Nelson: Britannia's God of War (55 page)

On 15 September the wind came round and the
Victory
left Spithead, accompanied by Blackwood’s frigate
Euryalus,
then coasted for Plymouth to pick up two more battleships. Nelson was soon working on his official correspondence: there were presents and a royal letter for the Emperor of Morocco, offered in the hope of securing supplies for the fleet and the garrison at Gibraltar, along with intelligence of enemy movements. With Portugal under severe Franco-Spanish pressure, Morocco was the last source of water and fresh food near the Straits.
¹
The Vice Consul at Tangier, James Matra, had just persuaded the Moroccans to relax their ban on food exports.
²

Nor did Nelson forget those he left behind:

However, his head always overruled his heart: he had actively sought this return to sea, anxious that no one else should reap the rewards he saw as his right. Once he was out to sea, his letters to Emma returned to their usual subject-matter of fleets, winds and professional concerns.
⁴

With the Combined Fleet in Cadiz, Nelson faced the age-old problem of persuading a reluctant enemy to come out to sea, where they
could be brought to battle. French and Spanish fleets had rarely chosen to face the risk in the preceding twelve years. Nelson’s hopes of getting them to do so rested on a combination of possibilities and pressures. He would disguise his own arrival, and the strength of his fleet, hoping they might feel strong enough to face battle. He could also develop the strategy that Collingwood had applied, of an increasingly rigorous blockade: hunger and the lack of naval stores might leave the enemy with little option but to sail, or see the fleet reduced to a ruinous condition. Collingwood had extended the blockade to the small ports close by Cadiz.
⁵
While Castlereagh agreed to a closer blockade, he stressed that it was only applicable if the ports were actually stopped up, and he reminded Nelson that the political cost of awkward relations with neutrals had to be borne in mind.
⁶

Nelson would also review the offensive options. A direct attack on Cadiz harbour was out of the question: though Drake had managed it in 1587, and Lord Howard in 1596, the defences had been greatly enhanced since then. Nelson had lain off Cadiz long enough in 1797 to know that the best option was long-range bombardment using mortar vessels. There were also two brand new options: the developed Congreve rockets, and the floating carcasses, or mines, of the American inventor Robert Fulton, then using the cover name ‘Mr Francis’. On the day Nelson resumed command, Castlereagh had sent him a note from Francis, who wanted to discuss his carcasses, which ‘might do much execution in many cases of blockade’.
⁷
Nelson was not overly enthusiastic about these new weapons, and despite some experiments at Boulogne, they would not be used in battle until after his death.

Off Lisbon on 25 September, Nelson urged Sutton to keep quiet about his movements, while Blackwood went ahead with a request that Collingwood should not salute him, or any other newly arrived ships. Two days later, Nelson rounded Cape St Vincent and entered his station. He fixed the fleet rendezvous off Cadiz, with a secondary location at Tangier. Late the following day he was off Cadiz, where he spent his forty-seventh birthday. He would not have been anywhere else for a king’s ransom, even ‘paradise Merton’. Having refused the offer of a seventy-four, Blackwood, the senior frigate captain, took command of the inshore watch.

Many officers came to pay their respects, and the more senioramong them dined that night. Fremantle of the
Neptune
was greatly
pleased to be given the place he had held at Copenhagen, as Nelson’s second astern. Back on board the following day, to dine with the remaining captains, Fremantle ‘never spent a pleasanter day’.
⁸
Duff, of the
Mars
, agreed: ‘A very merry dinner. He certainly is the pleasantest Admiral I ever served under.’
⁹
Both men were contrasting the social opportunities Nelson provided with the complete absence of such occasions under Collingwood, who as Edward Codrington of the
Orion
observed, ‘never communicates with anybody but upon service’. Codrington had longed for Nelson to resume command, ‘that I may once in my life see a Commander in Chief endeavouring to make a hard and disagreeable service as palatable to those serving under him as circumstances will admit of, and by keeping up by his example that animation so necessary for such occasions’.
¹⁰
Even Calder was preferable to Collingwood: his last dinner brought together twenty captains who showed ‘a strong desire to support each other cordially and manfully in the event of a battle’.
¹¹

Despite the presence of old friends, Nelson had taken command of a largely unknown fleet – most of the ships and captains had been detached from the Channel fleet, and consequently many had little experience of battle. He could rely on Collingwood, Louis, Fremantle, Hallowell and Berry, but there were many men whose conduct and capabilities were unknown. Nelson used these dinners with his captains to expound the tactical ideas he had already discussed with Keats and Sidmouth. The vital briefing was verbal:

Before the prospect of an offensive action in Italy could be considered, Nelson had to address the danger from the Combined Fleet. The latest intelligence from Portugal reported that Bonaparte had issued sailing orders, but a Council of War had decided that this was not possible. Local sources reported growing Franco-Spanish friction, and that Admiral Decrès was coming to take command.
¹³
Much of the news was inaccurate, a garbled version of reality. Nelson was still short of ships. The enemy had thirty-five or thirty-six, while he had twenty-three, allowing for the six he needed to send for food and water.
¹⁴
Admiral William Young, now Commander in Chief at
Plymouth, reported rumours that the enemy would be forced to sea by hunger: his only fear was that the Brest fleet might head south, so Cornwallis had better be ready.
¹⁵

