Strategy (119 page)

18
. Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan.”

19
. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War.”

20
. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Guerrilla War.”

21
. “People's War, People's Army” (1961), in Russell Stetler, ed.,
The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 104–106.

22
. Graham Greene,
The Quiet American
(London: Penguin, 1969), 61. The contemporary importance of Greene's critique of American naïveté in
Vietnam and the debates this prompted comes over in Frederik Logevall,
Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam
(New York: Random House, 2012). William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick,
The Ugly American
(New York: Fawcett House, 1958), 233. Hillendale was not the “Ugly American” of the title. Cecil B. Currey,
Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988). Edward G. Lansdale, “Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?”
Foreign Affairs
(October 1964), 75–86. For an appreciation of Lansdale, see Max Boot,
Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012), 409–414.

23
. On counterinsurgency thinking and its development during the Kennedy administration, see Douglas Blaufarb,
The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance
(New York: The Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer,
Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Larry Cable,
Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War
(New York: New York University Press, 1986). Apart from some work undertaken on the stresses and strains in newly independent states in the third world, there was very little academic work on the requirements of a counterinsurgency strategy prior to President Kennedy's embrace of the concept at the start of his administration. The early development of the doctrine within the administration is normally credited to Walt Rostow and Roger Hilsman. For the flavor of the doctrine, see W. W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas,” address to the graduating class at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, June 1961. Reprinted in Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall,
The Viet-Nam Reader
(New York: Vintage Books, 1965). See also Roger Hilsman,
To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy
(New York: Dell, 1967).

24
. Robert Thompson,
Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966).

25
. Boot,
Invisible Armies
, 386–387.

26
. David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1964).

27
. Gregor Mathias,
Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011).

28
. M. L. R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,”
Review of International Studies
29, no. 1 (2003): 19–37; Alistair Horne,
A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962
(London: Macmillan, 1977), 480–504.

29
. Charles Maechling, Jr., “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Role of Strategic Theory,”
Parameters
14, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 34. Shafer,
Deadly Paradigms
, 113.

30
. Paul Kattenburg,
The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945–75
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 111–112.

31
. Blaufarb,
The Counterinsurgency Era
, 62–66.

32
. Jeffery H. Michaels, “Managing Global Counterinsuregency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
35, no. 1 (2012): 33–61.

33
. See, for example, Alexander George et al.,
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
, 1st edition (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). John Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of PostWar American Security Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 243.

34
. See in particular an address at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, December 19, 1962, discussed at length in William Kaufmann,
The McNamara Strategy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 138–147.

35
. Schelling reported that the response was that “Schelling's games demonstrate how unrealistic this Cuban crisis is.” Ghamari-Tabrizi, 213 (see chap. 12, n. 10).

36
. William Bundy, cited in William Conrad Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), Vol. II, p. 349.

37
.
The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Edition: The Defense Department History of the U.S. Decision-Making on Vietnam
, Vol. 3 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 212.

38
. Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: 1961–1964
, 254.

39
. Ibid., 256–259. See Chapter 4 of
Arms and Influence
.

40
. See Freedman,
Kennedy's Wars
(see chap. 13, n. 48)
.

41
. Fred Kaplan,
The Wizards of Armageddon
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 332–336.

42
.
Arms and Influence
, vii, 84, 85, 166, 171–172. Given this analysis, Pape “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,” is unfair to Schelling in assuming that he would have advocated only attacks on civilian targets as part of Rolling Thunder.

43
. Richard Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?”
World Politics
50, no. 1 (October 1997): 16.

44
. Colin Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,”
Foreign Policy
4 (Autumn 1971): 111–129; see also Stephen Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,”
International Security
7, no. 2 (Autumn 1982): 83–113.

45
. Zellen,
State of Doom
, 196–197 (see chap. 12, n. 5); Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?”
Foreign Policy
4 (Autumn 1971): 151–162.

1
. Beaufre's two key works were published in French as
Introduction à la Stratégie
(1963) and
Dissuasion et Stratégie
(1964). Both were published
with English translations by Major-General R. H. Barry in 1965 as
Introduction to Strategy
and
Dissuasion and Strategy
, respectively, by Faber & Faber in London. This quote comes from
Introduction
, p. 22. Beaufre is discussed in Beatrice Heuser,
The Evolution of Strategy
, 460–463. See Chapter 6, n. 4.

