The Grand Alliance (28 page)

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113,000 tons by air attack, the first round in the Battle of the Atlantic may be said to have ended in a draw.

An all-important event now impended upon the other side of the Atlantic. I was in close touch with Hopkins in these days. After thanking him for the “packet of 250,000 rifles and ammunition, which has safely arrived,” I cabled on February 28:

I am, however, increasingly anxious about the high rate of shipping losses in northwestern approaches and the shrinkage in tonnage entering Britain. This has darkened since I saw you. Let me know when the

[Lend-Lease] Bill will be through. The strain is growing here.

Presently came good tidings from the United States. The Lend-Lease Bill had passed Congress, and on March 11

received the eager assent of the President. Hopkins sent me the earliest intimation. This was at once a comfort and a spur. The stuff was coming. It was for us to get it over.

Prime

Minister

to

9 March 41

Mr. Hopkins

Thank God for your news. Strain is serious. Kindest
regards.

To

President

9 March 41

Roosevelt

from

Former

Naval

Person

Our blessings from the whole British Empire go out
to you and the American nation for this very present
help in time of trouble.

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In my broadcast of February 9 I had already said, “Give us the tools and we will finish the job.” This could only be an interim pronouncement. Far more was needed, but we did our best.

We had now to make our budget of imports for the U-boat year 1941, exactly like a Chancellor of the Exchequer in finance. By the end of March all the studies and discussions of our ways and means were completed, and I could submit to the War Cabinet my final proposals for the size and character of the three branches of the fighting services, and also the quantity and character of the imports for which we should strive.

THE IMPORT PROGRAMMES

Memorandum by the Prime Minister, March
26, 1941

We should assume an import of not less than
31,000,000 tons in 1941. On this basis food cannot be
cut lower than 15,000,000 tons, and 1,000,000 is
required for the Board of Trade. This leaves 15,000,000

for the Ministry of Supply, as against 19,000,000 to
which they were working on the 35,000,000 programme. A cut of 4,000,000 has therefore to be made
by the Ministry of Supply, for which a revised programme should be framed. Ferrous metals, timber, and
pulp seem to offer the main field of reduction. As we
can now buy steel freely in the United States, the
keeping in being of the whole of the existing steel
industry cannot be accepted as an indispensable factor.

We must try to import in the most concentrated forms
and over the shortest routes. This principle must also
influence food imports.

2. Should our total imports fall below 31,000.000,
the deficit should for the present be met by the Ministry
of Food and the Ministry of Supply on the basis of one
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ton cut in food to two tons in supply. Should the imports
exceed 31,000,000, the benefit will be shared in the
same proportion. The position will be reviewed in the
autumn, when this year’s harvest is known.

3. I have received from the War Office a reply to my
notes about Army Scales, which they have had under
consideration for three weeks.
4
My notes do not look
farther ahead than 1942, and must be subject to review
in the light of events. My figure of “about two millions”

may be interpreted as desired by the War Office at

“2,195,000 [men],” for which the arrangements are
completed. The War Office proposal to substitute for
my figure of fifteen armoured divisions twelve armoured
divisions and nine army tank brigades may be approved, and the target figure for the grand total of the
Imperial Army in March, 1942, of fifty-nine and one third

“equivalent divisions” may be accepted. The resultant
saving on manpower intake from now to the end of
1942 is about 475,000. This saving, and the increase in
armoured forces at the expense of infantry and artillery,
should afford an important relief to the Ministry of
Supply in hutments, clothing, and projectiles.

4. The Purvis Programme, which was submitted to
President Roosevelt in January to give him the general
scale, may now be more precisely defined as the
Ministry of Supply desire, and in so doing, if convenient,
the adjustment may be made to cover the change in the
proportion of armoured forces. However, it is important
that no diminution should be made in anything we need
and are likely to get from the United States; in
particular, the equipment for the ten extra divisions
should stand.

5. The Naval Programme is the subject of a
separate note,
5
but the following principles which have
a bearing on imports may be stated here.

The remaining three King George V class battleships must be completed at full speed. The construction
of Vanguard, which is the only capital ship which can
reach us in 1943 and before 1945, is most desirable.

One new monitor is also needed. No other heavy ships
can be proceeded with at present, and no more armour-

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plate can be provided for other naval purposes for the
next six months; nor should new armour-plate factories
be laid down. This position will be reviewed on September 1 in the light of (a) the Battle of the Atlantic, (b)the
relationship of the United States to the war.

The requirements of the Admiralty for armour-plate
must not exceed the 16,500 tons provided for 1941, nor
the 25,000 tons for 1942. If these limits are observed,
the Ministry of Supply should be able to execute the
increased tank programme.

6. The Ministries of Food and Agriculture should,
upon the basis of 15,000,000 tons import in 1941,
concert an eighteen months’ programme, drawing as
may be necessary upon our meat reserves on the hoof
to cover the next six months, but endeavouring to
provide by concentrated imports the most varied dietary
possible for the nation at war. By taking a period as
long as eighteen months it should be possible to avoid
hurried changes in policy, to use reserves as balancing
factors, and to make the best use of the assigned
tonnage.

7. The British air power will continue to be developed to the utmost within the above limits and with the
present priorities and assignments.

When these precise instructions received the assent of the War Cabinet they were obeyed without demur by all concerned.

From the time of the passing of the Lend-Lease Bill our relations with the United States grew steadily closer. Under our pressures we adopted a stronger attitude towards Vichy France. The recent depredations of the German battle-cruisers had shown the mischief of these powerful ships, soon to be reinforced by the
Bismarck.
There was also the fear that the Germans might gain control over the French The Grand Alliance

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Fleet and bring the fast battleship
Dunkerque
into their service.

I cabled to President Roosevelt:

Former Naval Person

2 April 41

to President Roosevelt

We have entirely trustworthy information that Vichy
Government received “permission” from Armistice
Commission to transfer the battleship Dunkerque, with
escort protection of the whole Strasbourg group, from
Oran to Toulon for “disarmament.”

2. It seems certain that object of transfer is to effect
repairs, and we must, of course, assume it is being
done on German orders.

3. I do not need to point out to you the grave danger
to which this exposes us. The menace from German
surface raiders is already great enough. The addition of
such a vessel to the raiding fleet would set us a hard
problem indeed. If any value were to be attached to
Admiral Darlan’s word, it might be hoped that he would
in the last resort order out of French metropolitan ports
naval units ready for sea. But if Dunkerque is docked
and immobilised for repairs, that gives the Germans
time to swoop and gain possession of her.

4. I fear this is a sinister confirmation of our worst
suspicions of Darlan.

5. You have already, through your Ambassador in
Vichy, indicated to the French Government that negotiations for the supply of grain to unoccupied France
would be greatly facilitated if French warships in
metropolitan ports were gradually transferred to North
African Atlantic ports. Here we have Darlan not merely
failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately
flying in the face of them.

6. I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to
Marshal Pétain that if Darlan persists in this action he
will be cutting off relief from his country and finally
forfeiting American sympathy. We ourselves in this
situation could, of course, lend no assistance to the
revictualling of France. There may be just a chance that

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Marshal Pétain may deter him from this action, but if not
the matter for us is so vital that we may, even in spite of
all the dangerous implications, have to make an effort
to intercept and sink this vessel. I should like to hear
from you that you would understand the necessity for
such a step.