The Edward Snowden Affair (28 page)

Then something strange happened. On the day Greenwald’s masterpiece debuted, July 31, Lon appeared on Russia’s Rossiya 24 news channel via the network’s station in Washington. He thanked Putin, the Kremlin and the people of Russia for keeping his son safe.
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The reason the FBI wanted Lon to be waiting on the tarmac for Edward instead of merely walking into Sheremetyevo where his son would be sitting is the same reason Greenwald had taken the liberty of publishing his coup de grâce XKeyscore exposé. The FBI couldn’t guarantee the two would meet because Edward would be leaving the airport. Lon knew this because Kucherena had contacted him earlier that morning.
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Snowden was granted Russian asylum the next day.

All the indications had been there. Greenwald’s suddenly publishing after an unprecedented furlough of silence despite Putin’s warning and Lon’s slip of the tongue on national television made it obvious the FBI knew—probably through surveillance Russia deliberately made readily available—that Snowden was about to be a free man, as did Snowden, who had given Greenwald the green light. The press even found it suspicious the U.S. government did not have advance notice of Snowden’s impending freedom as it later pushed the White House on the issue.
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It had been no coincidence that one of the pieces of reading material Kucherena left with Snowden on July 24 was an alphabet book: The American needed to begin learning Russian. The same day, Snowden’s attorney told Rossiya 24 his client intended to settle in Russia.
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Less than a week after Snowden had submitted his second Russian asylum request, Andrey Pilipchuk, representative for Russia’s Interior Ministry, made a point to tell the press, “[Russian] [l]aw agencies asked the US on many occasions to extradite wanted criminals through Interpol channels, but those requests were neither met nor even responded to.”
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As with China and Ecuador, America expected a favor despite a history of being unwilling to do what was being asked by other nations.

The plan had worked perfectly despite the
Der Spiegel
and
Epoca
staffs’ publication faux pas. Kucherena announced Russia had consented to the fact Snowden could not control what journalists did with material previously handed to them.
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Snowden had told his editorial entourage to keep quiet to make the show convincing. Through it all, Russian officials reassured the world that Snowden’s appearance had been happenstance.

Long before August 1 arrived, Putin’s denial of interest in Snowden had become redundant to the point of parody. He’d informed a group of geology students on July 15, “He [Snowden] arrived on our territory without an invitation, we did not invite him. And indeed, he wasn’t coming here; he was in transit to other nations. But as soon as he was in the air, it became known, and our American partners essentially blocked him from traveling further. They scared all the other countries and essentially blocked him into our territory themselves. A Christmas gift, you could say.”
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Putin let it be known that the U.S. had inadvertently positioned and kept its exile in a country without an American extradition treaty by first revoking his passport then prohibiting other nations from letting him leave Russia. Whereas passport nullification was to be expected, America penning him in Russia was the true Christmas present for both the former Soviet Union and Snowden. For good measure, Putin told the geology collective, “[ … ] as soon as there is some kind of opportunity to move on, I hope he will do so.”
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Furthermore, the Russian Federation had not issued him a passport along with his asylum certificate, so while he was free to roam Russia, he could not leave the country.
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When it was made public at the end of the month that Snowden had been in contact with Russia while in Hong Kong, Kucherena automatically refuted the claim.
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Less than a week later, Putin came clean and admitted Russian diplomats had been speaking with the whistleblower long before he boarded Aeroflot SU213.
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The masterstroke of Snowden’s eventual entry into Russia was the revocation of his first asylum petition in feigned protest to Putin’s refusal to tolerate further U.S. harm at the whistleblower’s hands. The dirty little secret is he couldn’t have released any information even if he wanted: He had given all his files to Poitras and Greenwald back in Hong Kong.
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The pause before granting him asylum had given other nations the opportunity to first declare that Snowden’s actions were justifiable, therefore lending credence to Russia’s decision to do the same. Washington had done the former Soviet Union a favor by making a show over the whole of Europe a little over a week later. Through exquisite planning, reasonable expectation and helpful coincidence, Snowden and Russia could have hardly made it more convincing that neither party had a choice but to let him stay where he was. But the U.S. government had made one other mistake which all but absolved Russia of responsibility.

