Strategy (116 page)

7
. Jomini,
The Art of War
, 69.

8
. Shy, “Jomini,” 152, 157, 160, 146.

9
. Gat,
The Origins of Military Thought
, 114, 122.

10
. For a useful discussion on the relationship between the two, see Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction,” February 1993,
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm
.

11
. Clausewitz,
On War
, 136.

12
. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,”
International Affairs
87, no. 6 (2011): 1289.

13
. Martin Kitchen, “The Political History of Clausewitz,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
11, vol. 1 (March 1988): 27–30.

14
. B. H. Liddell Hart,
Strategy: The Indirect Approach
(London: Faber and Faber, 1968); Martin Van Creveld,
The Transformation of War
(New York: The Free Press, 1991); John Keegan,
A History of Warfare
(London: Hutchinson, 1993).

15
. Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz's
On War
: Problems of Text and Translation,” in Hew Strachan and Andrews Herberg-Rothe, eds.,
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 57–73. For biography, see Paret,
Clausewitz and the State
(see chap. 6, n. 10); Michael Howard,
Clausewitz
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Hew Strachan,
Clausewitz's On War: A Biography
(New York: Grove/Atlantic Press, 2008). On historical context, see Azar Gat,
A History of Military Thought
(see chap. 6, n. 5). On influence, see Beatrice Heuser,
Reading Clausewitz
(London: Pimlico, 2002).

16
. Christopher Bassford, “The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought,” in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds.,
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74–90; Christopher Bassford, “The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” in Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz, eds.,
War and Strategy
(New York: Nova Science, 2011), 45–54.

17
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, Chapter 1, 89.

18
. Antulio Echevarria,
Clausewitz and Contemporary War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96.

19
.
On War
, Book 1, Chapter 7, 119–120.

20
. Ibid., Book 3, Chapter 7, 177.

21
. Terence Holmes uses this stress on planning to challenge the view that Clausewitz was preoccupied only with the chaotic and unpredictable. The point is that the potential chaos and unpredictability set the challenge for the general. This is why Clausewitz argued for cautious strategies. Holmes notes the reasons why plans may go awry, of which the most important would be a failure to anticipate the enemy's moves correctly, and that when the original plans do not work new ones will be needed. It is setting up a straw man to counter a claim that Clausewitz opposed all planning, because clearly the logistical and command issues posed by the great armies of the time demanded planning. Better to view the strategic challenge as drawing up plans that took account of the problems of friction and unpredictable enemies but would not necessarily solve them. Terence Holmes, “Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's
On War
,”
The Journal of Strategic Studies
30, no. 1 (2007): 129–151.

22
.
On War
, Book 2, Chapter 1, 128, Book 3, Chapter 1, 177.

23
. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 6, 117–118.

24
. Paret, “Clausewitz,” in M
akers of Modern Strategy
, 203.

25
.
On War
, Book 1, Chapter 7, 120.

26
. Ibid., Book 5, Chapter 3, 282; Book 3, Chapter 8, 195; Chapter 10, 202–203; Book 7, Chapter 22, 566, 572.

27
. Ibid., Book 6, Chapter 1, 357; Chapter 2, 360; Chapter 5, 370.

28
. Clausewitz,
On War
, 596, 485. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought,”
Naval War College Review
LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 108–123.

29
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 8, Chapter 6, 603. See Hugh Smith, “The Womb of War.”

30
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 8, Chapter 8, 617–637.

31
. Strachan,
Clausewitz's On War
, 163.

32
. “Clausewitz, unfinished note, presumably written in 1830,” in
On War
, 31. Note this date is now put at 1827. See also Clifford J. Rogers, “Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules,”
The Journal of Military History
66 (October 2002): 1167–1176.

33
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, Chapter 1, 87.

34
. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 1, 81.

35
. Strachan,
Clausewitz's On War
, 179.

36
. Brian Bond,
The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47.

1
. Michael Howard,
War and the Liberal Conscience
(London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1978), 37–42.

2
. Cited in Ibid., 48–49.

3
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, Chapter 2, 90. See Thomas Waldman,
War, Clausewitz and the Trinity
(London: Ashgate, 2012), Chapter 6.

4
. Leo Tolstoy,
War and Peace
, translated by Louise and Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 829.

