Sears faced an uphill battle for the bulk of New York’s delegates. Many of the uncommitted delegates were ready to switch their status, but they were presumed to support either Ford or Nelson Rockefeller, rather than Reagan. The
New York
Times
asked Rockefeller if he might yet become a candidate. Instead of offering a flat “no,” the cagey old pol simply said, “I don’t see that scenario.”
21
Some good news for Ford came in a poll conducted for conservative Senator Jim Buckley by Arthur Finkelstein which showed the President to be more popular with the New York Republicans than either Reagan or Rockefeller.
22
New Jersey’s Republicans were also anxiously awaiting a better effort from Ford in the primaries. Early on, Reagan’s campaign had written off its chances there, as New Jersey had a long tradition of electing moderate to liberal Republicans. The entire lineup of elected GOP officials was supporting Ford. A handful of moderates and liberals including Assembly Speaker Thomas Kean, U.S. Senator Clifford Case, and three Congressmen—including pipe-smoking Millicent Fenwick—had climbed aboard the Ford bandwagon in early March.
23
Although the delegates would technically run as uncommitted, the GOP machine in New Jersey would control whom they voted for in Kansas City.
24
A small, disorganized group of New Jersey conservatives was attempting to file slates for Reagan in some of the more favorable areas. But they had little money and no support or direction from the Washington office of Citizens for Reagan. Sixty-seven delegates were at stake. Of the four big industrial states where the Reagan campaign would make only a half-hearted effort—New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey—Sears reasoned that Reagan had the least chance of winning or bargaining for delegates in New Jersey. “Despite Mr. Ford’s recent losses to the former California Governor in Indiana and the South and the political trouble the President is believed to be in in his home state of Michigan, New Jersey is regarded as a strong Ford state. ‘What we anticipate is that New Jersey will be the President’s trump card,’ a Republican leader said this afternoon,” wrote the
New York Times
.
25
Internal strife within Ford’s operation deepened. One side believed he was squandering the advantages of incumbency and called for pulling him back from too much campaigning. Yet the other side argued just as vociferously that he needed to take to the road and fight by calling Reagan an “extremist,” a “demagogue,” and a “zealot.”
Eventually, a hybrid emerged, with Ford campaigning aggressively on the road. Instead of talking down Reagan, he would talk up his and his Administration’s accomplishments. It would be a departure from the barbs the two were leveling at each other. Ford had told one audience, “Reagan and I both played football. I played for Michigan and he played for Warner Brothers.”
26
Reagan said, “Well at least when I played football, I played with my helmet on.”
27
According to all media reports, Reagan was comfortably ahead of Ford in the delegate count, but the “x-factor” was the uncommitted delegates and whether or not state party bosses could control them. Further, most believed at the time that neither man would have enough delegates for a first ballot nomination. The Republican Party faced the real possibility of its first brokered convention in years.
Despite enacting their “Scenario Number Two” strategy to replace the failed quick knockout strategy, poor planning by the Reagan campaign would come back to haunt them in the delegate rich states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey. An earlier effort to target congressional districts in conservative areas within those states might have yielded the campaign more delegates than they eventually received. By not organizing in these states, the campaign also overlooked the effect some Reagan delegates may have had as “inside” lobbyists within their individual delegations prior to and at the convention.
But the Reagan campaign was encouraged in states like Colorado and Missouri, which appeared to have uncommitted delegates who were open to persuasion. Reports from these states indicated that Reagan’s recent surge was giving delegates pause, as they considered seriously the candidacy of the Californian. The White House and President Ford Committee heard these reports too and found them disquieting. “There is a developing trend for people we had counted on in the caucus states to move to an uncommitted posture,” said one worried Ford official.
28
Ford had decided to continue his high road strategy by “acting Presidential” and would only refer to Reagan obliquely, for the most part. However, each time a White House aide would announce to the media that Ford was “acting Presidential” or “being Presidential,” this would only serve to undermine his credibility further with the American people as being somehow phony.
