Ostkrieg (98 page)

21
. Halder,
War Diary
, 22–29 June 1941, 410–32; Bock,
War Diary
, 22–29 June, 2 July 1941, 224–33, 235–36; Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 76–77, 94;
TBJG
, 28–30 June 1941; Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 531–32, 536. Soviet figures put the losses at 340,000 men, or half the strength of the Western Front at the outset of the invasion, 4,800 tanks, and 9,400 guns and mortars, figures higher even than the Germans estimated. Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 60.

22
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 537–41; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 45–46; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 42–46.

23
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 546–69; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 47–49; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 46–53.

24
. Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 55; Stolfi, “Barbarossa Revisited,” 35–36, and
Hitler's Panzers East
.

25
. Halder,
War Diary
, 3 July 1941, 446–47; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 146–47.

26
. Kroener, “Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs,” 567–69; “Sonderakte,” in Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 4 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1020; “Vortragsnotiz über die Besetzung und Sicherung des russischen Raumes und über den Umbau des Heeres nach Abschluß Barbarossa,” in ibid., 15 July 1941, 1022–25; “Besprechung Chef OKW mit den Wehrmachtteilen am 16. 8. 41 über Die Auswirkung der Richtlinien des Führers vom 14. 7. 41 sowie die Durchführbarkeit der sich daraus ergebenden neuen Schwerpunkt-Programme,” in ibid., 16 August 1941, 1047–54; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 149–50; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 219; Reinhardt,
Moscow—the Turning Point
, 26–31, 40–43.

27
. Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 147; Halder,
War Diary
, 8 July 1941, 458;
TBJG
, 9 July 1941; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 400–404; Jochmann, ed.,
Monologe im Führerhauptquartier
, 5–6, 11–12, 27 July, 1–2, 8–11, 19–20 August, 17–19, 22–26 September 1941, 38–71; Jürgen Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1235.

28
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 403–4; Jochmann,
Monologe im Führerhauptquartier
, 23–26 September 1941, 66–71.

29
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 404–5; Jochmann,
Monologe im Führerhauptquartier
, 23–28 September 1941, 65–72; Fritz,
Frontsoldaten
, 187–218, and “ ‘We are trying . . . to change the face of the world.' ”

For interpretations that emphasize Hitler's modernity, see Zitelmann,
Hitler;
and Prinz and Zitelmann, eds.,
Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung
. See also Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, introduction, chaps. 2, 5; Smelser, “How ‘Modern' Were the Nazis?”; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 1–10; and Aly,
Hitler's Beneficiaries
.

30
. Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 462–63; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 448. See also Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, passim.

31
. Jochmann,
Monologe im Führerhauptquartier
, 13 October 1941, 78; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 434; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 469–70. For a comparison of Nazi Germany's conduct to that of historical colonial powers, see Zimmerer, “Holocaust und Kolonialismus.” For a more critical assessment of this interpretation, see Gerwarth and Malinowski, “Der Holocaust als ‘kolonialer Genozid'?” and “Hannah Arendt's Ghosts.”

32
. Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 466–76; Aly,
“Final Solution
,” 149–60; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 253–55; Pohl,
Von der “Judenpolitik” zum Judenmord
, 89, 95–97; Schulte,
Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung
, 248; Madajczyk, “Synchronismus.” On Generalplan Ost, see Madajczyk and Biernacki, eds.,
Generalplan Ost;
Rössler and Schleiermacher, eds.,
Der “Generalplan Ost”;
and Wasser,
Himmlers Raumplanung im Osten
.

33
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–56, 268–77, and “Controlled Escalation”; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 452–53; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 141, 179; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 28–33. See also Matthäus,
Ausbildungsziel Judenmord?
and Kwiet, “Erziehung zum Mord,” “From the Diary of a Killing Unit,” and “Rehearsing for Murder.”

34
. Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 142–43, 151–78; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256–59; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–71; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 454–55, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 463–64.

35
. Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 38–54; Diary of SS-Hauptscharführer Felix Landau, 7 July 1941, in Dollinger, ed.,
Kain, wo ist dein Bruder?
87–88; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256, 268–77; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 68–69; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 463–64.

36
. Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 5–6, and
Keine Kameraden
, 110–12; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–69; Stahlberg,
Bounden Duty
, 159; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 260; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 184, 204–14, 226, 237, 249–51, 278; Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 405–6; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 90–92.

While agreeing with the central theme of Wehrmacht cooperation with and participation in these criminal actions, Christian Hartmann nonetheless makes an important distinction between frontline troops and those in the rear: much the greater part of Wehrmacht crimes were committed by security divisions or units behind the front. See Hartmann,
Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg
, 675–98, and “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?”

