Read Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw Online
Authors: Norman Davies
Tags: #Non-Fiction, #War, #History
German sources soon reported that nothing resembling the Warsaw Rising had been seen since Stalingrad. But there was a fundamental difference. Stalingrad had been contested by two professional armies, each possessing a full complement of aerial and armoured weapons. Warsaw was being contested by a professional army and a dedicated band of irregulars.
In London, the exiled Government had waited for news of the Rising for over a week. They had known it was coming, but hadn’t known when. But after the delayed message from Gen. Boor was properly received on 2 August, they sprang into action. They had two priorities. The first was to obtain the full support of the Western powers. The second was to organize a favourable outcome of the Premier’s talks in Moscow that were due to commence at any time. [
GOOSE FARM
, p. 261]
In its Cabinet meeting at 15.30 on 2 August, the exiled Government – minus its Premier – agreed the text of a communiqué and received a report from the socialist leader, ‘Thomas’, who had recently left Poland with Salamander. They also discussed the criticisms of the Rising contained in the Commanderin-Chief’s delayed telegram from Italy. They declared them invalid, and contrary to the Government’s decision of 25 July.
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The British public woke up to news of the Rising on 3 August. A small paragraph in
The Times
that morning was typical:
The Polish Government in London issued the following communiqué yesterday afternoon: – ‘The Delegate of the Polish Government in Poland and the Commanderin-Chief of the Underground Army report that at 1700 hours on August 1 units of the Polish Underground Army in Warsaw started open fighting for the seizure of the capital from the Germans.
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The Government served as the main channel of information about the Rising for the Western Allies, and Gen. Boor sent daily reports by radio. But there were considerable delays between messages being sent, and being deciphered, discussed, and forwarded to their final destination. Two whole days passed, for example, before the President could officially inform Churchill:
GOOSE FARM
The officer commanding Zoshka’s Storm Battalion liberates a death camp inside the walls of the former Ghetto
During the Rising, we did not know the history of the Goose Farm Camp. All we knew was that an extermination camp lay in front of our lines, and that the prisoners had to be rescued. The camp consisted of two sections. One abutted Trench Street and had been partly captured on the Rising’s first day. But the Germans had retreated to the other section, which was unusually well fortified. It was surrounded by a high brick wall, and about a dozen watchtowers, armed with heavy machine guns, had been built into the wall. From these towers, German ‘storks’ – as we called them – had an excellent view over the surrounding terrain.
The attack on the Goose Farm began about 2 p.m. on the 5th. ‘Alek’’s platoon . . . engaged the watchtowers from a position on Trench Street, drawing the Germans’ attention in that direction. ‘Felek’’s platoon then approached the first watchtower on the left unobserved. The tower was to be destroyed by two rounds from our tank; and the second round was to be the signal for the assault. The tank, under my command, was to proceed slowly down Goose Street from the Trench Street end. It was to make a sharp left turn opposite the main entrance to the camp which was blocked by an enormous barricade . . .
When we approached the barricade, which was built of concrete blocks, railway tracks, and other metal objects and which was at least one storey high, I realized the size of the risk that we were taking. Fortunately, we had a fantastic driver, called ‘Roar’. He pressed the accelerator to the floorboard, the engine roared at full rev, and bit by bit the tank edged its way to the top. Suddenly, it tipped over and dropped down on the far side. It wasn’t damaged, though we were all thoroughly shaken . . . The Germans hurled a cluster of grenades, but the tracks still held even though the vehicle was momentarily blown off the ground. A quick turn to the right, and we were already standing beside the second barricade. We fired the agreed two shots; the corner watchtower was demolished and the way was open for the assault. Some of our boys literally jumped the gun, and stormed one of the towers after the first of our shots . . .
All the watchtowers were under direct fire from our tank. As soon as anything moved, we demolished it . . . At one moment, I saw a lad riding at full speed through the middle of the camp on a bicycle. I was sure that he would be brought down. But he jumped off at the end of the alley, turned round, and started firing his Sten gun at one of the towers. The Germans had either to run, to surrender, or to perish.
