Mike Guardia (22 page)

FM 31-21 particularly resonated with Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the director of OCPW. McClure himself had an interesting military career. In 1944–45, he had been the head of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Branch in Europe
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and worked closely with the OSS. As the forerunner to the CIA, the OSS’ most memorable accomplishment in Europe was
Operation Jedburgh
. The participants—or “Jedburghs” as they were known—operated in three-man teams. Delivered by parachute, they would establish contact with local French, Belgian, and Dutch resistance fighters and provide a link to Allied materiel. McClure’s position as the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch gave him a front row seat to the planning and operations of the
Jedburgh
campaign.
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Influenced by Volckmann’s writing, and recalling the success of the Jedburghs in Europe, McClure sought to create a permanent special operations force that would combine the facets of unconventional and psychological warfare. Seeking Volckmann’s help, McClure approached him with an offer to become OCPW’s Chief of Plans—Special OperationsDivision. Like Volckmann, McClure believed that reinventing a special operations command for every war was counterproductive. Volckmann agreed to join McClure only after being assured that the Army was serious about creating and maintaining a special operations force. Joining Volckmann a few months later was Colonel Aaron Bank, a former OSS operative who had served with the Jedburghs in Europe.
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With Volckmann as Chief of Plans, OCPW prepared the framework for what would become the Army Special Forces.
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OCPW had the option of outlining a force that could follow one of two organizational precedents: (1) the model provided by USAFIP-NL (developing and organizing guerrillas in enemy territory), or (2) the Ranger-style traditions of a “shock-troop” force. Given the nature of what the Special Forces were intended to accomplish, the USAFIP-NL model provided the most logical basis. Aaron Bank later disclosed that Special Forces “have no connection with ranger-type organizations since their mission and operations are far more complex, time consuming, require much deeper penetration [into enemy territory] and initially are often of a strategic nature.”
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Aware of Volckmann’s earlier work, and recognizing the need for a special operations capability, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins held a conference at the Fort Benning Infantry Center in April 1951. In doing so, he opened the floor to discussion on the Special Forces concept. Collins, an infantryman himself, favored the Ranger model. In fact, he was quoted saying that, “the Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction.”
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In response, Volckmann—who represented OCPW at the conference—authored a memorandum for the Infantry Center commenting on the Chief of Staff’s position.

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Other members of the OCPW staff included Wendell Fertig, former leader of the Mindanao guerrillas, and Colonel Melvin Blair, a veteran of “Merrill’s Marauders.”

Volckmann equated the general’s use of the phrase “subversive activities” with “special forces operations.” He then identified six critical elements of Special Forces operations:

1. The organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
2. Sabotage.
3. Evasion.
4. Long-range reconnaissance.
5. Ranger-style raids.
6. Psychological Warfare.
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Even though the Special Forces would be capable of performing raids and ambushes in the Ranger tradition, their overall mission would be of a different and far more complex nature.

In regard to the general’s comments on indigenous personnel, Volckmann had this to offer:

We may visualize the world today as being divided into two major groups or layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together by common ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. The full exploitation of our sympathetic blue layer within the enemy’s sphere of influence is basically the mission of special forces [sic] operations.
It is from the blue layer within the enemy’s sphere that we must foster resistance movements, organize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, conduct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape
. We should, through special forces [sic] operations, exploit this layer to assist our ranger and commando operations, and a media for psychological warfare (emphasis added).
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Although Volckmann’s use of the term “international civil war” may have been extreme, his discussion of the “sympathetic blue layer” was not. Volckmann’s conception of Army Special Forces centered on the exploitation of “blue layer” elements, or friendly civilians who could be trained as partisans who could offset the enemy’s “home field” advantage. Volckmann’s memorandum is important because it spelled out the operational framework for the Special Forces, including its purpose—exploitation of the “blue layer”—and its mission parameters (the six critical elements listed above).

Aside from outlining the operational tenets and roles of the Special Forces, this document is important because it addressed the issue of CIA involvement. Volckmann had written earlier:

To me, it is basically sound that the military (the Army, since this field falls within ground operations) has the inherent responsibility in peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces [sic] operations and in time of war to organize and conduct special forces [sic] operations. Further,
I feel that it is unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civil agency
(emphasis added).
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Whether Volckmann disliked or distrusted the CIA is unclear, but he obviously knew that they were ill equipped to handle the tasks that were better left to professional soldiers. The Army-CIA alliance in Korea had caused much overlap of responsibility and bureaucratic friction. Furthermore, CIA involvement left military commanders without full control over operations within their sectors.

After forwarding his memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff, Volckmann began work on a study called “Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training,” synthesizing his ideas and the hard-fought lessons he had learned over the years. Upon receipt of Volckmann’s papers, General Collins gave his blessing to the Special Forces project.
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The Army Special Forces gained their own responsibilities for training and planning special operations—just as Volckmann had wanted. However, the CIA retained its paramilitary capabilities, and bureaucratic friction with the Pentagon over special operations responsibility continues to this day.

If followed exactly, Volckmann’s advice may have improved the efficiency of the civil intelligence and special warfare apparatuses. While his advice may not have been followed to the letter, it seems to have made some lasting impact. Today, CIA agents do not supervise military operations and largely serve as auxiliaries to special warfare troops instead of competing with them. Though friction still exists between the military and the civil intelligence community, the distinctions between their responsibilities and physical areas of operation are clearer today than they were over half of a century ago.

