Reagan arrived in Detroit on May 14 and delivered a speech of his own to the Economic Club, sharply criticizing the regulations Washington was placing on the long-suffering auto industry. The two thousand attendees greeted him warmly. Reagan said, “The automobile and the men and women who make it are under constant attack from Washington . . . from the elitists, some of whom feel guilty because Americans have built such a prosperous nation, and some of whom seem obsessed with the need to substitute government control in place of individual decision making.”
Continuing his remarks, Reagan blamed Ford for the plights of the auto industry. He cited the energy bill the President had signed the previous December, because it contained mandates to the industry and “regulates the marketplace, dictates to the consumer and, in the process, will make Detroit’s unemployment problem worse than it already is.” Reagan also charged that Ford’s signing of the legislation could cost Detroit over two hundred thousand jobs.
49
At a press conference before the speech, Reagan downplayed his chances for a victory in the Wolverine State and gave himself little chance of an upset, telling reporters he could not be expected to win against “even an appointed incumbent in his home state.” Reagan avoided calling on Ford to get out of the race if he lost in Michigan, saying, “That’s his decision, not mine.” He then elaborated, noting that he’d been in much the same position as Ford less than two months before, in the weeks leading up to the North Carolina primary. As pressure had mounted for Reagan to get out of the race, he explained, “Somebody tried to make decisions for me and I didn’t like it.”
50
Reagan would only devote a little over twenty-four hours to campaigning in the state, with airport rallies in Flint, Battle Creek, and Kalamazoo.
51
Several other speeches and receptions were thrown into the schedule. There was little money for television, radio, newspaper ads, phone banks, or even an official office for Citizens for Reagan.
But the Reagan forces also knew that cross-pressuring conservative voters’ desire to cast their ballots for Reagan was their pride in a home state hero. Even if the Reagan campaign would have had the necessary financial resources, it would have been difficult to defeat the President in his hometown. In fact, Ford finally found a solution to the mystery of combating the crossover votes Reagan was receiving in one primary after another: if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em. Ford decided to make open appeals to Michigan’s Democrats to vote for him in the primary, playing on their sympathies and their desire to not embarrass one of their own.
52
Party affiliation was declining at the time, especially among Republicans. The cliché, “I vote for the man and not the party,” had a great deal of basis in fact. In 1972, nine of the twenty-three primary states allowed for crossover voting. But by 1976, fourteen of the thirty primaries, or almost half, allowed for crossover voting.
53
Political analysts at the time misinterpreted Reagan’s appeal to conservative voters as unrepresentative of the majority of voters. In fact, both parties had vocal conservative elements and conservatives constituted the majority of the Republican Party. Liberal Republicans described conservatives in the GOP as a “minority of a minority.” But in fact, the opposite was true. The leadership of the Republican Party was unrepresentative of the grassroots of the party, though Reagan’s leadership was supplanting the old guard with his new, bold, conservative ideas. Reagan was accelerating the process of redefining the two parties that Goldwater had begun twelve years earlier. America was, in fact, a majority conservative country. Reagan knew this better than anyone else at the time. How?
Jeff Bell once recounted how Reagan spent so much time reading and answering his mail, which Bell thought was a waste of time: “Reagan would spend endless hours reading and answering his personal mail. I now believe it was at the heart of his populism. It gave him a vivid window on how voters think.”
54
A new distraction developed for Reagan as he headed into the Michigan primary. The
New York Times
published an analysis of the income statements his campaign had released several months earlier. In a front-page story, on May 16, two days before the primary, the paper charged that Reagan, “almost certainly paid no Federal income tax in 1970.”
55
Speaking for the campaign, Peter Hannaford denied the charge, but the damage had been done.
56
The allegations were heavily reported in Michigan and were seen by millions of taxpaying citizens who resided there. Hannaford’s denial was in a much shorter article and was buried on page nineteen of the paper two days later on May 18, the day of the Michigan primary.
Meanwhile, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, a liberal and supporter of Ford, blasted Reagan in a speech before the Ripon Society in New York. The Ripon Society was named after Ripon, Wisconsin—one of the locations where the Republican Party was believed to have been founded. The organization was decidedly liberal, and Javits’s speech was met with great fanfare and support. Javits charged Reagan would take the Republican Party, “on the way to extinction as a national governing alternative before the year is out.” Javits argued that Ford could lose “to a candidate who has adopted positions so extreme that they would alter our country’s very economic and social structure and our place in the world to such a degree as to make our country’s policy at home and abroad, as we know it, a thing of the past.”
57
Reagan’s response was more measured than Javits’s hyperbole. At an airport press conference in Los Angeles, he said, “Senator Javits has talked about the Republican Party being destroyed for years and years and, so far, it hasn’t been destroyed. I would like to have Senator Javits’s support if I’m a nominee, but I would also match my record of service to the Republican Party and my devotion to not destroying the party against that of Senator Javits any time.” Javits also broke with the agreement of the New York Republicans and declared his intention to vote for Ford at the convention.
58
Javits’s intemperate remarks about Reagan were in fact tame. Harsher rhetoric was often used when liberals were describing conservatives. For all the rhetoric stating that conservatives were the haters, in fact, the crueler, more baseless charges came far more often from the Left rather than the Right.
The Saturday before the Michigan primary, which would be held on Tuesday, May 18, Ford stumped the state, from Flint to Niles, via a train called the “Presidential Express.”
59
Ford campaigned for three of the final five days in Michigan leading up to its primary, much of it by this train, which included six stainless steel Amtrak cars and an observation car. The
New York Times
speculated that it might have been the first time a President had campaigned by train since Harry Truman in 1948. Stops included Lansing, Kalamazoo, and Battle Creek. Large and friendly crowds turned out, and Ford appealed to their sense of pride in having a fellow Michigander in the White House. “Help us on Tuesday,” was Ford’s oft-used phrase.