Our lads were dressed in captured German uniforms and German helmets. And
they shouted in German to the prisoners who were of various nationalities. The prisoners thought that their last hour had come. It’s hard to imagine the emotion when they realized that we brought them freedom not death. I remembered Radoslav’s words: ‘The Germans are capable of killing the prisoners even after you capture the camp.’ So I threw open the lid of the tank and shouted, ‘For God’s sake, get down and take cover.’ But no one paid any attention whatsoever . . .
The camp had been captured. Our nurses appeared. Since the tank’s ventilation had not been working very well, we were more or less suffocated; and I went for a stroll to recover. I saw the most extraordinary sight. In the middle of the camp square, at least a hundred prisoners had been drawn up military-style in two long ranks. As I went to them, a voice called out, ‘Attention! Eyes left.’ And one of them came up to me and saluted: ‘Sergeant Henryk Lederman, sir,’ he reported, ‘and the Jewish Battalion ready for action.’ My wonder at these people knew no bounds. Not only had they not been broken by Nazi savagery, they had managed to organize themselves, despite the conditions of the camp, and to ready themselves as soon as an opportunity occurred.
Radoslav gave me permission to take these Jewish soldiers into our ranks. Some of them went to Parasol, others to ‘Fila’ . . . Many died in combat. Our losses were horrendous. But those soldier-Jews left behind them the reputation of exceptionally brave, ingenious, and faithful people. Many of their names or pseudonyms can be seen in Zoshka’s enclosure in Warsaw’s Military Cemetery.
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W. Micuta
London 3 August 1944
My dear Prime Minister,
For the last two days Warsaw fights. To save the city, it is indispensable that a large quantity of equipment be dropped this very night in places indicated . . . It is to be feared that without your decision giving this operation priority for tonight (3rd to 4th August) it may fail to take place [and] my Nation . . . would never forget that it was left unaided at a most critical moment by its British ally. I appeal to your friendship . . . and your deep understanding of soldierly solidarity.
Yours very sincerely
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Considerable difficulties were also created by the fact that the Commanderin-Chief was still in Italy. His subordinates were left scrambling to make the necessary contacts on his behalf. His Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence were trying desperately to find out from the British
military whether their various requests were feasible. The Chief of Section VI was in constant touch with the Polish squadrons in the Mediterranean, asking them whether they were ready to fly.
As often as not, the British response was deeply distressing to their allies. In many instances, it showed little sense of urgency or commitment. It took five days, for example, for Churchill’s Chief of Staff, Gen. Hastings Ismay, to say (incorrectly) that the use of RAF bombers in Poland could only be considered in conjunction with the expected Soviet assault. Other proposals, such as the use of fighters, were again dismissed as unrealistic. Matters like the Home Army’s combatant rights remained ‘under discussion’. On 2 August, the Chief of the VI Bureau informed Gen. Boor by radio: ‘The English are making all significant assistance for you dependent on the results of the Moscow talks.’ He also said that the long-delayed issue of a British mission to the Home Army was waiting for Soviet approval.
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Diplomacy was brought into play, therefore, with maximum urgency. The Ambassador to Britain had been told by the Foreign Office a week earlier that British diplomats would intervene in Moscow in order to ensure maximum cooperation. He now wanted to learn what effect such intervention had achieved.
The Ambassador to the USA turned to the State Department. He received a sympathetic hearing from the acting Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, at 11.30 on the morning of Sunday the 6th, before moving on to Gen. Joseph T. McNarney at the Department of War. Stettinius immediately saw the point of instructing Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to facilitate the Premier’s talks with Stalin, and promised ‘to set the wheels to work within the hour’. Gen. McNarney similarly understood the gravity of the moment and the vital importance of Soviet cooperation. The Ambassador had specifically requested that Gen. Eisenhower become involved.