In his asylum request to Ecuador, Snowden stated, “Also, prominent members of Congress and others in the media have accused me of being a traitor and have called for me to be jailed or executed as a result of having communicated this information to the public.” He adds, “My case is also very similar to that of the American soldier Bradley Manning, who made public government information through WikiLeaks revealing war crimes, was arrested by the United States government and has been treated inhumanely during his time in prison. He was put in solitary confinement before his trial and the U.N. anti-torture representative judged that Mr. Manning was submitted to cruel and inhumane acts by the United States government.” In his conclusion, he reiterates and emphasizes, “I believe that, given these circumstances, it is unlikely that I would receive a fair trial or proper treatment prior to that trial, and face the possibility of life in prison or even death.”
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His Nicaraguan asylum bid is almost verbatim.
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Snowden and his legal advisors knew most countries were sympathetic to refugees who voiced concern that they might be confronted with death if returned to their abandoned nation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees mandates, “Where a threat to the life and/or personal safety or other fundamental human rights guarantees of a refugee exists, resettlement may be the only solution.”
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Though he had not been accused of committing a capital offense and was facing only 30 years based on the three charges brought against him, the United States retained the right to indict him on additional charges.
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The possibility remained that Snowden might be cited for treason. Under United States law, the maximum penalty for treason is death.
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The U.S. government’s mistake was it did not declare that the charges had been finalized. It did not help that Snowden’s specified fear of abuse and mistreatment was well founded on very recent events in a case not unlike his own. Countries were also having difficulty issuing benefit of the doubt to the United States government. They had recently witnessed the extent to which Washington was willing to go in hopes of capturing Snowden. The media had also been quick in pointing out that the Obama administration appeared to have an unprecedented vendetta against whistleblowers who leaked classified data to the press. Snowden’s lawsuit was the seventh in the five years Obama had been in office. Before him, only three people had been arraigned in the whole of American history.
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Thirty-nine days after filing charges against Snowden, 23 days after he’d applied for asylum in over 20 countries and 17 days after his first refugee requests were honored, the U.S. still left open the option of the death penalty. The irony was that Washington could see the specific terms of Snowden’s appeals. Ecuador had released his asylum request to the press on June 24.
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Only a week after he’d reapplied for Russian asylum did the U.S. inform Russia it would not pursue capital punishment if Snowden was turned over.
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Stunningly, Washington’s letter
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to Russia all but admits the U.S. government intended to charge Snowden with treason. It states that the U.S. court system “would not seek the death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were charged with additional, death penalty-eligible crimes.” Included in the appeal is a somewhat sardonic but nonetheless desperate attempt to discredit Snowden: “We understand from press reports and prior conversations between our governments that Mr. Snowden believes that he is unable to travel out of Russia and must therefore take steps to legalize his status. That is not accurate; he is able to travel. [ … ] He is eligible for a limited validity passport good for direct return to the United States.” The letter subtly acknowledges that the Justice Department had finally caught onto Russia’s game: “We believe that these assurances eliminate these asserted grounds for Mr. Snowden’s claim that he should be treated as a refugee or granted asylum, temporary or otherwise.” Snowden was not seeking political but temporary asylum. Doing so expedited his claim and made Putin exempt from blame. Temporary asylum requests only require the approval of the Russian Federal Migration Service, not the signature of the Russian president.
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As a temporary refugee he would be permitted to remain in Russia for a year, but his status could be extended indefinitely.
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But Washington’s assurances came too late. Maduro had already set the precedent. He implied he was saving the American exile’s life by granting him “humanitarian asylum” instead of political refuge.
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The speaker of Russian Parliament, Sergei Naryshkin, explicitly stated that Snowden needed a safe haven to avoid the death penalty.
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It remains unclear why Snowden remained in Sheremetyevo International Airport after July 24. When he did not exit the airport with Kucherena on the evening of July 24, the Russian attorney told reporters Snowden’s paperwork “was not a standard process” and was still being considered.
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But law enforcement and airport officials stated he had received his Russian Federal Migration Service asylum recognition certificate that permitted him to pass through border control. Interfax had even reported that Snowden presented the document to border control.
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Vladimir Volokh, former head of Russian Immigration Services, announced on July 23 that even if a certificate were to be issued, though Snowden had the right to move freely throughout the country, there would be safety concerns.
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Russia had instructed Snowden to remain in the airport for three reasons. One, it did not want to be held accountable if something were to happen to Snowden, especially on Russian soil, before he’d been granted asylum. Two, the airport had proven safe for the last 31 days. Three, the former Soviet Union did not want to appear as if it was handing Snowden his freedom immediately after acknowledging his asylum application.

On Thursday afternoon,
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August 1 at 3:30 p.m., after 38 days in Russian limbo, Snowden left the airport. He got into a taxi
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and was escorted to a secure location inside Russia where he would live with other American expatriates.
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Though the gesture would have been largely symbolic due to obvious travel difficulties, because he did not go directly to the Venezuelan Embassy, renounce his Russian asylum status and—similar to Assange—remain at the consulate until he had been acknowledged as a South American refugee, it was clear he intended to remain in Russia. In much the same manner that Fein would continue to question the integrity of Snowden’s editorial connections,
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Kucherena persistently refuted WikiLeaks’ claims of the organization’s physical proximity to Snowden. WikiLeaks implied Harrison had stayed in Sheremetyevo with Snowden after the G9 meeting.
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(In Kucherena’s defense, unlike his flight to and arrival in Russia, there were no status updates regarding Snowden’s welfare during this time period on WikiLeaks’ characteristically loquacious Twitter account.)
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WikiLeaks also reported that Harrison entered the cab with him.
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Kucherena said Snowden left by himself.
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The bickering remained between the various parties. Snowden later announced he had no conflicts with any of the journalists or legal personnel who had and were continuing to help him.
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What is irrefutable is that little is known about his time in Russia. Aside from WikiLeaks posting his statement about receiving Russian asylum 30 minutes after he left the airport, “Over the past eight weeks we have seen the Obama administration show no respect for international or domestic law, but in the end the law is winning. I thank the Russian Federation for granting me asylum in accordance with its laws and international obligations.”
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—amid brief communications with the press and various foreign nations—Snowden summarily disappeared into the deep recesses of the former Soviet Union.

He had gotten his wish. He had finally removed himself from the media spotlight and left the intelligence disclosures in his wake. In less than six weeks, a multitude of sources, both new and old, would file over two dozen original reports revealing classified data Snowden had liberated. Donning disguises, he purportedly walks undetected amongst the people whose daily lives had been consumed by stories of their adopted American brother.
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