The Grand Alliance (135 page)

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7. I gave an account of the progress of fighting in
Libya, by which the President and other Americans
were clearly much impressed and cheered.

8. In the course of conversation the President
mentioned that he would propose at forthcoming
conference that United States should relieve our troops
in Northern Ireland, and spoke of sending three or four
divisions there. I warmly welcomed this, and said I
hoped that one of the divisions would be an armoured
division. It was not thought that this need conflict with
preparations for a United States force for North Africa.

The first major design which was presented to me a day or two later by the President was the drawing-up of a solemn Declaration to be signed by all the nations at war with Germany and Italy, or with Japan. The President and I, repeating our methods in framing the Atlantic Charter prepared drafts of the Declaration and blended them together. In principle, in sentiment, and indeed in language, we were in full accord. At home the War Cabinet was at once surprised and thrilled by the scale on which the Grand Alliance was planned. There was much rapid correspondence, and some difficult points arose about what Governments and authorities should sign the Declaration, and also on the order of precedence. We gladly accorded the first place to the United States. The War Cabinet very rightly did not wish to include India as a separate sovereign Power. Mr. Hull was opposed to the insertion of the word

“authorities” by which I meant to cover the Free French, at that time in disgrace with the State Department.

This was the first time I had met Mr. Cordell Hull, with whom I had several conversations. He did not seem to me to have full access at the moment to the President. I was struck by the fact that, amid gigantic events, one small The Grand Alliance

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incident seemed to dominate his mind. Before I left England General de Gaulle had informed us that he wished to liberate the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which were held by the Vichy Governor, Admiral Robert. The Free French naval forces were quite capable of doing this, and the Foreign Office saw no objection. However, as it appeared later on, the American State Department wished the occupation to be made by a Canadian expedition. We therefore asked de Gaulle to refrain, and he certainly said he would do so. Nevertheless, he ordered his Admiral Muselier to take the islands. The Free French sailors were received with enthusiasm by the people, and a plebiscite showed a ninety per cent majority against Vichy.

This made no impression on Mr. Hull. He considered that the policy of the State Department had been affronted. He issued a statement on Christmas Day, saying, “Our preliminary report shows that the action taken by the
so-called
2
Free French ships at St. Pierre and Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned, and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the United States Government.” He wanted to turn the Free French out of the islands they had liberated from Vichy. But American opinion ran hard the other way. They were delighted in this grave hour that the islands had been liberated, and that an obnoxious radio station which was spreading Vichy lies and poison throughout the world, and might well give secret signals to U-boats now hunting United States ships, should be squelched. The phrase “so-called Free French” was almost universally resented.

Mr. Hull, whose sterling qualities I recognised, and for whom I entertained the highest respect, in my opinion pushed what was little more than a departmental point far

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beyond its proportions. The President in our daily talks seemed to me to shrug his shoulders over the whole affair.

After all, quite a lot of other annoyances were on us or coming upon us. Strongly urged by our Foreign Office, I supported General de Gaulle and “so-called” Free France.

Chapters have been written about this incident in various American and French books, but it did not at all affect our main discussions.

One afternoon Mr. Knox, Secretary for the Navy, came into my room in great distress. He said: “You have had plenty of disasters. I would like you to tell me how you feel about the following. We ordered our fleet to fight a battle with the Japanese to relieve Wake Island, and now within a few hours of steaming the Admiral has decided to turn back.

What would you do with your Admiral in a case like this?” I replied: “It is dangerous to meddle with Admirals when they say they can’t do things. They have always got the weather or fuel or something to argue about.” Wake Island fell that day, having been desperately defended by a handful of United States Marines, who inflicted far heavier losses than their own numbers upon the Japanese before they were killed or captured.