37
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 180, 189–90.

38
. Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 142–43; Schulte, “Korück 582,” and
German Army
, 69–85, 117–49; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 8–9, and
Keine Kameraden
, 42–44; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1211–16.

39
. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1189–1234.

40
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hitler quoted in Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 25.

On Soviet atrocities, see De Zayas,
Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle
, 273–77, 284; Rass,
“Menschenmaterial
,” 334; and Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes.” It has been estimated that 90–95 percent of German prisoners of war perished in 1941–1942 (De Zayas,
Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle
, 277).

On the propaganda uses of alleged Soviet atrocities, see generally the entries in
TBJG
for July 1941 (quote from entry of 17 July 1941). Two days earlier, Goebbels had asserted, “Just as every soldier returns from Poland as an anti-Semite, so they will come back from the Soviet Union as an anti-Bolshevik.”

41
. Prüller,
Diary of a German Soldier
, 5 July 1941, 75; Richardson, ed.,
Sieg Heil!
3 August 1941, 122; Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 136–38. See also Schulte,
German Army
, 117–49, 211–33.

42
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1189–1234; quote from Manoschek,
“Es gibt nur eines für das Judentum
,” 33. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 271–72. The letter was eventually displayed in the show windows of various Viennese businesses (ibid., 292 n. 62).

43
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 30–31; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1189–1234; Pohl,
Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien
, 45–47; Sandkühler,
“Endlösung” in Galizien
, 114–16; Schulte,
German Army
, 234–39; Diary entries of Robert Neumann, 7 July, 5, 7 October 1941, in Dollinger, ed.,
Kain, wo ist dein Bruder?
88, 100–101.

44
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1189–1234; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 6–7; Förster, “Hitler Turns East,” 130.

On the complexities of the partisan war, see Anderson, “Die 62. Infanterie-Division,” and “Germans, Ukrainians and Jews”; Birn, “Two Kinds of Reality?”; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 19–20, 24–30, 49–57, and
Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg
, 383 (quote).

While the army's criminal culpability as an institution is extensive, and despite the spread of racist ideology through the ranks, it is well to remember that only a strikingly small percentage of Landsers actively participated in the murders of Jews. As Christian Hartmann has argued, soldiers, especially those at the front, primarily focused on daily war tasks and the problem of survival. See Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 17–20, 31–32, 64–74. See also Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 151, 169–71, and “Die Wehrmacht und der Mord,” 50.

45
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 288–94; Gerlach,
Kalkulierte Morde
, 587–88, 593, 609–13, 628–39; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 73–74; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 275–82; Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 377–79; Schulte,
German Army
, 224–34.

46
. Wette,
Die Wehrmacht
, 115–17; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 162–69; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 141–54; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 71–75; “Auszüge aus verschiedenen ‘Ereignismeldungen UdSSR' über die Tätigkeit der Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, und D im Osten vom Juli 1941 bis zum März 1942,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 314–22. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 260–96; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?”; and Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew.”

47
. Wette,
Die Wehrmacht
, 118–19; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 498–506; Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew,” 53; Klee and Dressen, eds.,
“Gott mit uns
,” 118, 127.

48
. Wette,
Die Wehrmacht
, 119–20; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 164–65; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 493; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 128, 3 November 1941,” in Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 68; Klee and Dressen, eds.,
“Gott mit uns
,” 119.

49
. Wette,
Die Wehrmacht
, 120–28; “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 490–95; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 63–68; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 106, 7 October 1941,” in Klee and Dressen, eds.,
“Gott mit uns
,” 132 (see generally 117–36); Krasnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 237; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 92.

50
. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1217–18, and “Hitler Turns East,” 130;
Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 259–64, 277–78; Krausnick,
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen
, 195–224; Anderson, “Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews,” 339–40; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 69–70; Polian, “First Victims of the Holocaust”; Fleming,
Hitler and the Final Solution
, 73–74; Jochmann,
Monologe im Führerhauptquartier
, 25 October 1941, 106; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 464, and
Fateful Choices
, 457; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 7.

51
.
TBJG
, 8 July 1941; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 469–70, and
Fateful Choices
, 434–36, 455; Förster, “Securing Living Space,” 1237.

52
. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1237; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 434–36; Friedländer,
Nazi Germany and the Jews
, 1:84–90.

53
. “Geheime Absichtserklärungen zur künftigen Ostpolitik: Auszug aus einem Aktenvermerk von Reichsleiter M. Bormann vom 16. 7. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 330–31; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 309–10; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 265–66; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1235–36; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 148–49; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 405.