Read Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation Online
Authors: Trevor Wilson
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Reproduced from
Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation,
edited by Trevor Wilson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at
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U Myint
This chapter comments on some of the pre-requisites for foreign assistance to flow to Myanmar, but seeks to do this from a Myanmar perspective. It identifies ways in which international assistance might be designed to enhance maximum long-term benefits for the people of Myanmar in the particular circumstances they face.
In thinking about foreign aid, one issue that arises in the Myanmar context is the high importance the country attaches to self-reliance. This is a useful attitude to have, as no country has ever developed without relying on its own efforts. In Myanmar, however, from the early 1960s until the present day “self-reliance” has been taken to mean that the country must do things in its own way, by its own efforts, relying on its own resources, which are believed to be ample to ensure a favorable outcome. The fact that the outside world offers markets for Myanmar products, and opportunities to secure investment funds, technology, and development finance, and that it possesses vast experience with respect to alternative
ways of doing things and solving problems, has somehow not been given sufficient attention in Myanmar over all these years.
It will, however, be useful to keep matters in proper perspective. This is because in the present increasingly interdependent world economy, there are things that a country can do by itself and things that are not necessary for it to do by itself. For instance, Myanmar can grow rice and beans and undertake public works without help from anyone because it has been doing these things since the days of the Burmese kings. But if it wants a national electrical grid system that is reliable and a telephone system that works, doing things on its own is no longer a viable option. It is easier and more cost-effective to acquire the equipment and the technology from an outside source that has the capability and expertize in these areas.
Just as it is not possible to build a modern army based on traditional Burmese weapons and traditional concepts of warfare, it is not possible to build a modern economy by relying on traditional commodities such as rice and beans and on traditional approaches to development such as building public works. To modernize the economy, Myanmar, recognized as one of the least developed countries in the world, must avail itself of the opportunities that best suit its capacities and must have adequate and fair access to the technology, knowledge, expertise, and resources that are available in the rest of the world. At present there is a major deficiency on this score.
According to UNCTAD’s
Least Developed Countries Reports,
over the period from 1982 to 1988 Myanmar received an average of US$342 million
1
per year as official development assistance (ODA) from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries and the multilateral agencies. During the period 1989 to 1995, ODA flows to Myanmar fell by 56 per cent to an average of $150 million per year. There was a further decline to an average of $115 million in the years 2000 to 2002. During the same period in the new millennium, ODA flows to Laos averaged $267 million, while for Cambodia the average came to $427 million. In per capita terms, ODA receipts of Myanmar in 2000 to 2002 amounted only to $2.40, far below the $50 per head received by Laos, $32 per head received by Cambodia, and $21 per head average that all least developed
countries received over the same period.
2
In fact, Myanmar’s per capita ODA figure is the lowest among the forty-nine least developed countries given in the UNCTAD reports, and hence probably the lowest in the world. Recently, Myanmar, North Korea and Iran were designated as donor-constrained countries.
Myanmar’s experience with external assistance over half a century since gaining independence has not been a happy one. There were long periods during the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) era when the country unilaterally renounced assistance from USAID, the World Bank, and the IMF. There was also a long self-imposed delay in joining the Asian Development Bank. Perhaps there are useful lessons and insights to be drawn from this historical experience. Our historians will be able to tell us more about this.
But coming to the present and thinking about the future, those with goodwill towards the country will agree that external assistance to Myanmar should be revived and enhanced once the political impasse is overcome. However, it is important to bear in mind that resumption of ODA flows, even if it were to come in substantial amounts, might not by itself help to improve the welfare of the ordinary people of Myanmar, and especially the welfare of the large majority of the poorest people at the bottom of the income scale. A World Bank policy research report entitled
Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why
3
in reviewing the organization’s fifty years’ experience with development assistance, observed that foreign aid performance at different times and different places has ranged from highly effective to totally ineffective and everything in between.
Keeping the above in mind, let us now consider the conditions that will need to be satisfied for aid to contribute to Myanmar’s aim of becoming a modern, developed nation, assuming that the precondition that Myanmar make concrete progress on national reconciliation is met in order for ODA to be resumed by the major donor nations and international development agencies.
A useful way to consider how external aid could assist Myanmar’s economic and social development is to think in terms of road racing. To win a road race three things are required: a powerful engine, a smooth
track, and a skillful driver. In the case of an economy, sound policies provide the powerful engine. Good infrastructure with good economic and social institutions constitute the smooth track. The skillful driver is a person who inspires confidence, is blessed with sound judgment, and has the managerial capabilities to run the economy in an efficient and effective manner. Thus foreign aid can help a country if it does these things: assists in formulating and implementing good policies; provides technical assistance and finance to help build infrastructure and institutions; and imparts training to improve human capacities to perform tasks in a more productive and efficient way.
For Myanmar and other least developed countries, it may be desirable to bear in mind two other factors. These have to do with figuring out where we are at present in the race, and the nature and state of the car we are driving. Let us consider these in turn.
Let us begin with the car. At the start of the race in Myanmar, fifty years ago, we were driving the state-of-the-art and top-of-the-line Ford Popular Sedan, 1950 model. Our flashy car was envied by many, both near and far. We were tipped as the most likely country to reach the finish line and successfully industrialize well ahead of others in the region.
In the course of the race over the past half-century, our neighbours became able to afford better cars, through good ideas, diligence, and hard work on their part. They switched models, and, from about a decade and a half ago, began zooming around in Pajeros. But we prefer to do things our way and opted to stick to our Ford Popular 1950 model. Obviously, after fifty years on the road, obsolescence has set in and there has been considerable wear and tear. However, we repainted the car several times, so it retained its sleek and shiny good looks. In addition, a pair of new halogen head lights and mag wheels were installed. These did nothing to improve the car’s performance, but it did make us feel good and contributed to our sense of satisfaction and well-being.