The Grand Alliance (133 page)

The paragraphs which follow, dealing with the acquisition of air bases, with Russian intervention, with convoy protection in the Pacific, and with the use to be made of Singapore, need not be reprinted here. Finally:
12. We need not fear that this war in the Pacific will,
after the first shock is over, absorb an unduly large
proportion of United States forces. The numbers of
troops that we should wish them to use in Europe in
1942 will not be so large as to be prevented by their
Pacific operations, limited as these must be. What will
harm us is for a vast United States Army of ten millions
to be created which for at least two years while it was
training would absorb all the available supplies and
stand idle defending the American continent. The best
way of preventing the creation of such a situation and
obtaining the proper use of the large forces and ample
supplies of munitions which will presently be forthcoming is to enable the Americans to regain their naval
power in the Pacific and not to discourage them from
the precise secondary overseas operations which they
may perhaps contemplate.

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So many tales have been published of my rooted aversion from large-scale operations on the Continent that it is important that the truth should be emphasised. I always considered that a decisive assault upon the German-occupied countries on the largest possible scale was the only way in which the war could be won, and that the summer of 1943 should be chosen as the target date. It will be seen that the scale of the operation contemplated by me was already before the end of 1941 set at forty armoured divisions and a million other troops as essential for the opening phase. When I notice the number of books which have been written on a false assumption of my attitude on this issue, I feel bound to direct the attention of the reader to the authentic and responsible documents written at the time, of which other instances will be given as the account proceeds.

P
ART
III

T
HE
C
AMPAIGN OF 1943

December 18, 1941

If the operations outlined in Parts I and II should
prosper during 1942 the situation at the beginning of
1943 might be as follows: (a) United States and Great
Britain would have recovered effective naval superiority
in the Pacific, and all Japanese overseas commitments
would be endangered both from the assailing of their
communications and from British and American expeditions sent to recover places lost. (b) The British Isles
would remain intact and more strongly prepared against
invasion than ever before. (c) The whole West and
North African shores from Dakar to the Suez Canal and
the Levant to the Turkish frontier would be in Anglo-American hands.

Turkey, though not necessarily at war, would be
definitely incorporated in the American-British-Russian
front. The Russian position would be strongly estab-The Grand Alliance

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lished, and the supplies of British and American
material as promised would have in part compensated
for the loss of Russian munitions-making capacity. It
might be that a footing would already have been
established in Sicily and Italy, with reactions inside Italy
which might be highly favourable.

2. But all this would fall short of bringing the war to
an end. The war cannot be ended by driving Japan
back to her own bounds and defeating her overseas
forces. The war can only be ended through the defeat
in Europe of the German armies, or through internal
convulsions in Germany produced by the unfavourable
course of the war, economic privations, and the Allied
bombing offensive. As the strength of the United
States, Great Britain, and Russia develops and begins
to be realised by the Germans an internal collapse is
always possible, but we must not count upon this. Our
plans must proceed upon the assumption that the
resistance of the German Army and Air Force will
continue at its present level and that their U-boat
warfare will be conducted by increasingly numerous
flotillas.

3. We have therefore to prepare for the liberation of
the captive countries of Western and Southern Europe
by the landing at suitable points, successively or
simultaneously, of British and American armies strong
enough to enable the conquered populations to revolt.

By themselves they will never be able to revolt, owing
to the ruthless counter-measures that will be employed,
but if adequate and suitably equipped forces were
landed in several of the following countries, namely,
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French
Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well
as in Italy and possibly the Balkans, the German
garrisons would prove insufficient to cope both with the
strength of the liberating forces and the fury of the
revolting peoples. It is impossible for the Germans,
while we retain the sea power necessary to choose the
place or places of attack, to have sufficient troops in
each of these countries for effective resistance. In
particular, they cannot move their armour about laterally
from north to south or west to east; either they must
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divide it between the various conquered countries – in
which case it will become hopelessly dispersed – or
they must hold it back in a central position in Germany,
in which case it will not arrive until large and important
lodgments have been made by us from overseas.