5
. Isaiah Berlin,
The Hedgehog and the Fox
(Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1978). The title, which is now the best remembered aspect of the book, comes from a quote from the Greek poet Archilocus: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”

6
. W. Gallie,
Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 114.

7
. Tolstoy,
War and Peace
, 1285.

8
. Ibid., 688.

9
. Lieven,
Russia Against Napoleon
, 527.

10
. Berlin,
The Hedgehog and the Fox
, 20.

11
. Gary Saul Morson, “War and Peace,” in Donna Tussing Orwin, ed.,
The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65–79.

12
. Michael D. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillip, eds.,
Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art
(Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 2005), 118, 130.

13
. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, 298 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

14
. See Helmuth von Moltke, “Doctrines of War,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed.,
War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 220–221.

15
. Echevarria,
Clausewitz and Contemporary War
, p.142 (see chap. 7, n. 18).

16
. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, 288.

17
. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 305.

18
. John Stone,
Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War
(London: Continuum, 2011), 43–47.

19
. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” 142.

20
. Walter Goerlitz,
The German General Staff
(New York: Praeger, 1953), 92. Cited by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan,
Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2009), 24.

1
. Gordon Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, 326–353 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

2
. Azar Gat,
The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 106–107.

3
. Quote from Mahan in Russell F. Weigley, “American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,” in Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, 415.

4
. Donald Stoker,
The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 78–79.

5
. David Herbert Donald,
Lincoln
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 389, 499; Stoker,
The Grand Design
, 229–230.

6
. Stoker,
The Grand Design
, 405.

7
. Weigley, “American Strategy,” 432–433.

8
. Stoker,
The Grand Design
, 232.

9
. Azar Gat,
The Development of Military Thought
, 144–145.

10
. Ardant du Picq, “Battle Studies,” in Curtis Brown, ed.,
Roots of Strategy, Book 2
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 153; Robert A. Nye,
The Origins
of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic
(London: Sage, 1974).

11
. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” 312.

12
. The debate has largely been conducted in the pages of the journal
War in History
. Terence Zuber has been conducting a lonely but vigorous campaign, against the deep skepticism of other historians, to assert that there was no Schlieffen Plan. Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,”
War in History
VI (1999): 262–305. The argument is developed fully in his
Inventing the Schlieffen Plan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For some responses, see Terence Holmes, “The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber's ‘The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,'”
War in History
VIII (2001): 208–232. A. Mombauer, “Of War Plan and War Guilt: The Debate Surrounding the Schlieffen Plan,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
XXVIII (2005): 857–858; R. T. Foley, “The Real Schlieffen Plan,”
War in History
XIII (2006): 91–115; Gerhard P. Groß, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning,”
War in History
XV (2008): 389–431.

13
. Cited by Foley, “The Real Schlieffen Plan,” 109.

14
. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,”
International Affairs
87, no. 6 (2011): 1290.

15
. He did not start seriously publishing until he was 50, after which he published almost twenty books and numerous essays. The most important works are
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890) and
The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1892).

16
. Mahan,
The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire
, 400–402.

17
. Jon Tetsuro Sumida,
Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999).

18
. Robert Seager,
Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters
(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1977). See also Dirk Böker,
Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War I
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 103–104.

19
. Alfred Mahan,
Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land: Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., Between the Years 1887 and 1911
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), 6–8.

20
. Mahan,
The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution
, v–vi.

21
. Seager,
Alfred Thayer Mahan
, 546. This was referring to
Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted
.

22
. Böker,
Militarism in a Global Age
, 104–107.

23
. Cited in Liam Cleaver, “The Pen Behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British Naval Development, 1898–1918,”
Comparative Strategy
14 (January 1995), 52–53.

24
. Barry M. Gough, “Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power,”
The RUSI Journ al
133, no. 4 (December 1988): 55–62.

25
. Donald M. Schurman,
Julian S. Corbett, 1854–1922
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1981), 54. See also Eric Grove, “Introduction,” in Julian Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1988). This book was first published in 1911. The annotated 1988 publication also contains “The Green Pamphlet” of 1909. See also Azar Gat,
The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century
.

26
. On the relationship between Corbett and Clausewitz, see Chapter 18 of Michael Handel,
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought
(London: Frank Cass, 2001).

27
. Corbett,
Some Principles
, 62–63.

28
. Ibid., 16, 91, 25, 152, 160.

29
. H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,”
The Geographical Journal
23 (1904): 421–444.