Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (28 page)

Significantly, the political chatter seldom has an Islamic flavor to it. A number of factors have combined to impede the politicization of Islam in Qatar. Unlike Saudi Arabia, in Qatar religion historically did not play a role in the process of state formation. An absence of major urban centers also impeded the development of prominent centers of religious learning and philosophy. Today, most religious clerics in Qatar are actually from South Asia or from other Arab countries. They are, in effect, migrant workers whose residency permits can be revoked if they step out of line. More important, the state often uses the ministries of Awqaf, education, and justice for purposes of incorporating nationals with Islamist tendencies and to ensure the nurturing of a “government-friendly Islam” that finds expression in Friday prayer sermons across the country’s mosques.
⁸³
The state’s patronage of Yusuf Qaradawi, one of contemporary Islam’s most outspoken and most controversial clerics, has also done much to blunt possibilities of antistate sentiments from Islamic quarters.

Like all other states, the Qatari state faces constraints on its agendas and its policies by actors and currents in Qatari society, as well as from those emanating from the international arena. But the specific set of societal constraints faced by the Qatari state are relatively mild and deal mostly with issues of less direct significance to overall state policy. Qatari politics remain largely low-intensity, and state capacity is constrained by the availability of resources and the scope of ambition rather than by structural or political contractions narrowing the purview of state goals and agendas.

Conclusion

State capacity is far from constant and varies over time depending on the constellation of international and domestic forces with which the state has to contend. Neither is state capacity uniform in both the domestic and international arenas, nor across all areas of state operations domestically and internationally. In Qatar’s case, state capacity has been increasingly on the rise since Hamad bin Khalifa’s assumption of power in 1995, thanks largely to steady rises in oil and gas prices, growing cohesion and internal discipline within the Al Thanis, focused and carefully calculated policymaking, and the state’s effective inclusion of private capital and social actors in its developmental projects and its larger agendas of high modernism. Increased state capacity and deepened political consolidation have gone hand-in-hand with the robustness of state-society ties, increasing as the state has worked with the private and semi-private sectors to implement its developmental agendas.

Throughout, the state has kept its ears close to the ground—whether through the state intelligence service monitoring chatter in public or in cyberspace or through the private
majlis
es, or both—listening to “the street” intently to ensure that its normative gap with society does not widen beyond comfortable levels. Whenever through newspaper articles or letters to the editor scattered voices are heard about the “threat” of being a minority inside Qatar, for example, a statement is usually soon issued by some government ministry or official concerning a new push for Qatarization. In the late 2000s, complaints began surfacing about Sheikha Moza’s highly visible profile internationally and what it meant for the powers and influence of her large and influential family, the Al Misnids. In January 2011, she officially dropped Al Misnid from her last name and simply became Sheikha Moza bint Nasser. All state entities were subsequently instructed to use her new proper name. The state may be autocratic, and it may have had astounding success so far in bringing about high modernism, but it is also responsive to popular sensibilities.

That the state has the capacity to carry out high modernist projects of great ambition, and that in the process it has further cemented its ties to actors across Qatari society, is not questionable. What is open to question is the validity of the “build them and they will come” assumption underlying the state’s aggressive pursuit of high modernism. Are the new cities and islands being built simply to keep up with Dubai and Abu Dhabi or are they being built in response to genuine needs and thought-out developmental trajectories? Does it matter why they are being built as long as they are changing the geography and the physical landscape of the country? There is no single correct answer to these questions. What is certain is that Qatar is now developing a robust domestic infrastructure to go with its high profile diplomacy and its emerging status as one of the Middle East’s—and indeed one of the world’s—most influential players.

6

Q
ATAR
’
S
M
OMENT IN
H
ISTORY

Are Qatar’s powers and influence in the Middle East and elsewhere ephemeral or lasting? This was the question with which I started the book. This volume has demonstrated how the center of gravity in the Middle East has steadily shifted toward the Persian Gulf, and how within the Persian Gulf Qatar enjoys a number of comparative advantages that have propelled it to the top. This ascendance has been made possible through the acquisition and exertion of what may be called subtle power, arising from careful and strategic use of international investments, financial influence, and diplomacy. Qatar has been using this power to push through its agendas of buying international friends and allies, asserting its leadership role within the Arab world, setting agendas in international and even national forums, and, wherever possible—whether it is in Lebanon, Libya, Syria, or elsewhere—carving out for itself spheres of influence.

This subtle power in the international arena is reinforced by a solid domestic base thanks largely to the steady consolidation of Al Thani rule, increasing discipline and cohesion within the ruling inner-circle, and the institutionalization and codification of Hamad bin Khalifa’s vision of Qatar’s future. That future is one of ultra-modernism, continued hyper-growth, and physical and infrastructural expansion, all accompanied by and made possible through steadily expansive state capacity. Needless to say, the Al Thanis see themselves and their continued rule as an integral part of the future.