60
The President took stock of his two years in office, saying, “When I was sworn in, I said our long national nightmare was over. And it is. . . . My Administration has been as honest, as open and as candid as I can make it and so is my campaign for the high office I hold.” Ford may have been getting more comfortable campaigning on the stump, but no one ever called him “electrifying.”
61
Ford also cited the improving economy. But in Michigan, unemployment remained at 12 percent.
62
Still, the reaction was good and the media coverage positive. But with Wallace’s campaign on life support, no one could really know what would happen on Tuesday.
Reagan’s campaign had decided that their candidate should only spend one day in the state, reasoning that if he campaigned heavily and Ford won big, the result would be interpreted as a major setback for Reagan. But if Reagan campaigned only a little and did well, or even won, then Ford would be finished.
Also, the Reagan campaign was eyeing the delegates at stake in Michigan, since they would be apportioned proportionally. So a limited grassroots effort was mounted, but nothing compared to the campaign Ford was waging. Reagan’s campaign was still financially strapped. Mailings from Reagan’s campaign in Michigan were sent to National Rifle Association members that stated, “This will be the best opportunity you’ll have this year to send our message to the Washington politicians who want to take away our guns.”
63
Some limited radio ads also ran and the ACU spent a small sum on radio spots as well.
Ford’s staff did let it leak out that if he lost or, in the worst case, lost badly in Michigan, he would in all likelihood curtail campaigning in the remaining primary states and instead reassess the wisdom of pursuing the nomination any further.
64
Over the weekend, Reagan won additional delegates in convention and caucus states. He picked up the final eighteen delegates available in Oklahoma and several more in Louisiana, Virginia, and Missouri, bringing his total to forty-six for the weekend, according to the
New York Times
. Cumulatively, according to the paper, Reagan had extended his delegate lead over Ford by a margin of 476 to 333. Additionally, Reagan was in good shape in the state of Washington, as he won 61 percent of the state delegates for the statewide convention that would be held in Spokane; his ground forces would control the agenda and the selection of Washington’s delegates to the national convention in August.
65
In the meantime, the Federal Election Commission released the first filing made to the government agency on the financial contributions of corporate political action committees to the various candidates. The agency was only performing some of its functions. For the Presidential candidates, distributing their matching funds—not reporting disbursement—would have been far more important. Some outside of the Republican Party were mildly surprised when it was learned that Ford was receiving far more in corporate contributions than Reagan.
66
It had been widely assumed that Reagan’s free-market message was more appealing to corporate America.
More importantly, Ford had finally signed the bill reconstituting the FEC, but only after it sat on his desk for six days. He then waited another six days before re-nominating five Commissioners, whom the Senate confirmed. But Ford then refused to swear them in until a sixth was confirmed, using a specious argument about “political balance” at the FEC. So Reagan and the Democratic candidates were still being denied millions in matching funds, just as they had been for weeks. An editorial in the
New York Times
concluded, “If there is not a deliberate design at work here, then Candidate Gerald Ford is needlessly and foolishly letting the country suspect that there is.”
67
Both Maryland and Michigan held Presidential primaries on May 18, and Ford won a landslide victory in Maryland. Reagan had not contested the Maryland GOP primary, and Ford took all the forty-three delegates there.
68
But in Michigan, Ford swamped Reagan with 64 percent of the vote. He also won most of the delegates at stake, by a margin of fifty-five to twenty-nine. Wallace was not a factor, as he took only 7 percent of the vote in the Democratic primary. For all intents and purposes, the Democrats who crossed over to the Republican primary voted not for Reagan, as once expected, but for Ford.
69
Pat Caddell, Carter’s pollster in 1976, had conducted a survey of Michigan’s voters that showed Ford with a solid three to two lead over Reagan among Republicans. It was harder to measure the crossover intensity for Reagan among Democrats, which did show Reagan leading two to one.
70
Initially, Reagan was caught off guard by Ford’s margin, telling reporters it was “our worst day in May.” He then got more on message saying, “The thing that had them so uptight was that they had to win by substantial amounts in that state. Even a close race with him on the winning side would be considered a defeat. This was vital to him, but I don’t think anyone can say it was crucial to us.”
71
Reagan was right. The President had lost five of the previous six primaries, had thrown everything into the fight against Reagan, and had still come up short. This win was crucial for Ford. Evans and Novak revealed after Ford’s win in the Wolverine State that a knock-down, drag-out fight had occurred between Ford’s White House staff and his in-state supporters over how to conduct the campaign there. Ford’s staff opposed the whistle-stop campaign tour, which ultimately proved effective. But far more importantly, Senator Bob Griffin and others urged Ford to stop complaining about crossover voters and instead appeal to Michigan Democrats. The stratagem worked. The columnists fingered Head of Advance “Red” Cavaney, scheduler Jerry Jones, and Chief of Staff Cheney as those opposed to the change in tactics and strategy.
72
For the “bantam rooster,” of the Democratic Party, George Wallace, Maryland and Michigan represented the end of the line.
73
Four years earlier, he had won both. Wallace may have been well on his way to winning the Democratic Party’s nomination before Arthur Bremer shot him as he campaigned in Maryland on the day of his twin victories. With Wallace’s political demise, many expected Democrats to cross over and cast votes for Reagan in Michigan in 1976.
Carter won Michigan narrowly over Mo Udall, and lost Maryland surprisingly to Governor Jerry Brown of California.
74
The loss in Maryland and the close win in Michigan were interpreted as setbacks for the Georgian. Brown confidently told his supporters, “I’ll see you in the general election and I’ll see you in January.”
75
Carter admitted his surprise at the margin of Brown’s win, but pledged no essential changes in his campaign’s message or strategy.
76