Nelson: Britannia's God of War (32 page)

With the authority of the Bourbon regime at Naples re-established, and the war swinging in favour of the coalition, Nelson would have been excused for leaving the stage. He chose to stay, however, despite repeated complaints of headaches, chest pains and near-blindness. He thrived on the responsibility of command, and when Keith departed with the main fleet in Bruix’s wake, Nelson was the senior officer inside the Straits. The theatre was an unusual one, since the enemy did not possess a significant battle fleet. Instead the Royal Navy was conducting a range of important strategic tasks from Gibraltar to Alexandria, within a troubled coalition that necessitated watching ‘friends’ as well as foes. Under these circumstances, Nelson recognised the importance of the Commander in Chief occupying a central position to facilitate intelligence gathering and political contacts, while his flag would be the rallying point for the dispersed units of his squadron if an enemy fleet appeared.

In purely strategic terms, Syracuse would have been the best location for the operational fleet base; but political considerations made remaining in Palermo a more sensible choice, and Nelson was unwilling to sacrifice vital political leverage and strategic assets to save a day or two at sea. Nelson was becoming increasingly infuriated by the inability of the King and his ministers to see where their own best
interests lay, or to act to secure them. They constantly procrastinated about food and money for the siege of Malta, a Sicilian freehold, while Ferdinand would not go back to Naples, where his presence would have helped restore order and render his state a more effective partner in the war. Nelson was obliged to talk up the Neapolitan contribution to the ministers in London, while offering to mortgage his estate at Bronte and sell his trophies and decorations to fund the siege at Malta.

The main difficulty facing British naval commanders in the Mediterranean was the lack of a reliable military force under their control. The British army was too small, and too heavily committed to defensive tasks, to spare the men for a Mediterranean expeditionary force. The few British troops in the theatre were tied down at Gibraltar and Minorca. Nelson constantly badgered the generals to understand the big picture, to act on the spirit of their instructions rather than the letter, but only Charles Stuart had the necessary confidence in his own judgement, and political courage. Moreover, the command system did not permit the naval Commander in Chief to issue orders to the army. The result of this weakness was the interminable blockade of Valletta, where the French defenders were more numerous than the besieging marines and Maltese irregulars. A force of five thousand British regulars would have reduced the place in a month or two. Instead the operation tied down extensive naval forces for two years. Without troops, St Vincent, Keith and especially Nelson were left to rely on their allies, who were by turns unwilling, incompetent or absent. Rather than simply reporting his frustrations, Nelson landed seamen and marines, employing Troubridge as his general.

On 20 September Nelson received a package of official dispatches. One criticised his judgement in landing seamen and marines for service at Capua, and disobeying Keith’s orders; while another, more welcome, conferred temporary theatre command on him, in the absence of Keith. (Nelson, who remained a Rear Admiral until 1 January 1801, did not have the rank to be placed in permanent command of the theatre.) A further dispatch set out the Admiralty’s priorities among the strategic tasks of the fleet. The first task was to cooperate with the allies to drive the French out of Italy, specifically supporting the siege of Genoa. Next came the reduction of Malta, followed by the protection of Minorca. Fourthly he was to keep watch on the Spanish fleet at Cadiz, a task combined with securing the passage of Mediterranean convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. The formation and escort of British and allied
convoys was the fifth priority, while the redeployment of the squadron from the coast of Egypt, in the expectation that their task was at an end, rounded off the list. The same Board that had criticised his judgement then expressed their confidence that he would do all that he could with the forces under his command.
¹

Nelson’s replies to the Admiralty dispatches show him vigorously defending his decisions over Capua and Minorca, stressing his concern for the honour of the King and Country, ‘the dearest objects of my heart’. He also cited the opinions of Acton and Hamilton on the likely effect of a withdrawal while affairs at Naples were incomplete. He warned that the new instructions to restore the Knights at Malta, with the Tsar as Grand Master, would be unpopular, and he requested more ships, to replace those going home for refit and the unseaworthy Russians.
²
He expressed himself more strongly still, however, in letters to confidants. The third of the Admiralty’s tasks for him had already been dismissed in a letter to Spencer: ‘Minorca I have never yet considered in the
smallest
danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thought differently from me on that point.’
³
And his real feelings on the Admiralty’s censure were revealed to Davison:

 Nelson did not allow his feelings of being slighted to impair his command of the campaign, however. He was concentrating on Malta now: he sailed to Minorca to press for some British troops, and asked Oushakov to help. With Bruix gone, he anticipated the French would try to relieve the garrison from Toulon, where Nile escapee
Le
Genereux
and other vessels were fitting out. Scouts were placed on the patrol lines of Toulon–Ajaccio and Lampedusa–Cape Bon.
⁵
At the beginning of October, he was celebrating the fact that Troubridge and Louis had taken Rome, accepting the surrender of the French garrison.He responded by sending his battleships to Minorca, offering a substantial naval defence to release troops for Malta.
⁶
To outflank the inevitable objections from the general at Minorca, he asked the Neapolitans to request that the British garrison at Messina be sent to Malta. To make sure they understood his purpose, he warned them that if Malta remained in French hands the Barbary corsairs would use the harbour to annihilate Sicilian trade. Brigadier Graham, in command
at Messina, was also given the benefit of Nelson’s views on theatre strategy and national policy, but both the King and Graham were resolute. Ferdinand did not feel safe without British troops, and the Brigadier would not move without orders. ‘I am almost mad with the mode of going on here,’ Nelson lamented.
⁷