29
The Ford high command also decided that Reagan had been given the upper hand for too long in the campaign, especially on matters of foreign policy and national defense. They decided that Ford needed to start making his own headlines on these issues. Reagan had been dominating the debate ever since North Carolina. As Senator Bob Dole of Kansas told Elizabeth Drew, “Reagan has been running both campaigns, his and Ford’s. He lays out the issues, and Ford responds.”
30
Ford kicked off his new offensive with a speech in which he promised to keep the military “not strong for the sake of war, but strong for the sake of peace.”
31
To help jump-start his flagging campaign, a resolution was prepared by Republican members of Congress that praised Ford for striving “effectively for a strong national defense.” Every member of the Republican leadership on Capitol Hill save one, Congressman John Rhodes of Arizona, signed it.
32
The President headed to Michigan for several days of intensive campaigning, with quick side trips to Tennessee and Kentucky, where later primaries were to be held.
Meanwhile, an interesting story broke when it was learned that Soviet agents had made overtures to the Carter campaign, expressing outright opposition to the prospect of the nomination of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson on the Democratic side and dismay over Ford’s recent retreat from détente. The Soviets also suggested to Carter’s aides that they could possibly pursue policies that could affect the outcome of the election so as to favor Carter.
33
The Soviets blamed Reagan for publicly embarrassing Ford into a new, tougher stance against them.
It wasn’t the first time the Soviets had attempted to influence the outcome of an American Presidential election. In 1960, it was generally assumed that the Soviets delayed the release of American U-2 pilot Gary Powers until after the election to help John F. Kennedy defeat Richard Nixon. The Soviets had also tried to affect the outcome in 1968 to help Hubert Humphrey defeat Richard Nixon. But by 1972, the Soviets had developed a taste for Nixon’s policies and, as the
New
York Times
wrote, “showered attention and friendship on Mr. Nixon in his race against McGovern.”
34
The Ford White House was also taking a tougher stance against Reagan and any Democratic candidates for that matter, since a bill reconstituting the Federal Election Commission had yet to be signed by the President. Reagan’s campaign estimated that the FEC owed them approximately $2.2 million dollars in matching funds. Reagan’s debts, around $1.2 million, were mounting daily.
35
Charlie Black again was faced with running a threadbare effort, this time in Michigan, as he had been in Wisconsin, Illinois, and the other states in his region. He was doubly unfortunate because in most of his states, there were no homegrown grassroots organizations—like those that had emerged in North Carolina and Texas—to carry the load for the cash-strapped national campaign of Ronald Reagan. Spirits were high in the Reagan campaign, but if some money didn’t loosen up quickly, they would be facing a fresh set of problems.
36
Despite his string of losses, Ford still could marshal all the powers of his office and the party while Reagan had only his conservative message, which jibed with the attitudes of the American people. According to a poll conducted by the
Washington Post
, a majority, 54 percent, favored a smaller government with fewer services, as opposed to 46 percent who favored a larger government and more services. But it remained to be seen if Reagan could continue to win the upcoming primaries without the array of resources the President had at his command.
37
Ford’s message was simple and direct: “Peace, prosperity and trust are my record of performance in the nearly two years since I became President.” For all concerned, however, Michigan might well be Ford’s last stand. “But the President, opening an intensified, last-ditch campaign effort in the state, seemed in a somber mood, reflecting the fact that his quest for the Republican Presidential nomination was in trouble,” the
Times
wrote. “Members of his campaign staff . . . have conceded that a loss here in his home state, coming on top of other sharp setbacks at Mr. Reagan’s hands, would be an extremely damaging blow to his chances of winning the nomination.”
38
At one stop, a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, Ford asked rhetorically why he was asking Americans and Michiganders for their vote. Then he answered himself in a woeful manner, saying, “Because I’ve done a good job. Because I’ve turned a lot of things around and we’re going in the right direction. Because I want a mandate from Michigan and the American people to finish the job.”