After his discussions about weapons with Castlereagh, Nelson examined the prospects for an attack. It was possible the rockets might work: the Combined Fleet was crowded into the harbour area and might be hurried out by a bombardment, although he still put his faith in hunger. He adopted Collingwood’s practice of detaining the Danish ships, then trying to get into the smaller local ports with French supplies from Bordeaux. The only purpose of the blockade was to force the enemy out.
¹⁶

Rumours of an impending small ship attack were soon circulating, and ambitious young officers pressed forward to volunteer.
¹⁷
Royal Marine Artillerymen were coming for the two bomb vessels, fireships would follow and Blackwood was already working out how to use them: ‘I am very glad to learn your Lordship intends to make the place too hot for them.’ While sifting the best intelligence he could obtain on the winds and currents off Cadiz, both to anticipate the enemy putting to sea and to consider a fireship, carcass and rocket attack, Nelson warned Blackwood to be ready, but to keep the news to himself: ‘there is no occasion for putting the enemy on their guard’. With two bomb vessels he would have a useful offensive force.
¹⁸

As soon as he took command Nelson was immersed in a veritable blizzard of paperwork: ‘with the business of such a fleet I am not very idle’.
¹⁹
On his birthday he spent seven hours writing, most of it routine fleet administration, and the load rarely lightened. Admiral Knight at Gibraltar summed up the effect when he confessed that Nelson’s return had relieved him of a burden of responsibility that had made him ill.
²⁰
Food and water were pressing problems, with so many ships so far from a major port or naval base. The only way to keep the force efficient was to send the ships away in rotation to revictual. Six battleships left the fleet on 3 October; three days later the next six ships had been nominated. Meanwhile, store ships and newly arrived units were distributing supplies round the fleet. 10 October was a particularly hard day in the office, with a mass of standing orders and paperwork passing Nelson’s desk. Perhaps the most significant was a new form for reporting the casualties of battle in the manner required by Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund; this would ensure early payment for sufferers, and the bereaved.
²¹

The human dimension of fleet command was equally important to Nelson. His concern for his juniors, together with his anxiety to reward good service and promote the best men, made him the favourite admiral of every brave officer. He, like every admiral, had his favourites, but they were almost all men of the highest talent. When one of them, Sam Sutton, was invalided home from the
Amphion
, Nelson replaced him with Norfolk protégé William Hoste, who turned over his current command to Nelson’s nephew Sir William Bolton.
²²
When Berry turned up in the
Agamemnon
on 13 October Blackwood observed, ‘Berry is such [a] bird of good fortune, that now he is arrived I feel that the enemy will make a bolt – which God send.’
²³

The impact of one supremely charismatic man on old friends and new devotees created a unique professional harmony in the fleet in a matter of days – no one else could have generated the same enthusiasm. To mirror this transformation of morale, the captains chose to paint their ships
à
la
Nelson. His black and yellow colour scheme, with the gun-decks picked out by a thick black line, gave ships a chequerboard appearance when the gunports were lowered. In future years it would be the norm for all fleets. Codrington had been so impressed by the state of the ships of the old Mediterranean squadron that he had already done so, once he thought the
Orion
fit for the honour.
²⁴

*

Bonaparte’s orders for the fleet to sail reached Cadiz on 26 September. Gravina reported fourteen Spanish ships ready, but reports that three more ships had joined Collingwood changed Villeneuve’s mind. He did not yet know that the three-decked ship carried his nemesis, only that the enemy seemed to have thirty-one sail, far too many for his motley armada of thirty-three to deal with. On 2 October intelligence from Lisbon revealed that Nelson had arrived, with plans to attack, bombard or burn the Combined Fleet. There was little security for any supposedly secret measures. In response Villeneuve prepared a harbour defence flotilla. Although he could not see Nelson, or his fleet, he knew what lay just over the horizon. On 7 October the allied flag officers met in council: Gravina and the Spanish officers considered the enemy outside was not an ‘inferior force’; and therefore they were not obliged to seek battle. Some French officers agreed, but others condemned such opinions, impugning Spanish honour and courage. The inevitable argument only ended when Gravina called a vote. They decided to stay put.

Admiral Lord Collingwood

 

At the same time Nelson, now aware that the Continental war was about to begin, had to prepare for a longer watch off Cadiz. This meant he had to detach a fifth of his fleet to resupply, or risk having to retreat and allow the enemy out. He would accept battle with an inferior force. Although Blackwood reported soldiers being embarked and every preparation for sea, he detached Rear Admiral Louis with six battleships to replenish their food and water, look at Cartagena and cover a convoy bound for Malta. His sympathetic and inspirational handling of Louis, who was desperate to stay, showed his charm and wit at their very best. Louis left on 3 October, taking with him Hallowell in the
Tigre
, halving the number of Nile veterans among the senior officers. Nor were the needs of his fleet his only concern. The entire Mediterranean theatre demanded Nelson’s attention: if the situation off Cadiz was not resolved soon Malta, Naples and Sardinia would begin to draw off his forces. Little wonder he was anxious for battle.