seems that during the early part of the war, the Haliap people killed a man that was causing trouble. This man was related to [a family in Kiangan]. The Kiangan people rose up, secured arms, and attacked the Haliap. A Captain Jewel (American) stopped the fighting and patched things up.
251
Since that time, however, tension between the Kiangan residents and the rural Haliap continued to boil. Most recently, the new leader of the Kiangan precinct—identified only as “Beylong”—accused the Haliap of killing one of his relatives. Inciting the old feelings of hatred and distrust, Beylong rallied the Kiangan population against the Haliap. The entry continued:
The Kiangan people, under the leadership of one Beylong, singled out [Kamayong] and about fifteen other Haliap people and maltreated them severely. The Haliap people even believe the Mayor of Kiangan was in on the deal. It’s going to be a job to settle the whole affair.
252
But settle it he did. And the “whole affair” was quite the double-edged sword. His natural instinct was to launch a raid on the Kiangan jail, execute Beylong, and hang his traitorous comrades.
253
Begrudgingly, however, Volckmann knew that this was a bad idea. Kiangan was too close to the USAFIP-NL Headquarters—and if a local police station went up in flames, the Japanese would comb the area looking for perpetrators. Yet, if Beylong stayed where he was, it would only be a matter of time before his hatred for the Haliap led him to discover the nearby guerrillas.
Kamayong was later transferred to a nearby hospital, where the Mayor of Kiangan brought up a trumped-up charge of assault against him. Apparently, Beylong’s accusation that Kamayong had killed his relative wasn’t enough to get the Haliap leader out of the way—there had to be some sort of formal charge. Volckmann, already disgusted by the troublesome mayor, wrote him a letter demanding both Kamayong’s release and punishment for the reckless constable. But the mayor, true to his Vichy-ite instincts, settled on a compromise: Kamayong would be released, the charges would be dropped, and Beylong would be transferred to another province.
254
After the incident with the Mayor of Kiangan, Volckmann’s diary entries became progressively shorter and less frequent. From that point on, he often wrote only one entry to cover an entire week’s activity.
25 November 1943. Thanksgiving. No Turkey. Spent the day answering communications from the various units.
28 November –18 December 1943. The only thing exciting during this period is the offensive on the Gilbert Islands and Bougainville. However, the action on Bougainville has been so slow after the initial landings that it’s hard to figure out what they are waiting on. Had report, (reliability unknown) that Col. Thorp, Nakar, and Straughn were taken from Ft. Santiago to Cemetary North Manila—executed. Can’t understand why this war in the Pacific is moving so slowly. No action in Burma yet?
19-24 December 1943. Nothing exciting.
25 December 1943. Another Xmas in the mountains. Formoca sent us some cigars, a bottle of Chinese whiskey, some cakes.
26-31 December 1943. Received some pretty good news; New Britain landed on. Rumors also they have landed in Mindanao. So ends another year. I’d sure like to see something come in here before too many months of the New Year pass.
255
On New Year’s Day 1944, Volckmann and Blackburn intercepted a spy near General Headquarters. A few Haliaps had noticed a stranger wandering around the trails close to Volckmann’s hideout. He didn’t necessarily look suspicious, but none of the Haliap had ever seen this man before. Choosing to err on the side of caution, Volckmann ordered the man to be picked up and brought in for questioning. The following day, Blackburn questioned the stranger until he finally admitted that he was a spy for the Japanese. For this, he was executed on the spot.
256
The moral of the story was harsh, yet simple: spies and informers were a deadly nuisance and they would be taken care of accordingly. Volckmann knew that if he expected to survive the war, he would have to make the “fifth column” fear
him
more than the Japanese. And he did so by instituting ways to eliminate those who were confirmed as spies.
*
Throughout the spring of 1944, Volckmann’s diary recorded new feats of guerrilla warfare as he continued to expand his forces, train his men, and coordinate strikes on enemy garrisons and troop movements. However, on 18 June 1944, his diary abruptly stopped. The last entry simply reads:
The raid on the Philippine Constabulary Co. in Baguio fell through. One of our undercover men got cold feet and exposed the plan. No casualties on our side.
**
But aside from organizing his forces and planning attacks on Japanese outposts, Volckmann wanted to engage the enemy in open combat; he wanted to take back the Philippines. By raids and ambushes alone, he could no doubt harass the Japanese and possibly, over time, defeat the enemy juggernaut. But this approach would take years to accomplish, and he was bound to run out of supplies long before the Japanese did.