By all accounts, what has been accomplished so far in the fields of diplomacy, international finance, domestic politics, and economic growth, have been remarkable and impressive. Ever-expansive oil and gas revenues have no doubt helped mask lingering inefficiencies in the state sector, and chatter about nepotism and the appointment of incompetent paper pushers to key civil service positions remains widespread. But the state’s accomplishments on multiple economic, political, and diplomatic levels, and its overall efficacy and effectiveness in achieving the goals it sets for itself, cannot be denied.

This concluding chapter tackles the question of the durability of Qatar’s power and influence. Qatar may not be a mere blip on the radar, but how durable is its prominent regional and international position likely to be? And, domestically, how viable is the “Qatar model” likely to be in the long run? Does the consolidation of Al Thani rule and the increasing expansion of state capacity equate with a continuation of, and ultimate success of, the country’s ambitious project of high modernism?

Lessons from Qatar

Before delving into the prospects of Qatar’s fortunes, it may be worth reiterating some of the main theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from my analysis of the country. Specifically, I believe my research has yielded five significant conclusions. The first two conclusions have to do with the size of a state and the form(s) of power it may come to acquire and project. In international relations small size need not necessarily be a hindrance to power and influence. Small states are not always on the receiving end of international power. Some can become quite consequential and—under the right set of circumstances—may in fact exert different kinds of power.

Second, this kind of power may not always square perfectly with our preexisting conceptions of hard, soft, and smart varieties of power. Such notions of power do not adequately capture the emergent power and influence of countries such as Qatar, whose investments are actively courted and which in subtle ways can influence and frame agendas. In today’s international relations, subtle power may be as much of a factor in influencing outcomes as hard or soft power.

Third, the acquisition and exercise of subtle power is as much a product of carefully crafted use of available financial resources and diplomacy as it is due to context, opportunities, and structural conditions. Agency matters. And it matters even more in shaping outcomes in developing political systems, where personal initiatives directly influence the viability of such institutions as the ruling family, the state and its constituent organizations, and the nature, direction, and intensity of projects of high modernism meant to engineer entire societies.

A related, fourth conclusion has to do with the transferability of the developmental state model. With the developmental state seen as a product of specific historical and political developments in East Asia, it is often assumed that “there exist major constrains on its transferability to or replicability in alternative national contexts.”
¹
But the Qatari state exhibits all the characteristics of a classical developmental state, and so does its closest relative, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
²
Clearly, the Qatari state is unique in the inordinate amount of wealth it has at its disposal. But it also possesses seemingly single-minded vision, clearly articulated developmental objectives, tremendous intra-elite cohesion, and a robust set of linkages between strategically placed social actors and critical state or state-related agencies. Whatever its merits, Qatar currently possesses its own variety of a developmental state.

All of this points to a rather obvious fifth conclusion. Whether as a social science construct or an actual entity, the state is not about to dissipate anytime soon. In fact, far from rendering the state obsolete or eroding its powers, globalization has significantly strengthened some states by enabling them to carve out a specific niche for themselves in the international political economy. That the state is nowhere near being eclipsed was established as far back as the mid-1980s, when the historical sociologist Peter Evans and others successfully brought it back into the fore of analysis.
³
But what the Qatari case shows us is that even in the post–Arab Spring Middle East, an authoritarian state can be both quite durable and popular. It bears repeating that popularity appears to have much to do with durability, especially if it is rooted in strategic alliances with social actors whose positions of affluence and prestige and whose economic well-being are closely tied to the personalist state’s policies and institutions.

Qatar’s Future

What does all of this mean for Qatar in the coming years? The durability of Qatar’s preeminent position within the larger Middle East and in the Persian Gulf in particular, and the viability and success of its high modernism project, pivot on two main factors: contingency and agency. More specifically, the question of Qatar’s continued ability to capitalize on its strategic assets and opportunities, and at the same time to fulfill the promises of its high modernist projects, depend in large measure on several independent variables. These tend to fall into the two broad categories of domestic and international developments.

Domestically, the success or failure of Qatar’s high modernist project depends overwhelmingly, if not entirely, on the vision, strategic priorities, and resourcefulness of the country’s next generation of leaders after the current emir departs from the scene. Sheikh Hamad has not been just a wily, crafty politician. He has been the driving force behind what Qatar has become today. With multiple and expansive institutional and organizational accouterments being added to the state every day, Hamad may no longer personify Louis XIV’s dictum of “L’Etat, c’est moi.” But he does personify all that Qatar and its ambitions for rapid modernization and progress stand for. Will Sheikh Tamim, the heir apparent, share the same vision and drive, the same contagious enthusiasm, the same navigatory craftiness? Only time will tell.

What will become of the high modernist drive is less uncertain. The intensity and zeal of the multiple high modernist projects underway may change, but the facts on the ground will not. Qatar’s physical landscape is being forever changed, and the cities going up in the sky and the islands being created in the sea will neither wither away nor sink. The very creation of infrastructures where none existed before—of roads and schools, water desalination plants and new public spaces—will permanently change the lives of Qataris, in the same way, for example, that the widespread introduction and use of air-conditioning did in the 1960s and the 1970s.