Reviewing Volckmann’s contribution to the development of Special Forces, it begs to question why he receives virtually no recognition for his involvement and why history has given the lion’s share of the credit to Aaron Bank. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, memorials dedicated to Bank cite him as the true “Father of Special Forces.” There are two possible reasons behind this affirmation.

The first is that Bank created the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) under which the Special Forces currently operate. While OCPW determined what structural format the Special Forces teams would follow, Bank suggested a derivative of the Operational Group concept from the OSS.
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This is Bank’s major contribution to the program. Using this concept, Bank created an organizational table that divided Special Forces units into three tiers. These tiers would officially be called Detachments and given a letter designation—A, B, and C. The finished product would be similar to a conventional brigade, but with fewer personnel. The first tier, the A-Detachment—or A-Team, as it would later be known—consisted of twelve soldiers. One captain would serve as a Detachment Commander with a 1st lieutenant as his executive officer. The remaining ten were enlisted men who worked in pairs according to their primary specialty, for example demolition, combat engineering, combat medics, field communications, and heavy weapons. Three “A-Detachments” comprised a “B-Detachment,” commanded by a major with a complement of nine NCOs. Three “B-Detachments” made up a “C-Detachment” (run by a lieutenant colonel) and three “CDetachments” made a Special Forces Group.
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Operational Groups were 30-man units designed to conduct irregular warfare behind Axis lines.

The second reason is that Bank commanded the first operational Special Forces unit—the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As Bank was the first Special Forces Group commander, and was responsible for its TO&E, it is not surprising that he is often heralded as the “Father of Special Forces.”

By any reasonable standard, Aaron Bank was a bright, talented, and extremely competent officer. However, the title “Father of Special Forces” is not appropriate for him. It was Volckmann, not Bank, who articulated and designed the mission capabilities and operational framework upon which the Army Special Forces would operate. It was Volckmann, not Bank, who represented OCPW at General Collins’ Fort Benning conference and authored the memorandum explaining the strategic purposes of special operations and the mission parameters defined by the six numerated functions. Furthermore, these were concepts that Volckmann had already codified in FM 31-20 and 31-21, both of which he wrote before Bank ever joined OCPW. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, in a letter dated 23 February 1969 addressed to the History Office at Fort Bragg,
Bank actually credits Volckmann
for “the development of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special Forces units in the active Army.”
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Even though Army Special Forces operate under Bank’s conception of the TO&E, their operations today have more in common with Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL. As per FM 31-21, Volckmann advocated many of the tenets he had developed in the Philippines and lessons he drew from his time with Eighth Army Headquarters in Korea. Volckmann knew that the first thing Special Forces needed was a unified command structure under full military authority. The OSS, for its part in the war, was still a civilian agency and did not take its orders exclusively from the Army. Moreover, Volckmann did not strictly focus on utilizing the Special Forces for “behind the lines” activities. He also envisioned the Special Forces operating in environments where the front lines had
disappeared
, as had been the case for him in the Philippines.
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Furthermore, Volckmann’s initial memorandum to General Collins and his “Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training” envisioned a force that would both
train
and
equip
indigenous peoples for guerrilla warfare.

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This is important considering the operational environments of the Vietnam War and the current War on Terror.

For their part, Bank and McClure shared with Volckmann their experiences in the OSS and the Psychological Warfare Branch. However, Volckmann arguably had a better grasp on the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare and understood these concepts in ways that Bank and McClure never could. Although the OSS and USAFIP-NL both conducted “subversive activities,” the OSS operated within an established framework that experienced no discontinuity in its operation. At the start of the war in the Philippines, USAFFE handled all military operations but, after the Fall of Bataan, it ceased to function as a military organization. Volckmann’s guerrillas picked up the pieces of the shattered Philippine Army and organized them into the USAFIP-NL, a guerrilla force that operated under fighting doctrines that Volckmann developed as he went along.

Additionally, the OSS did not carry on its missions at a distance from other Allied units. Europe was a densely militarized theater of war with high concentrations of Axis and Allied units. In Volckmann’s case, however, the nearest Allied ordnance lay thousands of miles offshore. Also, it was easier in Europe for OSS personnel to blend in with the local population, since both the Europeans and Americans were ethnically white. Volckmann and his American comrades in North Luzon could not duplicate this feat. In fact, this was a condition that highlighted Volckmann’s need for civilian support—his Filipino spies could go into places that a white American could not.

It would also not be appropriate to bestow McClure with the title “Father of Special Forces.” Although McClure established OCPW with the expressed desire to maintain unconventional forces, he regarded the Special Forces solely as a means to an end. McClure’s primary objective was to establish special operations forces within the Army’s existing psychological warfare community and bring psychological operations to the forefront of Army doctrine. Initially, Special Forces were subordinate to the Psychological Warfare Center. Although today this relationship is reversed, in 1951, it was the natural consequence of McClure’s leadership. Conducting psychological operations in World War II, McClure regarded them as the banner under which all special operations should fall.
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There was nothing hazardous in McClure’s setup, but as time progressed, it was evident that a more efficient structure would be one under which Special Forces took the lead.

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McClure’s focus on the psychological aspect of the program was probably the reason why Volckmann had so much independence in designing the Special Forces component. McClure obviously trusted Volckmann’s expertise in guerrilla and unconventional matters.