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As the days passed, Gen. Boor’s reports, whilst desperately pleading for assistance, nonetheless indicated that the Rising might continue ‘for several days’. So there was still a chance. Yet the ‘deathly silence’ of the Soviet Army, and still worse the continuing arrests of AK soldiers by the Soviets outside Warsaw, were causes of intense anxiety. On 4 August, Boor was obliged to deny the content of a BBC broadcast which had stated that the Soviets were cooperating fully. For his superiors, it was a painful experience to see the difference between the first-hand information in their possession and the complacent stories that filled the Western press.
Almost without exception, the British newspapers carried optimistic accounts. The
News Chronicle
of 1 August had reported that Warsaw was on the verge of ‘complete liberation’. On 4 August, the
Daily Mail
mentioned ‘street fighting’. The
Daily Express
spread the news that members of the Polish Underground were fighting ‘shoulder to shoulder with the Russians’.
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The Western Governments in London and Washington could not honestly claim that they were taken completely by surprise. They had long known that a Rising was on the cards, though they knew nothing of the timing. They were preoccupied with the campaign in Normandy, and they took it as read that events on the Eastern Front in the Soviet sphere were not their business. On the other hand, they could hardly turn a deaf ear to the appeals of a close ally in distress; and they had a prime interest in keeping the Soviets sweet. So their priorities were twofold: to send such aid for the Rising as could be quickly improvised and to assure a congenial climate for the Polish–Soviet talks in Moscow.
Churchill had made a measured statement to the House of Commons on the evening of 2 August, before news of the Rising was generally known. He announced: ‘The Russian armies now stand before the gates of Warsaw.’ He made one gesture to the courage of the Poles, and another to ‘Russia’s need for friendly neighbours’. And he made an appeal for the ‘union of different Polish forces’:
[The Russian armies] offer freedom, sovereignty and independence to the Poles friendly to Russia. This seems to me very reasonable, considering the injuries which Russia has suffered . . . The Allies would welcome any general rally or fusion of Polish forces, both those who are working with the Western powers and those who are working with the Soviet . . . Let them come together. We desire this union, and it would be a marvellous thing if it could be proclaimed or at least its foundations laid, at the moment when the famous capital of Poland . . . has been liberated by the bravery of Russian Armies . . .
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His words were well received. On the face of it, they sounded perfectly reasonable. Yet in reality they begged some essential questions: what exactly did ‘friendly neighbours’ mean, and whose definition of ‘friendliness’ did Churchill intend to accept? His Polish listeners would have
noticed that he did not say that Poland, too, needed friendly neighbours. Indeed, they might have argued, since Poland’s injuries were proportionately greater than the Soviet Union’s, that some Allied powers were in very special need of good neighbours. [
PROFESSOR
, p. 266]
Incidentally, Churchill’s preoccupation with Poland irritated some members of his own Government. Sir Alexander Cadogan, for one, was kept waiting at 10 Downing Street in the hope of joining the cabinet on 2 August, and was then told that he wasn’t wanted when Churchill headed off for the Commons. ‘It’s terrible that we have a P.M., who simply can’t conduct business,’ he noted in his diary. ‘It’s all hot air!’
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Churchill certainly reacted energetically. Despite the predictable feet-dragging by British officials, he authorized RAF flights to Warsaw to be prepared without delay. One should note that in this same period, British and American officials were resisting requests for flights of similar difficulty to be sent to destroy the rail-lines to Auschwitz. There were delays, perhaps unavoidable. But the operation started at Churchill’s specific request.
On 4 August, the Prime Minister telegraphed Stalin:
At the urgent request of the Polish underground army, we are dropping subject to the weather about 60 tons of equipment and ammunition into the south-western quarter of the city, where, it is said, a Polish revolt against the Germans is in fierce struggle. They also say that they appeal for Russian aid, which seems very near. They are being attacked by one-and-a-half German divisions. This may be of help to your operations.
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Stalin’s reply was received the next day. It was not encouraging, but neither was it overtly hostile:
I think that the information given to you by the Poles is greatly exaggerated and unreliable . . . The Home Army consists of a few detachments misnamed divisions. They have neither guns, aircraft, nor tanks. I cannot imagine detachments like those taking Warsaw.
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