Every allowance must be made for the state of mind into which the Australian Government were thrown by the hideous efficiency of the Japanese war machine. The command of the Pacific was lost; their three best divisions were in Egypt and a fourth at Singapore. They realised that Singapore was in deadly peril, and they feared an actual invasion of Australia itself. All their great cities, containing The Grand Alliance

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more than half the whole population of the continent, were on the seacoast. A mass exodus into the interior and the organising of a guerrilla without arsenals or supplies stared them in the face. Help from the Mother Country was far away, and the power of the United States could only slowly be established in Australian waters. I did not myself believe that the Japanese would invade Australia across three thousand miles of ocean, when they had so much alluring prey in their clutch in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya.

The Australian Cabinet saw the scene in a different light, and deep forebodings pressed upon them all. Even in these straits they maintained their party divisions rigidly. The Labour Government majority was only two. They were opposed to compulsory service even for Home Defence.

Although the Opposition was admitted to the War Council no National Government was formed.

I cabled to Mr. Curtin as follows:
Prime

Minister

to

25 Dec. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

On Japan coming into the war we diverted at once
the 18th British Division, which was rounding the Cape
in American transports, with President’s permission, to
Bombay and Ceylon, and Mr. Roosevelt has now
agreed that the leading [British] brigade in the United
States transport Mount Vernon should proceed direct to
Singapore. We cancelled the move of the 17th Indian
Division from India to Persia, and this division is now
going to Malaya. A week ago I wirelessed from the ship
to London to suggest that you recall one Australian
division from Palestine either into India to replace other
troops sent forward or to go direct, if it can be arranged,
to Singapore. I have impressed upon the military
authorities the importance of not using up the forces
needed for the defence of Singapore and Johore
approaches in attempting to defend the northern part of
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the Malay Peninsula. They will fall back slowly, fighting
delaying actions and destroying communications.

2. The heavy naval losses which the United States
and we have both sustained give the Japanese the
power of landing large reinforcements, but we do not
share the view expressed in your telegram to Mr. Casey
of December 24 that there is the danger of early
reduction of Singapore fortress, which we are determined to defend with the utmost tenacity.

3. You have been told of the air support which is
already on the way. It would not be wise to loose our
grip on Rommel and Libya by taking away forces from
General Auchinleck against his judgment just when
victory is within our grasp. We have instructed Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to concert a plan for
sending fighters and tanks to Singapore immediately
the situation in Libya permits.

4. I and the Chiefs of Staff are in close consultation
with the President and his advisers, and we have made
encouraging progress. Not only are they impressed
with the importance of maintaining Singapore, but they
are anxious to move a continuous flow of troops and
aircraft through Australia for the relief of the Philippine
Islands, if that be possible. Should the Philippine
Islands fall the President is agreeable to troops and
aircraft being diverted to Singapore. He is also quite
willing to send substantial United States forces to
Australia, where Americans are anxious to establish
important bases for the war against Japan. General
Wavell has been placed in command of Burma as well
as India, and instructed to feed reinforcements arriving
in India to Malayan and Burmese fronts. He, like
everyone else, recognises the paramount importance of
Singapore. General Pownall has now arrived. He is a
highly competent Army officer.

5. You may count on my doing everything possible
to strengthen the whole front from Rangoon to Port
Darwin. I am finding cooperation from our American
allies. I shall wire more definitely in a day or two.

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Simple festivities marked our Christmas. The traditional Christmas Tree was set up in the White House garden, and the President and I made brief speeches from the balcony to enormous crowds gathered in the gloom. I venture to reprint here the words that I used, as they seemed to rise so naturally in my mind on this occasion and in these surroundings.

Mr. Churchill’s Speech from the White House
Balcony, Washington, Christmas Eve, 1941

I spend this anniversary and festival far from my
country, far from my family, yet I cannot truthfully say
that I feel far from home. Whether it be the ties of blood
on my mother’s side, or the friendships I have developed here over many years of active life, or the commanding sentiment of comradeship in the common
cause of great peoples who speak the same language,
who kneel at the same altars, and, to a very large
extent, pursue the same ideals, I cannot feel myself a
stranger here in the centre and at the summit of the
United States. I feel a sense of unity and fraternal
association which, added to the kindliness of your
welcome, convinces me that I have a right to sit at your
fireside and share your Christmas joys.