39
Ford was introduced by Milliken, who could not conceal his contempt for Reagan. “Narrow concepts and shallow rhetoric,” was how he described the Californian’s agenda in his presentation.
40
He had also cut a radio commercial attacking Reagan on his “box office diplomacy,” calling Michigan “the state where the celluloid candidacy of Ronald Reagan will be exposed.”
41
While Ford was tied down in Michigan, the Reagan campaign again trumped the Ford campaign when it was announced by Sears in Washington that George Clark, the leader of the Brooklyn Republican Party, would endorse Reagan. Clark predicted he could deliver fourteen of his eighteen delegates, plus himself, for Reagan in Kansas City. Richard Rosenbaum, the State Chairman, was not pleased.
42
Ford finally signed a bill reconstituting the FEC several days before the Michigan primary, but then declined to appoint the six Commissioners necessary to reactivate the agency, thus effectively delaying the millions owed all the candidates running for President.
43
The Senate would have to confirm the six Commissioners, though it had adjourned the Friday before the Michigan and Maryland primaries and would not return to session until the following week. But since Ford had actually never sent six nominees to the Senate for its consideration, the finer point of the Congress being out of session was moot.
The Administration had been put on the defensive by Reagan’s charges over the Panama Canal. But by May, Henry Kissinger engaged in a counter-offensive, attacking Reagan for interfering with the negotiations, telling the
Boston Herald
American
that Reagan’s public pronouncements on the canal “have certainly not helped the negotiations.” He also told the newspaper that Reagan’s position on the Panama Canal was a “disaster.”
44
Yet another example where Reagan was certainly having an impact on the Ford Administration’s foreign policy was the abrupt delay of a long planned signing ceremony with the Soviet Union to limit the megatonnage of underground nuclear blasts.
45
Speculation was rampant that the White House wanted to avoid handing Reagan yet another contentious foreign policy issue to use against Ford.
Pressure was increasing for Ford. A supporter who was running as one of his delegates from New Jersey, former Congressman Charles Sandman, told the
New
York Times
, “The President should withdraw as a candidate if he loses to former Governor Ronald Reagan . . . in next week’s Presidential primary election in Michigan.” Sandman went even further, saying a close race there could “finish the President” and that Ford was “already terribly weakened.” Sandman also said that he would assist in organizing a meeting of New Jersey’s Republicans to determine their next move.
Though he was a conservative who personally liked Reagan, Sandman opposed Reagan for either position on the national ticket, likening his nomination to Goldwater’s in 1964. Sandman preferred Rockefeller as the party’s standard-bearer should Ford falter in the face of the Reagan challenge.
46
Clark had more confidence in Reagan than Sandman did. At a press conference at the Biltmore Hotel with Paul Laxalt, Clark announced that fifteen New York delegates, all from Brooklyn, had endorsed Ronald Reagan. “It illustrates Mr. Reagan’s strength in the New York delegation and it comes at a significant time for us in relation to the momentum we have developed in other states,” Laxalt told the assembled reporters. Rosenbaum would have much more to worry about in the days and weeks ahead. The Reagan camel had its nose under his tent, and Rosenbaum didn’t like the lobbying that was going on inside one bit.
47
Two more FEC complaints were filed against the Ford campaign, one by Citizens for Reagan and another from the Democratic National Committee. The DNC asked for the FEC to review its earlier decision to allow the Republican National Committee to pay for Ford’s political travels in late 1975. While the Reagan complaint was that all the expenditures by the Ford committee were not being reported, it also asked again that Kissinger’s travels be charged to the Ford campaign, rather than the U.S. taxpayers. In his letter to the Commission, Reagan General Counsel Loren Smith wrote, “It is clear to everybody that Dr. Kissinger is using his high office for the express purpose of a campaign platform to promote the Ford candidacy.”
48
Both complaints were harassing actions, designed to distract the President Ford Committee from the more immediate task of winning in Michigan.