There is no reason to share the pessimism of James C. Scott with regard to the project of high modernism underway in Qatar. Scott contends that high modernist projects invariably end up in tragedies of national proportion or, at best, ultimately worsen the lives of those meant to benefit from them.
⁴
Undoubtedly, the physical and geographic changes underway in Qatar are only bound to aggravate the country’s strained ecosystem.
⁵
Already, Qatar leads the world in per capita electricity consumption and CO2 emissions.
⁶
But long-term environmental damage is not perceived by the average Qatari as a catastrophe in the making or even a point of concern. And questions about the prudence of all the buildings going up in Doha and its environs, about whether they will become white elephants or sources of national progress and pride, have taken a backseat to the hype and excitement of real estate speculation and the glitz of gleaming buildings. The wholesale importation of Western and especially US educational establishments, and the rapid implementation of profound changes to the country’s educational system, is similarly done with little or no study of their long-term impacts. Qatar’s high modernism may be a product of bad or shortsighted public policy. But unpopular, or negatively perceived, it is not.

At least for the foreseeable future, Qatar’s prospects for continued growth, especially compared to its regional neighbors, appear quite positive. Across the Arabian Peninsula, despite phenomenal transformations and development in recent decades, vulnerabilities remain. Given their overreliance on hydrocarbon exports, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been vulnerable to cycles of boom and bust.
⁷
The one thing certain about oil is the uncertainty of its prices.
⁸
States with a fragile resource base in particular—most notably Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia—can face serious challenges in times of economic downturns. The existence of numerous “fault-lines” and “fissures,” along sectarian lines for example, can “heighten regime vulnerability to future politicization and contestation if resource scarcities develop and persist.”
⁹

But this is not the case with Qatar. The state has inordinate resources at its disposal in proportion to its national population. Throughout the 2000s, when the price of oil hovered around or above $100 a barrel, Qatari authorities based the country’s national budget and their spending estimates on oil prices far below oil’s actual market price, sometimes nearly by half.
¹⁰
Even when oil and gas prices dipped, and in times when the private sector suffered, as it did in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global financial meltdown, the state’s resources remained robust enough for it to maintain previous levels of spending and, more important, patronage and social welfare. Unless the world suddenly stops its reliance on hydrocarbons altogether, Qatar’s comparative financial health appears secured.

The bigger question marks remain in relation to Qatar’s diplomacy and international relations. With its proactive diplomacy and its attempts to exercise subtle power, is Qatar biting off more than it can chew? Is Qatar running the risk of overreach? The country has taken a number of controversial stands on contentious issues without, it seems, having fully considered the consequences. For example, in 2011 Qatar played perhaps the most prominent and public role of all Arab states in helping Libyan rebels overthrow Colonel Qaddafi. Later that year and in the following year, Qatar similarly led the effort—this time through the Arab League—in expediting the demise of the Assad regime in Syria. In Libya, some of the estimated twenty thousand tons of Qatari weapons and equipment sent to support the anti-Qaddafi rebels—by one estimate amounting to $400 million
¹¹
—ended up in the hands of Islamist groups with goals and objectives inimical to Qatar’s stated policies.
¹²
Although there is a possibility that this may be part of a calculated strategy to pursue complex political objectives—in both instances, Qatar appears to be supporting comparatively moderate Islamist groups to prop them up against more extremist, Salafist elements
¹³
—it appears more a result of unintended consequences of decisions not fully thought out and carelessly implemented. Whether or not Qatari leaders have given due consideration to the consequences of their actions in relation to Syria is similarly open to question.

There does appear to be a somewhat deeper logic at work here in guiding the foreign policy objectives of Qatari leaders. This is particularly evident with regard to the initial decision to become involved in Libya and Syria. In fact, it is here where we see the most direct manifestations of Qatari subtle power at work, when the country begins cashing in on the power and influence it had accumulated over time. Aware of their growing stature and influence regionally and beyond, Qatari leaders had begun their deliberate maneuvers for regional influence a number of years ago. An example occurred in 2008–2009, when through its mediation and investments Qatar sought to position itself favorably among Lebanon’s contentious factions and to slowly replace Saudi Arabia’s influence with its own. Ultimately, however, Saudi influence in Lebanon proved too pervasive to be easily dislodged. Similar efforts in Yemen and the Sudan met with equally ephemeral success. Throughout the 2000s, Qatari leaders continued to amass subtle power through deepening the combination of resources at their disposal, aggressively expanding their investments, fine-tuning their branding efforts and their national narrative, securing their image of indispensability to regional peace and stability, and steadily positioning themselves as one of the region’s most consequential agenda-setters. At around the same time, those who were their primary competitors—most notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran—were in deep morass or, worse yet, about to be engulfed in revolution. When the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010, Qatar was perfectly positioned to deploy the powers it had steadily accumulated over the previous decade and a half.