4. We must face here the usual clash between short-term and long-term projects. War is a constant struggle
and must be waged from day to day. It is only with
some difficulty and within limits that provision can be
made for the future. Experience shows that forecasts
are usually falsified and preparations always in arrear.

Nevertheless, there must be a design and theme for
bringing the war to a victorious end in a reasonable
period. All the more is this necessary when under
modern conditions no large-scale offensive operation
can be launched without the preparation of elaborate
technical apparatus.

5. We should therefore face now the problems not
only of driving Japan back to her homelands and
regaining undisputed mastery in the Pacific, but also of
liberating conquered Europe by the landing during the
summer of 1943 of United States and British armies on
their shores. Plans should be prepared for the landing
in all of the countries mentioned above. The actual
choice of which three or four to pick should be deferred
as long as possible, so as to profit by the turn of events
and make sure of secrecy.

6. In principle, the landings should be made by
armoured and mechanised forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by landing-craft
or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The
potential front of attack is thus made so wide that the
German forces holding down these different countries
cannot be strong enough at all points. An amphibious
outfit must be prepared to enable these large-scale
disembarkations to be made swiftly and surely. The
vanguards of the various British and American expeditions should be marshalled by the spring of 1943 in
Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in French
Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct
across the ocean.

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7. It need not be assumed that great numbers of
men are required. If the incursion of the armoured
formations is successful, the uprising of the local
population, for whom weapons must be brought, will
supply the corpus of the liberating offensive. Forty
armoured divisions, at fifteen thousand men apiece, or
their equivalent in tank brigades, of which Great Britain
would try to produce nearly half, would amount to six
hundred thousand men. Behind this armour another
million men of all arms would suffice to wrest enormous
territories from Hitler’s domination. But these campaigns, once started, will require nourishing on a lavish
scale. Our industries and training establishments
should by the end of 1942 be running on a sufficient
scale.

8. Apart from the command of the sea, without
which nothing is possible, the essential for all these
operations is superior air power, and for landing purposes a large development of carrier-borne aircraft will
be necessary. This however is needed anyhow for the
war in 1942. In order to wear down the enemy and
hamper

his

counter-preparations,

the

bombing

offensive of Germany from England and of Italy from
Malta and, if possible, from Tripoli and Tunis must
reach the highest possible scale of intensity. Considering that the British first-line air strength is already
slightly superior to that of Germany, that the Russian
Air Force has already established a superiority on a
large part of the Russian front and may be considered
to be three-fifths the first-line strength of Germany, and
that the United States resources and future development are additional, there is no reason why a decisive
mastery of the air should not be established even
before the summer of 1943, and meanwhile heavy and
continuous punishment [be] inflicted upon Germany.

Having regard to the fact that the bombing offensive is
necessarily a matter of degree and that the targets
cannot be moved away, it would be right to assign
priority to the fighter and torpedo-carrying aircraft
required for the numerous carriers and improvised
carriers which are available or must be brought into
existence.

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9. If we set these tasks before us now, being careful
that they do not trench too much upon current necessities, we might hope, even if no German collapse occurs
beforehand, to win the war at the end of 1943 or 1944.

There might be advantage in declaring now our
intention of sending armies of liberation into Europe in
1943. This would give hope to the subjugated peoples
and prevent any truck between them and the German
invaders. The setting and keeping in movement along
our courses of the minds of so many scores of millions
of men is in itself a potent atmospheric influence.

I read this paper during our voyage to the Chiefs of Staff on the day it was written. The following is from the note of our conference:

The Prime Minister said he wished the Chiefs of
Staff to examine the whole of this note, which he
intended to use as the basis of his conversations with
the President. He thought it important to put before the
people of both the British Empire and the United States
the mass invasion of the continent of Europe as the
goal for 1943. In general the three phases of the war
could be described as (1) Closing the ring. (2)
Liberating the populations. (3) Final assault on the
German citadel.

I found my professional colleagues in full agreement with these views, and generally with those set forth in the other papers, which indeed summed up the results of our joint study and discussion of the war problem as it had now shaped itself.