2
. Bernard Brodie, “General André Beaufre on Strategy,”
Survival
7 (August 1965): 208–210. For a more sympathetic review, at least of Beaufre's thought if not his policy advocacy in France, see Edward A. Kolodziej, “French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre: A Critique,”
World Politics
19, no. 3 (April 1967): 417–442. While he was unimpressed with Brodie's complaint about “majestic concepts” that got in the way, he acknowledged that Beaufre ideas were often expressed too vaguely to be convincing.

3
. There is no evidence of this, although he had been influenced by Clausewitz (there are regular references to “centers of gravity”) and Liddell Hart.

4
. J. C. Wylie,
Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), first published in 1967. A biography is provided by John Hattendorf's introduction.

5
. Henry Eccles,
Military Concepts and Philosophy
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965). On Eccles see Scott A. Boorman, “Fundamentals of Strategy: The Legacy of Henry Eccles,”
Naval War College Review
62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 91–115.

6
. Wylie,
Military Strategy
, 22.

7
. On the importance of the distinction, see Lukas Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie's Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of Operations,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
35, no. 2 (April 2012): 223–242. Twenty years after the first publication, Wylie believed that cumulative strategies were more important.
Military Strategy
, 1989 edition, p. 101.

8
. His collected works can be found at
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html
. The key books on Boyd are Frans P. B. Osinga,
Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd
(London: Routledge, 2007); Grant Hammond,
The Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); and Robert Coram,
Boyd, The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 2002).

9
. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” September 3, 1976, available at
http://goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf
.

10
. John Boyd,
Organic Design for Command and Control
, May 1987, p.16, available at
http://www.ausairpower.net/JRB/organic_design.pdf
.

11
. The theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligent meteorologist who discovered the “butterfly effect” while searching for a way to produce more accurate weather predictions. Minuscule changes in his initial input to mathematical calculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary and unpredictable effects on the outcomes. The butterfly effect comes from a 1972 paper by Lorenz to the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, “Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” For a history of chaos theory, see James Gleick,
Chaos: Making a New Science
(London: Cardinal, 1987). On complexity theory, see Murray Gell-Man,
The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex
(London: Little, Brown & Co., 1994); Mitchell Waldrop,
Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). On the relationship between scientific theories and military thought, see Antoine Bousquet,
The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Robert Pellegrini,
The Links Between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1997),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/pellegrp.pdf
.

12
. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,”
International Security
(Winter 1992/93); Barry D. Watts,
Clausewitzian Friction and Future War
, McNair Paper 52 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1996).

13
. John Boyd,
Patterns of Conflict: A Discourse on Winning and Losing
, unpublished, August 1987, 44, 128, available at
http://www.ausairpower.net/JRB/poc.pdf
.

14
.
Patterns of Conflict
, 79.

15
. U.S. Department of Defense,
Field Manual 100-5: Operations
(Washington, DC: HQ Department of Army, 1976).

16
. William S. Lind, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army,”
Military Review
58 (March 1977).

17
. U.S. Department of Defense,
Field Manual 100-5: Operations
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1982), vol. 2-1; Huba Wass de Czege and L. D. Holder, “The New FM 100-5,”
Military Review
(July 1982).

18
. Wass de Czege and Holder, “The New FM 100-5.”

19
. Ibid.

20
. Cited in Larry Cable, “Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War,”
Small Wars and Insurgencies
4 (Autumn 1993): 228–262.

21
. U.S. Marine Corps,
FMFM-1: Warfighting
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), 37.

22
. Edward Luttwak,
Pentagon and the Art of War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

23
. Edward Luttwak,
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 5. For a flavor, see Harry Kreisler's conversation with Edward Luttwak in
Conversations with History
series, March 1987, available at
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Luttwak/luttwak-con0.html
.

24
. Luttwak,
Strategy
, 50.

25
. Gregory Johnson, “Luttwak Takes a Bath,”
Reason Papers
20 (1995): 121–124.

26
. Jomini,
The Art of War
, 69 (see chap. 7, n. 5). On the development of the concept of operational art, see Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art's Origins,”
Military Review
77, no. 5 (September–October 1997): 32–47.

27
. Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917–1936” and David M. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Art Since 1936, The Triumph of Maneuver War,” in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, eds.,
Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art
(Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2005); Condoleeza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, 648–676; William E. Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine,”
Foreign Affairs
(Winter 1988 / 89): 114–134.