Reports of thirteen French battleships off Cape Finisterre forced another redeployment. Niza’s Portuguese squadron had been recalled, but on 3 October Nelson begged him to stay off Malta, while he sought out the enemy. By 11 October Nelson was heading for Gibraltar, but the following day he realised that the reported sightings of the enemy had been false – just one of many unreliable fragments of intelligence that exercised the mind of the admiral. Nelson returned to Minorca instead to request the troops for Malta. General Erskine admitted the island was in an excellent state of defence, but he was about to hand over to General Henry Fox, and would not commit to the new commander. No amount of naval protection would persuade him to detach troops from Minorca, or redeploy those from Messina. Nelson sent a sloop to report on Toulon, and hurried east, anxious the French would try to reinforce Malta.
⁸

Nelson was forced to return to Palermo, with nothing to show for his cruise. Frustrated by Erskine’s attitude, and the inability of the Neapolitan government to pay the Maltese soldiers, Nelson kept up the pressure on the general and spent his own money on the Maltese. For a man of Nelson’s temperament these were more than professional setbacks. He feared Malta might be lost; he believed the general was wrong to ignore the changed circumstances, and that the war must be prosecuted to the utmost.
⁹
He was frustrated that all his hard work since returning to Palermo had not generated a single soldier, and that his successes had not been given the credit they deserved, as he revealed in a bitter letter to Fanny:

If Parliament underestimated the British contribution to the restoration in Naples, then the Neapolitans themselves could be accused of no such thing; rather, they remained highly dependent, as Nelson stressed to the Admiralty:

As Berry had resumed his post, Hardy, who carried the dispatch home, could inform the Board of the condition of the fleet, and the admiral. Nelson’s mood was not improved by a letter from the Victualling Board, which appeared to sustain Consul Lock’s claims. Wounded and angry, he exploded onto the page – ‘I defy any insinuations against my honour’ – and demanded a full enquiry. He also demanded Lock provide copies of any public letters concerning fleet supply.
¹²
A fortnight later Nelson demanded an Admiralty enquiry. Aware that Lock had used family influence to secure a private commendation of his actions, Nelson demanded he produce evidence, or withdraw. The following day, a humiliated Lock abandoned his claims, and the demand for an enquiry was withdrawn.
¹³
The determination with which Nelson pursued any criticism of his honour was typical.

Given his mental state it was perhaps fortunate that French attempts to supply the Malta garrison now took centre stage. This gave a suitable focus for Nelson’s efforts, and provided a task that could be carried out by naval forces. Another letter begging Erskine to act reached Minorca after General Fox had taken over command. Fox responded quickly: his order that the Messina garrison go to Malta arrived on 25 October.
¹⁴
Nelson was also promised three thousand Russian troops, but the Messina garrison were the only men who turned up. Troubridge was instructed to sustain the claims of Britain and the Neapolitans, while avoiding friction. Niza, meanwhile, had been ordered home, but Nelson kept up a barrage of letters begging him to run the risk of disobeying, for a higher purpose.
¹⁵
His successful persuasion earned the Marquis a fulsome tribute of public and private thanks – perhaps more than the Portuguese ships deserved – when he finally departed in mid-December.
¹⁶

Nelson was further angered by a new Admiralty complaint, alleging that he had not kept them fully informed of events. In response, he reminded the Board that he lacked the secretarial staff and extra pay of a regular Commander in Chief, and yet dealt with the greatest naval and political correspondence that fell to any senior officer. He never relaxed before 8 p.m. and rarely went ashore.
¹⁷
The dishonest conduct of Austria, Russian ambition and the hopeless sloth of Naples were making his task almost impossible: ‘I am nearly blind, but things go so
contrary to my mind
out
of our profession, that truly I care not how soon I am off the stage.’
¹⁸

To make matters worse, just when he wanted to focus on Malta, Nelson had to respond to the complete failure of the Russian fleet to secure trade or cooperate with the allied army on the Tuscan coast. Despite the fact that the Admiralty had so reduced his force that there were no spare ships, Nelson had to ensure a British presence.
¹⁹
With ships and troops committed to the siege of Malta Nelson detached a squadron to the Tuscan coast. Henry Blackwood was sent in the frigate
Penelope
to watch for the Combined Fleet between Cape Spartel and Cape St Vincent. If the fleet was sighted he was to retreat, informing Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta.
²⁰

Minorca was the appointed rendezvous for the newly re-introduced Italian convoys.
²¹
Once Leghorn, the greatest market for naval stores in the Mediterranean, was recovered Nelson directed the Port Mahon naval yard to buy stores.
²²
There were too few ships for the tasks in hand, while those that were available were almost all in need of refit. His best hope was that the new Consulate in France would mean peace.
²³
This news followed the escape of Bonaparte from Egypt, which Nelson regretted. In a total war it was necessary that the French should all die in Egypt. Similar strategic concerns underpinned his views on belligerent rights at sea, an issue he would have occasion to fight over in less than eighteen months.